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This thesis investigates how Chinese decision-makers d al with the complexities of EU 
foreign-policy making. Which of the many entities within in the EU, among Brussels-based 
institutions and in member states, do they approach and how? How can the modalities of 
engagement be explained? What patterns emerge and how and why do they change over time? 
In answering these questions, the thesis provides insights on three under-researched issues of 
international relations: first, on how outsiders engage with the EU and whether the EU is 
capable of managing requests from the outside; second, on how China makes its EU policy, 
and, by extension, to what extent its decision-making structure can deal with complex 
foreign-policy challenges; third, and more generally, on how international actors interact 
through numerous contacts among the bureaucratic agents within them. To reach these goals, 
a new analytical framework is introduced that distinguishes three processes to explain such 
transnational bureaucratic interaction. First, the decision-making in China on how to engage 
the EU. Second, the reception this approach receives on the EU side. These first two 
processes are analysed as based on the interplay of organisational logic, bureaucratic politics, 
and the degree of central control. Third, there are ind pendent dynamics of direct interaction 
between bureaucratic entities, which result from the quality of personal relations and the 
matches or mismatches in preferences, worldviews, and perceptions. Two intensive case 
studies are performed, one on China’s efforts to be recognised as a market economy by the 
EU, and another on the Chinese push to have the EU lift its arms embargo against China. The 
thesis proposes a threefold argument. First, due to complex formal rules and volatile informal 
patterns of EU foreign policy, the EU remains difficult to approach for third actors and is 
incapable of managing requests from the outside. Second, engaging a complex counterpart 
like the EU puts strain on the foreign-policy process. Chinese policy making suffers from 
strong horizontal divisions which prevent the distribution of expertise and hinder the 
formation of elaborate strategies for approaching the EU. Lastly, in order to explain the 
modalities of interaction between different actors in international affairs, it is crucial to look 





































As most research endeavours this thesis has benefited from the support of many persons 
and institutions. First of all, I would like to thank Prof. Pascal Vennesson for his excellent 
guidance over the last four years. He has been a dem nding supervisor, constantly pushing to 
move on, yet always ready to engage seriously with new ideas and doubts about the work, and 
encouraging the natural development of the research project as I envisaged it. 
At the European University Institute (EUI), I am also indebted to Prof. Marise Cremona 
of the Law Department, the second reader of my thesis. She commented on my research at 
various stages of the project and provided detailed fe back in the final phase. Her advice 
with regard to some of the legal intricacies of EU foreign policies was particularly valuable. 
In addition to Prof. Vennesson and Prof. Cremona, I would like to express my gratitude 
to the two professors who kindly agreed to serve as xternal members of the thesis jury, Prof. 
Xiang Lanxin of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, 
and Prof. Christopher Hughes of the London School of Ec nomics and Political Science. All 
jury members provided rich comment and criticism on the thesis that will be valuable in the 
further elaboration of my argument. 
Many other academics, at EUI and in other universiti s, facilitated my research by 
offering feedback on particular aspects of the thesis, and I am very grateful for their remarks. 
There are too many of them to list them all. But I would like to mention Prof. Zhang Qingmin 
of Beijing University, Prof. Emil Kirchner of the University of Essex, Prof. François 
Godement of SciencesPo in Paris and Prof. Loi Phan of the University of Paris who were 
particularly generous with their time and advice. 
Most importantly, I am deeply indebted to the almost 60 interviewees who allowed me 
to get first-hand information about China-EU relations and related policy processes. They 
include officials, from Chinese and European governme t bodies as well as EU institutions, 
and policy-consultants from think-tanks and academia in China and Europe. As they were all 
guaranteed anonymity, I cannot list their names here but I would like to express my deep 
gratitude for their availability and confidence. Without them the research would not have been 
possible. 
Two institutions in China hosted me during two of my research trips, and I would like to 
thank their staff for their friendly welcome, the stimulating academic environment and the 
organisational support for my empirical research. At the end of my first year in the doctoral 
 
 vi
programme I spent two months at the School of Advanced International and Area Studies 
(SAIAS) of East China Normal University (ECNU), upon invitation by their director, Prof. 
Feng Shaolei. This stay allowed me to conduct a number of preliminary interviews and to get 
familiar with some Chinese writings on China-EU relations. Between the second and third 
year, I performed the bulk of my empirical work as a visiting student at Institute of European 
Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). This had been made possible by 
Prof. Zhou Hong, director of the institute. 
Funding for this research has come from the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst 
(DAAD) and from the Centro di Alti Studi sulla Cina Contemporanea (CASCC) in Turin. 
Research missions have been funded by EUI. 
Maureen Lechleithner at the Department of Social and Political Sciences of EUI has 
steered me through the final phase of the PhD with great professionalism and reliability. I am 
very grateful for her help. 
Throughout the doctoral programme much precious input has come from colleagues at 
EUI, in particular during workshops and colloquiums of the supervisees of Prof. Vennesson, 
as well as from my Chinese colleagues at ECNU and CASS. I am full of gratitude for their 
critical and constructive comments. They were crucial for the development of the analytical 
framework and for keeping the research focused. Outside the academic sphere I would like to 
thank my friends in Europe, China and elsewhere for all the stimulating discussions about 
non-thesis-related topics, the many happy moments, the shelter they offered during research 
trips, etc. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, brother, and sister-in-law who have closely 
followed my work during the entire doctorate and helped me in many ways. My parents felt 
with me through all the ups and downs of the research p ocess, sometimes more intensively 



































































Introduction: Who is the European Union for China?.................................................... 1 
0.1 An Outsider’s Perspective on the EU ................................................................ 1 
0.2 Chinese Approaches of the EU.......................................................................... 2 
0.3 The Analytical Framework ................................................................................. 3 
0.4 Relevance and Argument................................................................................... 5 
0.5 The Structure of the Research ........................................................................... 7 
0.6 Methodological Considerations.......................................................................... 9 
0.7 Conclusion......................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter I. Foreign Policy Making and Interactive Dynamics – Towards a New 
Analytical Framework..................................................................................15 
1.1 Existing Approaches to Bureaucratic Interaction and Their Limits .................... 15 
1.1.1 Foreign-Policy Analysis .............................................................................. 16 
1.1.2 Strategic Choice..................................................................................... 18 
1.1.3 Two-Level Games ................................................................................. 20 
1.1.4 Literature on Transnational Relations ....................................................21 
1.2 Outlining a New Approach................................................................................ 24 
1.2.1 International Actors versus Bureaucratic Agents ............................................. 25 
(i) A General Definition of International Actorness.............................................. 26 
(ii) Many Actors, Different Roles.................................................................. 27 
(iii) Sub-Units as Bureaucratic Agents ..........................................................29 
1.2.2 Explaining Modes of Engagement and Their Reception.................................. 30 
(i) Organisational Logic and Bureaucratic Politics ...... ........................................ 31 
(ii) The Degree of Central Control .................................................................... 32 
1.2.3 Direct Relations Between Bureaucratic Entities............................................... 35 
(i) Preferences, Worldviews and Personal Relations ........ ................................... 35 
(ii) The Role of Perceptions......................................................................... 37 
1.3 Conclusion......................................................................................................... 42 
Chapter II.  Fitting China and the EU Into the Framework .......................................... 45 
2.1 The Chinese Foreign-Policy Process............................................................... 45 
2.1.1 Studying Chinese Foreign-Policy Making – But No Towards the EU ........... 47 
2.1.2 The Basic Policy-Making Structures in China ................................................. 48 
(i) Intertwined Systems..................................................................................... 49 
(ii) The Party as the Backbone .......................................................................... 50 
(iii) State Organs and Their Connection to the Party .............................................. 55 
(iv) The Military Hierarchies.......................................................................... 58 
2.1.3 The Bureaucratic Agents of China’s Foreign Policy........................................ 62 
(i) The Central Leadership.......................................................................... 62 
(ii) Intermediate Bodies: Coordination or Policy-Making?.................................... 66 
(iii) The Central Bureaucracies..................................................................... 70 
 
 x
2.1.4 Analysing China’s Foreign Policy Process....... ........................................... 72 
(i) The Organisational Logic in Chinese Foreign-Policy Making......................... 73 
(ii) Bureaucratic Politics: Fragmentation and Bargaining...................................... 76 
(iii) The Role of Central Control ........................................................................ 78 
2.1.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 81 
2.2 The Foreign-Policy Process in the EU............................................................. 82 
2.2.1 Studying EU Foreign Policies – But Not From the Perspective of Outsiders .. 83 
2.2.2 Grasping a Complex International Organisation.............................................. 85 
(i) The Origins and Evolution of the EU..........................................................86 
(ii) The EU as an International Actor .................................................................90 
(iii) The Main Bureaucratic Agents of the EU ................................................... 92 
2.2.3 The Institutional Structures of EU Foreign Policy ........................................... 96 
(i) Foreign Policies in the First Pillar: Supposedly Technical............................... 97 
(ii) The Second Pillar: How High the Politics? ................................................. 99 
2.2.4 Analysing the EU Foreign Policy Process....... ......................................... 104 
(i) The Organisational Logic in the EU............................................................... 104 
(ii) Bureaucratic Bargaining in EU Foreign Policy..... ....................................... 106 
(iii) The Logic of Central Control ................................................................ 112 
2.2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 112 
2.3 Independent Dynamics of Direct Interaction Between China and the EU ......... 114 
2.3.1 Transnational Bureaucratic Interaction: Grounded in Recent History ........... 114 
2.3.2 The Role of Perceptions...................................................................... 116 
2.3.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 117 
2.4 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 118 
Chapter III.  China-EU Relations From the Cold War to Present............................... 123 
3.1 Sino-European Relations – a Historical Overview................................................ 123 
3.1.1 Cold War – Slow Contacts Between Western Europe and “Red China” ....... 123 
3.1.2 1989 to mid-1990s – the End of the Age of Innocence and a Normalising 
Relationship ............................................................................................... 124 
3.1.3 Mid-1990s to 2002 – Into the Honeymoon ............................................. 127 
3.1.4 2002 to Present – Learning to Live with Each Ot er ..................................... 130 
3.2 Reflections of Contemporary China-EU Relations in the Literature.................. 131 
3.2.1 China-EU Relations: Who is the EU for China? ....... .................................... 133 
3.2.2 Sino-European Relations in General ..............................................................137 
3.2.3 Member States in Sino-European Relations ........ ...................................... 139 
3.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 142 
Chapter IV.  Trade Matters – China’s Quest for Official Recognition as a Market 
Economy by the EU .....................................................................................145 
4.1 The Significance of Market Economy Status for China ....................................... 145 
4.1.1 The Symbolic Dimension .................................................................... 145 
4.1.2 MES and Expected Commercial Benefits ...................................................... 147 
(i) The WTO and Non-Market Economies.................................................... 147 
(ii) MES in China’s WTO Membership .......................................................... 149 
(iii) The EU Approach to MES.....................................................................151 
4.2 The Evolution of the Issue .............................................................................. 152 
4.2.1 Before WTO Accession – MES as One Issue Among Many ......................... 152 
 xi
4.2.2 After Accession – MES as a Main Item on China-EU Agenda...................... 153 
(i) A Technical Issue Between Technical Bureaucracies .................................... 154 
(ii) MES Travels to the Top........................................................................ 154 
(iii) Disenchantment – MES Moves Down the Agenda ........................................ 156 
4.3 Explaining China-EU Interaction on MES............................................................157 
4.3.1 Chinese Foreign-Policy Making and MES.............................................. 157 
4.3.2 EU Reactions to Chinese Approach on MES ........ ................................... 160 
4.3.3 Independent Dynamics of Bureaucratic Interaction ....................................... 162 
4.4 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 164 
Chapter V. Trading for Security? China’s Efforts to Get the EU’s Arms Embargo 
Lifted..................................................................................................... 167 
5.1 Why Does the EU’s Arms Embargo Matter for China?....................................... 167 
5.1.1 The Arms Embargo and the Issue of “Face” .................................................. 167 
5.1.2 Military Dimensions ............................................................................. 169 
5.2 The Evolution of the AE as an Issue in China-EU Relations ............................... 171 
5.2.1 The Jiang Zemin Years – “Don’t Mention the Embargo”.............................. 171 
(i) The Origins – One of Several Restrictive Measure ...................................... 171 
(ii) But the Only One Left ............................................................................... 172 
(iii) An Unusual Restrictive Measure .............................................................174 
5.2.2 2002 to 2005 – Pushing for a Lifting......................................................177 
(i) Targeting France.................................................................................. 177 
(ii) A Broader Approach............................................................................. 178 
(iii) An Intra-EU Process of Convergence....................................................... 182 
(iv) China Focuses on Member States...........................................................185 
(v) A Dissenting Voice of America................................................................188 
5.3 Explaining China-EU Interaction on the Arms Embargo Issue.......................... 192 
5.3.1 Chinese Foreign-Policy Making and the Arms Embargo............................... 193 
5.3.2 EU Reactions to China’s Push for a Lifting ...... .......................................... 195 
5.3.3 Independent Dynamics of Bureaucratic Interaction ....................................... 196 
5.4 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 198 
Conclusion: Explaining China-EU Bureaucratic Interaction.......................................... 199 
6.1 Engaging the EU: Challenges for Outsiders .........................................................199 
(i) Evidence from MES: Wrong Timing and Victim to Intra-EU Competition .. 200 
(ii) Evidence from the Arms Embargo: Erratic Targeting of EU Bureaucratic 
Agents ........................................................................................................ 200 
6.2 China’s Foreign Policy Apparatus and Complex Policy Targets ........................ 201 
6.3 Analysing Bureaucratic Interaction: Assessment of a New Framework ............ 203 
Annex: Description of empirical data.......................................................................... 205 

































Introduction: Who is the European Union for China? 
 
 
0.1 An Outsider’s Perspective on the EU 
 
In the half century since its inception European integration has not only profoundly 
transformed international relations among the state participating in it, but has had a growing 
impact on the world at large: as a guarantor of stability in a continent that had been at the 
heart of two world wars; as a trading bloc vis-à-vis the rest of the world; as a major aid donor; 
as a promoter of democracy, human rights, regional integration, etc. Over time, the states 
involved in this regional integration project have d veloped an increasingly integrated agenda 
in global affairs, and, more recently, a consolidating common approach to strategic and 
security matters. Nowadays, states and organisations on the outside have to engage with the 
European Union (EU) on many key issues of current world affairs. Yet the problem is: engage 
with whom and how? The large roof of the EU shelters a multitude of administrative entities, 
both at union and at member state level, which are involved in shaping the common foreign 
policies. Competence for handling external relations is distributed among them according to 
policy field, and decision-making is based on complicated procedures. Intersecting with this 
formal structure, there are informal patterns of cooperation, coordination or competition based 
on the specific interests and/or habits of these actors. 
This means that while the EU has become an important partner for others in 
international affairs, and a more and more integrated body, it has remained a hydra with many 
heads and no clear rule for the outsider which of them to talk to. Although, rhetorically the 
EU may appear as a single entity and relations withit as simple bilateral ones, in reality third 
states and organisations have to engage with a multitude of European decision-making units, 
an exercise of complex, multilateral diplomacy. How then do outsiders engage with the EU, 
and how can the modalities of engagement be explained? What patterns emerge and how and 
why do they change over time? How do administrative entities within the EU react to requests 
from the outside? What does this imply for the EU and its capacity to manage its external 




0.2 Chinese Approaches of the EU 
 
In principle, to answer these questions concerning outsiders’ engagement with the EU 
one can look at any third actor – states, internatio l organisations or maybe even NGOs. I 
propose an in-depth analysis of Chinese foreign policy towards the EU. Why China? It 
presents a number of advantages, although some other candidates may present more intensive 
and deeper ties with the EU. First of all, as a major player in international affairs, China can 
be expected to have enough leverage over the EU to balance EU influence on China. This is 
not the case for many smaller countries, in particular in the direct neighbourhood of the EU, 
whose policy towards the EU may be dominated by the EU itself, especially when there is 
economic dependency and the possibility to use conditi ality.1 
Second, over the past two decades, China-EU relations have strengthened considerably 
In this context, China has also made enormous efforts at improving its understanding of the 
EU’s inner workings, e.g. by separating its mission t  the EU from its embassy to Belgium in 
2005, thereby nearly doubling its total staff in Brussels and committing almost two-thirds of it 
to the EU.2 This means that China is a strong test for difficult es in engaging the EU. 
Third, China has only recently become an active player on the international stage. 
Certainly, China has been a factor in global power politics since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and for a number of reasons: its sheer size, its role 
in the Korean War, the build-up of a nuclear capability, and later the shift of China’s 
permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) from Taibei to Beijing. Yet 
it was only after the beginning of its reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s that 
China toned down its criticism of the existing inter ational order and its calls to change it, and 
started to step up progressively its participation in international institutions.3 This change in 
Chinese foreign policy has happened more or less in parallel with the latest push in European 
integration, including in particular efforts to enhance and formalise an integrated approach to 
foreign policy. As a result Chinese foreign-policy makers, in their relations with the EU, are, 
a priori, more likely to take an integrated EU in international affairs for granted and less 
likely to be biased towards relations with individual member states instead of common EU 
                                                
1 See Kelley 2004 on the impact of EU membership conditionality on relations with various states of theformer 
Soviet bloc. 
2 Interview China 11, Brussels Q1 2008; according to the interviewee, since its establishment the mission has a 
staff of about 80, while the embassy to Belgium has only about 30-40; prior to 2005 the embassy’s total staff 
was at about 70 covering China’s relations with both Belgium and the EU. 
3 See on this Johnston 2003a and Johnston 2008, pp. 32-39. Johnston 2003c as well as Johnston 2008 analyse the 
socialisation of Chinese foreign-policy makers in international institutions. 
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institutions than officials of other states who have been used for a long time to dealing 
intensively, and almost exclusively, with member states on all major foreign policy issues. In 
fact, in the early 1970s, when Kissinger allegedly complained that he didn’t know who to call 
to talk to Europe,4 Chairman Mao could hardly call anyone, not even in the member states, 
given that most of them established diplomatic relations with the People’ s Republic of China 
(PRC) only in the course of the 1970s.5 
Yet Chinese foreign policy towards the EU is also interesting per se, and not only as a 
good illustration of outsiders’ approach towards the EU. Policy making in Beijing involves 
many different bureaucratic agents, follows complex procedures and is often guided by 
obscure vested interests.6 Ironically this may recall somewhat the EU bureaucr cy in Brussels. 
At the same time, China has been the fastest rising power in the world, and its improving 
relations with the EU may be considered of crucial importance at a global scale, in particular 
against the backdrop of a debate about a more multipolar world – as is visible in the debate on 
new geometries in international relations triggered by strengthening China-EU ties.7 This 
leads to additional questions for this research: How d es the Chinese foreign-policy process 
determine the modalities of China’s engagement of the EU? To what extend can it adjust to 
feedback? What is the connection between the mode of engaging the EU and China’s capacity 
to reach specific foreign policy goals? Are Chinese for ign-policy makers up to the challenge 
of managing interactions with a complex actor like th EU? What does this imply in general 
for China’s capacity to pursue complex multilateral diplomacy and pursue foreign-policy 
goals in such a setting? 
 
0.3 The Analytical Framework 
 
In order to analyse China’s engagement with the EU it is useful to distinguish three 
explanatory dimensions, each matching a different dynamic process. First, the Chinese 
foreign-policy process determines how China designs ts policies towards the EU. As specific 
policy goals emerge for relations with the EU, Chinese decision makers decide the modes of 
interaction by which to pursue them. Given the intricacies of European integration there is 
                                                
4 Rodman 1999. 
5 For a time line of countries recognising the PRC, see Garver 1993, p.82; Liu 2001, chaps. 1, 3, 5, discusses the 
new diplomatic relations in the context of the overall evolution of China’s foreign policy. 
6 The most comprehensive books on this are Lieberthal and Lampton (eds.) 1992, Hamrin and Zhao (eds.) 1995, 
Lu 1997, and Lampton (ed.) 2001. 
7 See Shambaugh 2004 and 2005; Xiang 2004 and 2006. 
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great variety of options. Chinese officials may choose to engage a single public unit in the EU 
or a selected few of them, or alternatively approach  multitude of EU entities. When it is 
more than one, contact may occur in parallel or in sequence, with a focus on the EU level or 
on individual member states, or including both. And fi ally the differentiated definition of the 
usual parameters of international bargaining for each European counterpart presents a nearly 
endless number of alternatives: when to resort to unilateral incentives or threats, i.e. “carrots 
and sticks,” with regard to whom to use side-payments a d in which international bargaining 
venues, like e.g. the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to what 
extent to target private actors, in particular influential interest groups, etc. 
Second, the EU’s foreign-policy process matters, as this initial approach by China is 
conditioned by the response it receives from the EU. This kind of “feedback” depends on how 
well the initial policy, or “stimulus”, matched formal and informal patterns within the EU. 
The intra-European reaction processes may substantially alter the modalities of interaction, 
depending on a number of points: To what extent did the initial approach correspond to the 
formal distribution of competences among institutions, and the formal procedures linking 
them? Did it match informal habits of cooperation ad coordination and patterns of 
competition? Did it correctly anticipate the interests of concerned public and private entities 
and the resulting ad-hoc groupings and coalitions? 
Third, there is a truly relational, or interdependet, dimension in the direct interaction of 
Chinese bureaucratic agents and their EU counterpars. The interaction between two players 
on the international stage cannot be sufficiently described as an interplay of actions and 
reactions between two closed systems. In fact, the history and quality of direct 
“transgovernmental” relations between administrative units,8 or individuals, outside and 
inside the EU has a strong impact on the mode of interaction with regard to new issues. At the 
same time it may matter a great deal whether the preferences on and perceptions of the issue 
(e.g. substantial versus symbolic) and the perceptions of each other coincide or not. 
Taken together, these three intertwined processes go a long way in explaining the 
modalities of China’s engagement of the EU. Indirectly all three of them are influenced by the 
larger international environment in which the relation takes shape. Other states or 
organisations may influence issues substantially or symbolically, or provide fora of 
interaction or opportunities to exercise pressure, p ovide side-payments, etc. Yet the direct 
                                                
8 Keohane and Nye 1974. 
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explanatory factors are contained in this three-dimensional framework, which, it should be 
emphasised, is sensitive to change over time and in particular learning effects. 
This points also to a larger theoretical issue: more generally, what are the modalities of 
interaction between two international actors, and how can they be explained? What are the 
roles played by processes within the respective political and administrative hierarchies? What 
is the impact of direct interactive dynamics? 
 
0.4 Relevance and Argument 
 
This thesis covers completely new terrain. No comparable efforts have been made so 
far, neither in the literature on EU foreign policies, nor in research on Chinese foreign policy, 
nor in the writings on China-EU relations. From the point of view of EU foreign policies, 
there has been a fair amount of research on the difficulties of foreign policy making in the 
EU, most notably related to issues of consistency or coherence.9 Yet the aim of this thesis is, 
in a way, to invert the approach of the literature on consistency: it is not about how difficult it 
is within the EU to make policies towards the outside but rather about how outsiders deal with 
these difficulties. With regard to literature on Chinese foreign policy, previous research has 
created a good understanding of the, often tortuous, paths of foreign-policy making in 
China.10 Yet so far, it has not been studied how this impacts China’s interaction with other 
major actors in international affairs and its ability to reach certain foreign policy goals 
towards them. Lastly, the literature on China-EU relations, scarce when compared to writings 
on China-US ties, has covered quite some ground in exploring interests and policy goals as 
well as, to some extent, mutual perceptions.11 But no efforts have been made thus far at 
explaining the modalities of interaction. 
From a theoretical point of view, I am also exploring a topic that has been under-
researched hitherto. Progress in the understanding of foreign-policy making has been made 
mostly during the 1960s and 1970s,12 with interest in the issue resurging more recently.13 Yet 
this literature has not taken the step of exploring the interactions between two administrative 
                                                
9 See in particular Nuttall 2000 and 2005, Michael E. Smith 2001b, Keukeleire 2003, Missiroli 2002. 
10 See in particular Yang 1995, Lu 1997, and Lampton (ed.) 2001. 
11 See Edmonds (ed.) 2002, Crossick and Reuter (eds.) 2007, Kerr and Liu 2007, Shambaugh, Sandschneider, 
and Zhou (eds.) 2008, Zhou and Wu (eds.) 2004; on perce tions see Friedrich 2000, Shambaugh 2008 and Zhu 
2008. 
12 See most notably, Frankel 1963, Allison 1969, Rosenau 1971 and 1974. 
13 See for example Charillon 2002. 
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structures. Other approaches appear relevant at first s ght because they take interaction 
seriously, but they cannot explain the various modalities of interaction: the two-level games 
model concentrates on the negotiation situation;14 the strategic-choice approach is too fixated 
on formal rational choice assumptions.15 The few exceptions that deal explicitly with the 
transnational links between decision-making entities of different administrations are limited in 
scope in that they only consider specific types of uch interaction.16 
My argument is threefold. First, I argue that the EU remains a complex partner for 
outsiders. Even with a high degree of familiarity with institutional features and interest 
structures, as in the case of China, it is virtually impossible for a third state to deal with the 
many entities inside the EU in an efficient and consistent manner. A certain degree of 
familiarity with institutional features and interest tructures may help a third actor, under 
favourable circumstances, to turn this complexity to its own advantage, e.g. by using 
competing interests among EU member states. Yet this does not go beyond tactical tricks. 
Beyond the basic institutional structure and certain fundamental, and well-known, interests of 
various EU actors, the degree of intricacy is such that it is virtually impossible for third actors 
to develop sustainable strategies on how to approach the EU. Conversely, this also means that 
the EU is not capable of managing requests and expectations from the outside efficiently. 
Since there are no consistent patterns of dealing wth such stimuli, intra-EU politics get in the 
way of a common approach to external relations, with the risk of alienating third actors.  
The second part of my argument concerns Chinese forign-policy making. The 
difficulties of engaging an entity like the EU reveal a general weakness of the Chinese 
foreign-policy structure in dealing with complex challenges. The decision-making process is 
too fragmented to allow for a thorough pooling of all relevant expertise ahead of a decision on 
how to approach third actors. Similarly, it is slow to internalise feedback. The reasons are two 
types of divisions: first, horizontal layering, espcially on non-technical issues of traditional 
“high politics,” means the distance is too great betwe n the working level, i.e. the experts, and 
the top leadership, where final decisions are made; second, vertical divisions among different 
administrative entities entail that approaches may change or become inconsistent when more 
than one of them is involved in handling the relations with a specific third actor. This 
compromises China’s capacity to reach foreign policy goals, especially in complex 
multilateral contexts. 
                                                
14 See Putnam 1988 and Evans, Jacobson and Putnam (eds.) 1993. 
15 The strategic-choice approach is developed in Lake and Powell (eds.) 1999. 
16 On transgovernmental relations, see Keohane and Nye 1971, 1974 and 1977; on transnational governmental 
networks, see Slaughter 2004. 
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Lastly, at a more theoretical level, I argue that to analyse and explain the modalities of 
interaction between any two international actors on a certain issue, the analytical framework 
developed in this thesis can be used. Aside from the obvious reference to the decision-making 
processes on both sides, direct transnational relations between bureaucratic entities, or 
transgovernmental relations, are crucial. In general, personal relations between officials on 
both sides play a crucial role in determining modalities of interaction. Otherwise, when a new 
issue comes up, past experiences are a key factor. As an issue evolves, the match or mismatch 
of preferences and perceptions becomes more and more i portant. 
Lastly, aside from contributing to three different bodies of literature within the field of 
international relations, this study has a more general aim: improving the state of our 
knowledge on China-EU relations. This, together with a better understanding of the respective 
decision making processes may, so it is hoped, help policy makers on both sides to improve 
the quality of their cooperation. 
 
0.5 The Structure of the Research 
 
This research is not a comprehensive, historical narrative of relations between China and 
the EU. Rather it will develop the arguments outlined above based on selected case studies 
within the larger context of their interaction. Also it is not concerned with contacts between 
China and individual EU member states per se. Instead the focus is on relations within the 
widening array of policy fields that EU member states are trying to manage jointly. Member 
states will only be studied when their actions affect overall China-EU relations. 
The cases are selected to cover two crucial dimensions of China-EU relations, namely 
international trade and security. It is important to include cases from both fields as, in the EU 
as well as in China, the respective decision making patterns are very different and can provide 
distinct insights about the management of their interaction. The two cases studied in this 
research are, first, in the trade policy field, China’s quest for recognition as a market economy 
by the EU, and, second, in the realm of internationl security, the Chinese initiative to 
convince the EU to lift the arms embargo that had been imposed in the aftermath of the 
violent repression of popular demonstrations in China in 1989. 
The period covered by the research corresponds approximately to the first Chinese 
administration under the fourth leadership generation, i.e. from the 16th congress of the 
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Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2002, when the new top ranks of the party were put 
under the leadership of Hu Jintao, to the 17th in 2007. Current China-EU relations have 
experienced continuous development since the early 1990s, and ideally this whole period 
should have been included in this study through sequences of case studies in the two policy 
fields. Yet this has not been possible for several re sons. First and foremost, as archives are 
not accessible, the research is necessarily based mainly on interviews with decision-makers. 
In this connection the chronically short memory of of icials is a significant problem. In 
addition, due to the usual personnel rotations of all administrative entities it is hard to go back 
further than roughly five years, as systematically tracing back former holders of specific 
positions is close to impossible. This means that, given the life cycle of this project, anything 
before the year 2000 had to be excluded. Unfortunately this implied also the elimination of 
the interesting case of bilateral negotiations ahead of China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Second, this project requires ca es in which China is developing and 
pursuing clear goals in its relations with the EU. However, an active stance in international 
diplomacy on the part of China is a relatively recent phenomenon. Otherwise, it is much 
easier to find instances of reactive policy-making, e.g. reacting to outside requests on 
implementation of WTO agreements, respect for non-pr liferation norms, questions of 
governance in Africa, human rights in China, etc.17 
Aside from being dictated by considerations concerning empirical research, the choice 
of the period between the 16th and the 17th party congresses has another advantage. It keeps 
policy-making structures fairly stable on the Chinese side, where leadership transitions are 
rare (at most every 10 years18) and bear a risk of uncertainty and disruption. On the EU side, 
by contrast, where changes in top personnel are a common feature with which outsiders have 
to deal regularly, it does include the transition from the Prodi to the Barroso Commission in 
2004. 
For the case studies the main source of empirical dat are interviews with policy makers 
and policy consultants in China and Europe, altogether 18 one the Chinese side and 39 on the 
EU side. I conducted interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, Berlin, Brussels, London and Paris on 
various occasions between August 2006 and December 2008. All interviewees were promised 
anonymity; therefore interviews are codified. What will be quoted is: a) whether the 
interviewee participates in the Chinese or the EU policy-making process (“China” or “EU”); 
                                                
17 This view was confirmed by a Chinese interviewee; Interview 5 China, Q2 2007. 
18 Since the beginning of reform and opening up age limits and term limits for officials have been progressively 
introduced and enforced. The Constitution of 1982, currently in force, sets a limit of at most two five-year terms 
for both the president and the premier; Constitution 1982, arts.79 and 87. 
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b) a number that identifies a particular interview; c) the location (city) and period (quarter and 
year) of the interview. Annex 1 contains an overview of the positions and affiliations of the 
interviewees. 
Aside from interviews, Western media as well as Chinese news sources in English have 
been used to establish the “skeleton” of the narrative, like dates and topics of diplomatic 
visits. Lastly, both Western and Chinese publications n China-EU relations help the analysis, 
in particular insofar as perceptions of issues or of the respective counterparts are concerned. 
 
0.6 Methodological Considerations 
 
The case studies will follow the basic logic of Alexander L. George and Andrew 
Bennett’s “structured, focussed comparison” in that t ey are based on “general questions that 
reflect the research objective […] asked to each case under study […] making systematic 
comparison and cumulation of the findings […] possible” and deal “only with certain aspects 
of the historical cases examined.”19 For the sake of comparison and cumulation George and 
Bennett emphasise the need to “identify the universe – that is, the class or subclass of events – 
of which a single case or a group of cases to be studied are instances.”20 The cases studied for 
the present research are all specific instances of Chinese interactions with the EU. These latter 
are a subclass of two larger groups: one that includes all interactions of outsiders with the EU, 
another that covers all interactions of China with o er main actors of international relations, 
i.e. states and international organisations. These two groups in turn are both part of the 
universe of all interactions among such actors. 
After placing the cases under study so neatly into a larger order, I should add a 
cautionary note. It has been argued that cases are larg ly constructed by the researcher; that 
they are not to be found by simple observation as part of a pre-existing universe of similar 
phenomena.21 In fact, to a large extent “cases are ‘made’ by invoking theories, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, for justification or illustration, in advance of the research process or as 
its result,”22 and “[t]he universe is inferred from the case.”23 This does not mean that it is not 
useful to classify cases, which can help to point to other potential objects of research along 
                                                
19 George and Bennett 2005, p.67. 
20 George and Bennett 2005, p.69. 
21 Ragin 1992, pp.4 and 7. 
22 Walton 1992, p.121. 
23 Walton 1992, p.126. 
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similar lines, possibly even in a comparative perspctive. But one needs to be aware that 
“general questions” and “theories” may work very differently when put in a different context, 
and cases that appear comparable at first sight make take very different shapes. 
Although the cases under study belong to the universe of all interactions among 
international actors, it is important to stress that the analysis does not target states or 
international organisations as unitary actors but rather the level below them. From a 
conceptual point of view, this research concentrates on the interaction between the various 
entities in the administrative structures of different international actors. I will refer to this as 
transnational bureaucratic interaction. In this, the word “bureaucratic” is used only to 
emphasise the focus below international actors, on administrations or bureaucracies, and does 
not imply any type of judgement or interpretation. 
Accordingly, the units of analysis are individual decision-making units, which I will 
term “bureaucratic agents.” They may include, for example, ministries of involved states, 
Directorate-Generals of EU institutions, as well assmaller units, like departments, 
directorates, etc. or even individuals in influential positions, whenever they play a meaningful 
and traceable role in the decision-making process. The emphasis here is on meaningful and 
traceable. In the case of the EU, the attempt to dec mpose systematically bureaucratic entities 
into smaller units, as long as they have some potential significance in relations with China, 
would not only lead to a confusing number of actors, it would also result in insuperable 
problems for empirical work. Therefore the degree of detail will depend, on the one hand, on 
the requirements resulting from the concrete interpretative context, on the other hand, on the 
limits imposed by the constraints of empirical research. 
How will the cases be studied? Most methodological literature distinguishes between 
nomothetic and ideographic case studies, of which the former seek to apply or develop 
general laws that are valid across time and space while the latter follow a narrative, case-
specific approach.24 On the continuum between these two ideal-types, appro ches close to the 
nomothetic ideal type are not practicable for the purposes of this research. First, since the 
modalities of engagement between the administrations of different international agents have 
hardly been theorised so far, there is no theory from which to start deriving testable 
hypotheses that could be verified empirically, or falsified in the Popperian sense,25 or that 
would allow for the comparison of “observable implications” of theory with empirical 
                                                
24 The dichotomy is discussed explicitly in Elman and Elman 2001, p.13; for other typologies see for example 
George and Bennett 2001 and 2005, Hall 2006, or als Abbott 1992. 
25 See Popper 1935 and 1999. 
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observations.26 Second, a thorough explanation of the concrete modalities of China’s 
interaction with the EU, or any other set of interactions between international actors, cannot 
be based on any single general theory. At best sucha multifaceted problem would require a 
large group of theories – which would defeat the entir  purpose of deductive method. 
The problem is that while literature on methods for s cial sciences often lists many 
different kinds of case studies, usually only methods for the nomothetic type are discussed in 
any depth.27 Therefore I propose a new approach that is somewher  alfway between 
nomothetic and ideographic ideal types.28 I introduce a general analytical framework that 
identifies several dimensions of analysis and proposes a number of theoretical tools for each 
of them.29 From this framework it is not possible to derive testable hypotheses or precise 
predictions since its different elements allow for far too many possible combinations. Yet it 
does allow me to organise the analytical account, to state assumptions explicitly that would be 
implicit in a pure narrative, and to avoid too “thick” a description.30 The theories it refers to 
serve mainly heuristic purposes in an otherwise hermeneutic undertaking aimed at 
understanding in the Weberian sense. 
This approach allows for a coherent tracing of the rel vant processes over time and the 
identification of turning points, a kind of process-tracing somewhere close to what George 
and Bennett call a detailed narrative,31 yet more selective as a result of the framework. At the 
same time, it also maintains a certain flexibility, .e. it is be possible to fit in factors of which 
the importance only emerges in the course of the cas analysis. This reduces the probability of 
leaving out any crucial factors simply because one is wearing the wrong “analytical glasses”. 
Lastly, the new approach also facilitates comparison and cumulation in the sense of George 
and Bennett.32 
 
                                                
26 King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p.46. 
27 See, for example, George and Bennett 2001 and 2005, chaps. 4 and 6, as well as Hall 2006. 
28 Amenta 1991 elaborates an approach that would also fit in somewhere between the nomothetic and 
ideographic extremes. It is based on elaborating ideal-types from competing theories which are then compared 
with empirical observations. In the present case it is the lack of existing theories that makes this approach 
difficult to apply. 
29 This framework has been introduced in section 1.3 above and will discussed in further detail in chapter II. 
30 This use of the general theoretical framework may recall the concept of a “paradigm” in Robert K. Merton’s 
definition, of which the function is to set out “central concepts and their interrelations” and to avoid “importing 
hidden assumptions and concepts”; Merton 1968, pp.12-14. 
31 George and Bennett 2005, pp.210-212. 
32 In George and Bennett’s typology the approach proposed here would probably be closest to “heuristic case 





This introduction has outlined the basic problématique underlying this research, i.e. 
analysing and explaining the modalities of China’s engagement the EU, and the question it 
seeks to answer, on how outsiders deal with the EU, on how Chinese foreign-policy makers 
manage complex diplomatic challenges, and, at a more theoretical level, on the interaction 
between international actors. It has summarised the relevance of these questions, an issue that 
will come up again in various chapters of this thesis, and introduced the analytical framework. 
Over the last few pages, it has then discussed the research design and some methodological 
issues.  
The first chapter will further elaborate the general analytical framework presented 
above, while chapter II will discuss how China, theEU, and China-EU relations fit into it. 
This will also be an opportunity to introduce in detail the three processes that make up the 
three dimensions of this framework and, in their interaction, define the patterns of China-EU 
engagement, namely the Chinese and EU foreign-policy processes as well as the dynamics of 
direct transnational bureaucratic interaction. Chapter III will then present an historical 
overview of China-EU relations, with special attentio  to the issue-areas this research is 
focussing on, international and security. The two case studies, the question of China’s market 
economy status and the issue of the EU’s arms embargo against China, will then be treated in 


































































Chapter I. Foreign Policy Making and Interactive Dynamics – Towards 
a New Analytical Framework 
 
 
The previous chapter has already pointed to the fact that this research on China’s 
engagement of the EU has more general implications. In fact, if the cases selected for this 
research are part of a wider universe of cases, then on  may enquire about the interactions 
between any two (or maybe even more) international actors, i.e. states and international 
organisations, with similar questions as those asked here about China and the EU. Which 
units and persons in the US administration engage with hom in the Russian government? 
How do they interact, and what explains this interaction? By which channels do Iranian 
authorities connect with the UN and its specialised agencies? How does this affect their 
capacity to reach certain foreign-policy goals? 
Some international relations literature has prepared th  ground for this kind of enquiry 
or moved close to certain related issues. Yet so far there is no single theory that can grasp the 
core of the problem and provide any direct answers to such questions. Therefore, the goal of 
this chapter is to develop a general framework for analysing transnational bureaucratic 
interaction. The first section below will discuss the potential value and the limits of a number 
of existing theoretical approaches that may appear romising for this research. The second 
section will then combine some of them into a new analytical framework. 
 
1.1 Existing Approaches to Bureaucratic Interaction and Their Limits 
 
Interactions among the different players on the world stage are one of the key concerns 
of international studies and have been at the core of much scholarly research. Systemic 
analyses of international politics,1 most prominently Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism,2 writings 
on strategic interaction, deterrence, and the influe ce of mutual perceptions,3 the body of 
literature that analyses strategic interaction through the use game theory,4 structural realism 
and regime theory,5 etc. – they all deal, in one way or another, with the various aspects of 
                                                
1 See for example Deutsch 1968, Rosecrance 1977. 
2 Waltz 1979, 
3 See for example Schelling 1966, Jervis 1982-83, or Thies 1980. 
4 See for example Axelrod 1984. 
5 See for example Krasner 1983, Keohane 1983 and 1984. 
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interactions among international agents, most prominently states. Yet in all this, one particular 
aspect has been largely neglected: the patterns of transnational bureaucratic interaction. Who 
are the personalities or ministries on each side involved in Schelling’s “diplomacy of 
violence”?6 Beyond the factors that lead to a “demand for international regimes,”7 which 
entities of the participating states cooperate to create the regime and how? 
 
1.1.1 Foreign-Policy Analysis 
 
The idea that many groups within an international agent participate in the making of 
policies towards the outside, implicit in all questions above, stems from the literature on 
foreign policy analysis. This line of research originated in the 1950s,8 arising from the study 
of public policy as a criticism of what was perceived as an overemphasis of the unitary state 
in realist writing on international relations, and with a focus on the decision-making process 
below the aggregate level of the state.9 Academic interest in the decision-making approach to 
foreign policy, in particular efforts on “comparative foreign-policy analysis”, remained strong 
until the late 1970s,10 before it diminished considerably during the 1980s. In the course of the 
1990s, enquiries about the foreign policy of the EU pushed towards a revival of the 
approach,11 and more recently general interest has resurged.12 Without dwelling on the many 
different approaches, theories, and interpretations, what unites most of these writings is their 
basic view of the foreign-policy process. Put simply, in the universe of the foreign-policy 
analyst, inside any one international actor, public decision-making units cooperate and 
compete in making policies towards another agent on he outside, under the constraint of 
public opinion, and with private entities trying toinfluence this process or even directly 
taking part in it. 
From recognising that there are numerous entities involved in the shaping of relations 
with the outside, it is but a small step to acknowledging that each of them separately 
maintains contacts with counterparts in other international actors. In foreign-policy analysis, 
                                                
6 Schelling 1966, p.34. 
7 Keohane 1983, p.142. 
8 One of the earliest works is Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1954. 
9 For a description of the origins of foreign policy analysis in the study of public policy see Kessler 2002. For an 
insightful comparison between foreign policy analysis and the different strands of realism, see Guzzini and 
Rynning 2002. 
10 Some of the major publications are Frankel 1963, Allison 1969 and 1971, Rosenau 1967, 1971, and 1974. 
11 See for example Hill 1993, Peterson and Sjursen (eds.) 1998, White 2001. 
12 See for example Charillon (ed.) 2002, Hill 2003. 
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the phenomenon of transnational bureaucratic interaction has not gone entirely unnoticed, yet 
surprisingly little efforts have been made to extend research in this direction. Guillaume 
Devin is among the few to comment on this, pointing out that foreign ministries still play a 
key role in defining foreign policies, but they have many contenders nowadays, as most other 
branches of the executive manage “their own” internatio al relations.13 In his view, this 
corresponds to a historical trend of the 20th century that has seen ministries developing greate 
activities in the international sphere, heads of state or government engaging more and more in 
summit diplomacy, and even sub-national entities like regions or provinces establishing 
contacts across borders.14 The idea of a multiplicity of foreign relations also shines through 
indirectly in Christopher Hill’s definition of foreign policy as “the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.”15 And 
he states explicitly that while foreign ministries “try to achieve the status of gatekeeper and 
clearing-house, in practice they have to accept a gre t deal of parallel diplomacy on the part of 
colleagues in ‘domestic’ ministries.”16 
Beginning from these affirmations, could theories of f reign-policy analysis not 
constitute a good starting point to set up a parsimon ous theoretical framework for the present 
research? This answer is no. Even if some authors in this field admit the existence of multiple 
connections between the administrative structures of different international actors, the focus 
of foreign-policy analysis remains on decision-making processes within a certain international 
actor. Similarly, when transnational phenomena are acknowledged, they are understood as 
factors in this internal process, or as constraints on the policy-making activity of bureaucratic 
agents.17 The present research has to consider such internal processes of foreign-policy 
making for both involved international actors, i.e. China and the EU, yet at the same time it 
needs to account for independent dynamics of direct nteraction between bureaucratic agents 
from both sides. This is something related to, and to some extent resulting from, their 
decision-making structures but essentially outside of them, with a logic of its own, and 
beyond the reach of the conceptual tools of foreign-policy analysis. This idea is different from 
                                                
13 Devin 2002, p.219. 
14 See on this Devin 2002, 219-222. 
15 Hill 2003, p.3, my emphasis. 
16 Hill 2003, p.4. 




analysing outside actors as exogenous constraints on he decision-making process, as is done 
by some authors.18 
Foreign-policy analysis has led to insights that can be considered pre-conditions without 
which it would not be imaginable to ask the questions that are being asked here. At the same 
time, some of the findings on foreign-policy making are useful for certain dimensions of the 
present research, and will be discussed more in detail in the following section. Yet foreign-
policy analysis by itself is not enough to serve as a general analytical framework. 
 
1.1.2 Strategic Choice 
 
Another approach that at first sight appears promising with regard to the present 
endeavour is the strategic-choice approach, rooted in the literature on strategic interaction 
already quoted at the beginning of this section.19 According to David A. Lake and Robert 
Powell, it is based on “a vision of international politics as strategic interaction of actors,” 
whereby “[a] situation is strategic if an actor’s ability to further its ends depends on the 
actions others take.”20 This matches the sensibility of the present research to the interactive 
aspects of international politics. In addition the strategic-choice approach seems compatible 
with a focus on actors below state-level, as the authors state that “[n]o single level or set of 
political actors is likely to be everywhere and alwys helpful in understanding international 
phenomenon [sic]” and therefore “intentionally leav open the question of whether 
individuals, groups, states, international organizations, or other entities are appropriate actors 
in theories of international politics.”21 
The problem of this paradigm is that, beyond the general flexibility as to the level of 
analysis, it is based on rigorous rational-choice th orising and modelling. Lake and Powell 
initially adopt a moderate perspective on this: “Like other rational-choice analyses, the 
strategic-choice approach assumes that actors make purposive choices, that they survey their 
environment and, to the best of their ability, choose the strategy that best meets their 
subjectively defined goals.”22 It is easy to agree with this intuitive view of actors’ behaviour. 
In fact, one might wonder to what extent such a general statement is meaningful at all. Yet, 
                                                
18 Such an approach is taken, for example, in Papadakis and Starr 1987; for a more technical model of foreign 
constraints on foreign policy making see Wittkopf and Dehaven 1987 in the same edited volume. 
19 Elaborated in the edited volume Lake and Powell 1999. 
20 Lake and Powell 1999, pp.7-8. 
21 Lake and Powell 1999, p.16. 
22 Lake and Powell 1999, p.7. 
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from this simple starting point, Lake and Powell develop strong assumptions that make the 
strategic-choice approach inadequate for this study of transnational bureaucratic interaction. 
First, they emphasise the basic need to distinguish between actors and their environment 
and assume the two to be “analytically separable.”23 For them, the environment consists of 
“actions available to actors” and “an i formation structure that defines what the actors can 
know for sure and what they have to infer, if possible, from the behavior of others”, whereas 
the attributes of actors are “preferences, defined simply as how they rank the possible 
outcomes defined by their environment” and “prior beliefs about the preferences of others.”24 
I contend that it is problematic to assume sets of actions and an information structure to exist 
independently from actors. In a complex context of interaction, like for example between the 
various units of two different administrative struct res, available actions are virtually infinite 
and information is essentially subjective, not objective. Second, the classical assumption, 
taken up by Lake and Powell, of “complete and transitive preferences”, meaning “that actors 
can rank order the possible outcomes of known actions in a consistent manner”, is also 
problematic.25 Policy alternatives are complex and not always mutually exclusive, and as a 
result it is difficult and often impossible to identify and rank order outcomes. Lastly, despite 
the flexibility as to the level of analysis, the strategic-choice approach requires to focus 
exclusively on the actor at the chosen level and to assume all activity below to be only within 
this actor.26 This kind of “boxing” is not useful when transgovernmental interactions at 
different levels, e.g. top leaders as well as decision-making units within the administration, 
are equally meaningful. 
To be fair, some of the assumptions of the strategic-choice approach may become 
helpful when accounting for “snapshots” of transnational bureaucratic relations, specific 
situations at a given point in time when actors andtheir environments appear clearly separate, 
when paths of action seem finite, etc. And under such circumstances, the analysis in the 
empirical chapters of this study may indeed adopt a language akin to that of rational-choice 
analysts. However, sensitivity to changes over time s a key feature of the process-tracing 
method used in this research, which makes many of the assumptions of the strategic-choice 
approach too simplistic. With regard to changes over time, the perspective adopted in this 
research is close to historical institutionalism, which emphasises time as an explanatory 
                                                
23 Lake and Powell 1999, p.11. 
24 Lake and Powell 1999, pp.8-11; original emphases. 
25 Lake and Powell 1999, p.7. 
26 Lake and Powell 1999, pp.14-16. 
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factor.27 The emphasis of historical institutionalists on unintended consequences is also in line 
with the critique of the strategic-choice approach in the previous paragraph28. Yet in the case 
of China-EU relations, the very limited institutionalisation of interactions excludes historical 
institutionalism as a strong candidate for developing a theoretical framework. 
 
1.1.3 Two-Level Games 
 
For the analysis of interaction between administrative entities of two international 
agents, the double constraint of two domestic policy-making processes on an international 
phenomenon may recall the literature on two-level games.29 The original two-level games 
approach focuses on the substance of international agreements and how well it matches the 
preferences of those domestic political players who have to ratify the agreement. Put simply, 
the logic of two-level games posits that the outcome of an international negotiation (“level I”) 
can only become effective if it is a “win set” within the domestic political arena (“level II”) of 
each of the participating states. International negotiators are playing simultaneously two 
games, one international and one domestic. The goalof this approach is to explain 
international bargaining outcomes that seem implausible from a purely international, i.e. 
“third image,” perspective through reference to domestic constraints, i.e. the “second 
image.”30 
But the two-level games approach cannot fit the purpose of the present research either. 
There are several reasons for this. First, while literature using this framework is sensitive to 
the role played by public and private sub-state entiti s, in various fora, and including side-
payments, it does not account for their transnationl ties.31 Instead, it tends to use simplified 
models of international interaction. In Robert Putnam’s original article, for example, the point 
of encounter between two states is the negotiation nd nothing else, i.e. the only interaction he 
sees is between chief negotiators.32 This makes sense given the focus of this approach n 
explaining substantial outcomes from international egotiations but does not match the goal 
of explaining transnational bureaucratic interaction. Second, it is virtually impossible to adjust 
the two-level games approach in order to use it to explain the multiple channels interaction 
                                                
27 See Pierson and Skocpol 2002 as well as Pierson 1996 and 2003. 
28 Pierson and Skocpol 2002, p.708. 
29 In particular Putnam 1988 and the contributions to Evans, Jacobson and Putnam (eds.) 1993. 
30 See Moravcsik 1993, in particular pp.5-17. 
31 Good examples for coverage of various actors and fora are Eichenberg 1993 and Oddell 1993. 
32 Putnam 1988. 
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between the administrative structures of different international actors. The interests of entities 
involved in decision-making are far more diffuse on the process of interaction than on the 
substance of a negotiation. The choice of who to bargain with and how has a far less direct 
effect on any actor within the concerned polities, neither in relative (i.e. power) nor in 
absolute (i.e. distributional) terms. As a result, the central notion of “win set” is hard to 
operationalise. Lastly, for the specific agents chosen for this research, in particular the EU but 
also China to a certain extent, the neat division of the game into two levels does not match the 
real nature of the policy making processes. If one wanted to adjust the model it should be 
extended to a far more complex multilevel game.33 
In summary, while the two-level games approach focuses on explaining the substantial 
outcome of international negotiations, the present r search wants to account for the modalities 
of transnational bureaucratic interaction. The substantial issues at stake matter only to the 
extent that they have an impact on these modalities, and insofar as I draw conclusions on the 
impact of the type of engagement on final outcomes (i. . whether a foreign-policy goal is 
achieved or not). This means that the models and concepts of two-level games are not 
compatible with the goals of this research. 
 
1.1.4 Literature on Transnational Relations 
 
Despite substantial research on transnational relations and interdependence since the 
1970s,34 very few scholars have treated the question of transn tional relations between units 
of different governments. Two noteworthy exceptions will be discussed here: first, the work 
by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye on “transgovernmental” relations;35 and, second, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s more recent research on transn tional “government networks.”36 
Keohane and Nye focus directly on the interaction between the administrative structures 
of different international actors. They start from the observation that “bureaucracies find that 
to cope effectively at acceptable cost with many of the problems that arise, they must deal 
with each other directly rather than indirectly through foreign offices.” 37 As a result there are 
                                                
33 On “multi-level games” see for example Collinson 1999. 
34 See for example the special issue of International Organization on “Transnational Relations and World 
Politics”, edited by  Keohane and Nye 1971, Keohane d Nye 1977, Rosenau 1980, Rosenau (ed.) 1989, or 
Snidal 1981. 
35 Keohane and Nye 1974 and 1977, especially chaps.2 nd 7. 
36 See Slaughter 2004. 
37 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.42. 
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multiple transnational connections, or for Keohane d Nye “transgovernmental relations”, 
which they define as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments 
that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of 
those governments.”38 They distinguish two types of transgovernmental cooperation. First, 
there is “transgovernmental policy coordination,” i.e. “simply informal communication 
among working level officials of different bureaucra ies.”39 Second, “transgovernmental 
coalition building” means that “sub-units build coalitions with like-minded agencies from 
other governments against elements of their own administrative structures” in order to 
improve their chances of success in influencing decision-making.40 From this distinction the 
authors move on to the main topic of their article, namely to show the political significance of 
international organisations in the context of transgovernmental relations. 
The present research does not deal with the role of international organisations, but 
nevertheless Keohane and Nye’s discussion of transgovernmental relations contains a lot of 
useful elements for the explanation of transnational bureaucratic interaction between 
international actors. In fact, their notion of transgovernmental relations targets the same 
phenomenon as the notion of transnational bureaucratic interaction in this research. When 
developing a new analytical framework in section 2 of this chapter I will get back to some of 
their points. Yet again, taken by itself, this approach is not sufficient as a framework for my 
purposes here. First, Keohane and Nye’s framework only covers “the relatively autonomous 
activities of the lower-level bureaucracies as opposed to those of top leadership”, as they 
regard the latter as cases for the “state-centric model whose inadequacies we are criticizing.”41 
In my view, top leaders do not necessarily need to be considered as perfectly representing a 
certain international actor or as fully summarising t in their person. Such a perspective may 
be adopted, and for good reasons, by researchers who choose state-centric models – yet they 
would most likely interpret statements and actions by many other decision-making units in a 
similar fashion. Yet for the present purposes, top leaders, like lower level bureaucracies, 
should be seen as units in a decision-making structure. Since they are highly influential in 
policy making and since their relations with foreign counterparts may have particularly strong 
repercussions on the overall pattern of interaction, they cannot be neglected.42 Second, 
although Keohane and Nye admit that transgovernmental relations may also include important 
                                                
38 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.43. 
39 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.44. 
40 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.44. 
41 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.43-44. 
42 In this sense my notion of transnational bureaucratic interaction is a little larger than Keohane and Nye’s 
transgovernmental relations; nevertheless, the two concepts will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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episodes of conflict, they only consider cooperation.43 My goal is to trace the patterns of 
transnational bureaucratic interaction, which means I cannot disregard conflict. To the 
contrary, insofar as this research is sensitive to variation over time, conflict may be of 
particular importance in explaining change. Lastly, the types of transgovernmental relations 
suggested by Keohane and Nye concern certain instances of interaction between specific 
administrative entities. The emphasis in this research is, however, on the general modalities of 
bureaucratic interaction. This larger issue cannot be ackled with the framework suggested by 
Keohane and Nye. 
Slaughter describes two types of governmental networks, horizontal and vertical ones. 
The horizontal ones are “links between counterpart n tional officials across borders”44 and 
take three major forms. First, “[h]orizontal information networks […] bring together 
regulators, judges, or legislators to exchange information and to collect and distill best 
practices.”45 Second, “[e]nforcement networks typically spring up due to the inability of 
government officials in one country to enforce that country’s laws.”46 Third, “harmonization 
networks […] bring regulators together to ensure that t eir rules in a particular substantive 
conform to a common regulatory standard.”47 Vertical networks, by contrast, are “those 
between national government officials and their supranational counterparts,”48 which can be 
divided into vertical enforcement and information networks.49 Slaughter does not provide an 
abstract analysis of the emergence of such networks. In fact, after a reference to the article by 
Keohane and Nye discussed in the previous paragraph she adds that her point “is not so much 
to ‘discover’ government networks” but rather “to pint out their proliferation in every place 
we have eyes to see, if only we use the right lenses.”50 
Conceptually, Slaughter’s government networks fit into the logic of transgovernmental 
relations in the sense of Keohane and Nye: they canbe considered instances of 
transgovernmental policy coordination and may possibly even lead to coalition building. Yet 
Slaughter’s approach is more limited than that of Keohane and Nye. They start from a 
political logic in which actors cooperate depending on their positions, interests, habits, and 
convictions. What can I do? What do I want to do? What are the others’ interests? What do I 
believe in and who do I trust? Should I change anythi g? Slaughter, by contrast, follows a 
                                                
43 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.44. 
44 Slaughter 2004, p.13. 
45 Slaughter 2004, p.19. 
46 Slaughter 2004, p.19. 
47 Slaughter 2004, p.20. 
48 Slaughter 2004, p.13. 
49 Slaughter 2004, pp.21-22. 
50 Slaughter 2004, pp.10-11. 
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largely functional logic, in which a shared goal, like better enforcement, information, or 
harmonization, brings officials from different international agents together, because it cannot 
be reached alone. In fact, some of her examples look like classical cases of neo-functionalist 
spill-over,51 e.g. when occasional meetings of central bankers give rise to networks first and 
then to formal international organisations.52 
This means functional networks in Slaughter’s sense, lik  Keohane and Nye’s approach, 
need to be kept in mind when developing a new conceptual framework in the following 
section. Such networks are a reality of transnationl bureaucratic interaction and may be 
important in determining who interacts with whom. Yet this concerns only a very particular 
aspect, and it does not match the explanatory richness of Keohane and Nye’s approach. 
 
1.2 Outlining a New Approach 
 
Given the absence of meaningful strong theories for the purpose of this research, I will 
now develop a new conceptual framework that is intended to give structure to the research, to 
indicate promising explanatory variables and causal mechanisms, and to provide for 
conceptual coherence in making assumptions explicit. In order to render the highly complex 
reality of transnational bureaucratic interactions more accessible I propose two 
simplifications. First, the interaction will be portrayed as having a direction at the outset: 
international actor A implements an initial pattern of engagement towards international actor 
B; this is then conditioned by the reception it receives from the bureaucratic agents of B. 
Subsequently there may be repeated stimulus-feedback cycles between the two. Obviously, 
this is not a realistic representation of the development of transnational bureaucratic 
interaction, but it is useful for heuristic purposes. Second, this framework concentrates on 
specific policies and how transnational bureaucrati interaction evolves in their pursuit. It 
would be impossible to account in general for all interactions between two international 
actors. Not only are interactions at various levels of administrations too numerous, happening 
at the same time on many issues in various venues, to be traced consistently, many of them 
are also virtually invisible, even to the eyes of the close observer. Policies that fit this purpose 
must have vectorial characteristics, i.e. not only have a substance but also a clear direction, 
developed by A and targeted at B. 
                                                
51 See Haas 1958, p.297; Haas 1961, pp.372, 377-378; Haas 1964, p.48. 
52 See Slaughter 2004, chap. I. 
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These simplifications allow me to distinguish three processes in order to explain the 
modalities of transnational bureaucratic interaction (see Fig.2.1). First, there are two policy-
making processes. One determines the goals international actor A is pursuing towards the 
outside and how it wants to engage international actor B for that end, while the second one 
shapes the response by B to this engagement. The third process concerns the independent 
dynamics of direct interaction between bureaucratic entities on both sides, which also shape 




 Substance: Theoretical tools: 
Process I 
Decision making in agent A: 
leads to policy towards agent B, incl. an initial approach 
of bureaucratic actors in B’s foreign policy apparatus. 
Foreign policy analysis; in particular: 
Organisational process model (Allison) 
Bureaucratic politics model (Allison) 
 
Process II 
Decision making in agent B: 
Determines how A’s policy is received, and possibly 
modifies A’s initial approach into a new pattern of
bureaucratic interaction. 
Foreign policy analysis; in particular: 
Organisational process model (Allison) 
Bureaucratic politics model (Allison) 
 
Process III 
Dynamics of direct bureaucratic interaction: 
Decides whether and how well involved bureaucratic 
entities on both sides can cooperate. 
Match vs. mismatch in preferences and perceptions: 
Previous experience of cooperation 
Preferences, worldviews (Keohane and Nye) 
Personal relations between top officials 
Mutual perceptions, issue perceptions 
Governmental networks (Slaughter) 
 
 
The following sub-section will discuss the definitions and roles of international actors 
and bureaucratic agents in this analytical framework. Then I will turn to the three processes, 
i.e. introduce the two policy-making processes in the second sub-section, and lastly present 
the independent dynamics of direct bureaucratic interaction. 
 
1.2.1 International Actors versus Bureaucratic Agents 
 
Without further justification, the discussion so far has been based on the distinction 
between, on the one hand, states and international rganisations, which I refer to as 
international actors, and the decision-making units within their administrative structures, 
termed bureaucratic agents. Prima facie, this appears like a straightforward and unproblematic 
approach, but a closer look reveals a number of thorny conceptual issues. Both the inclusion 
of international organisations in the purview of the research and the focus on the activities of 
administrative entities in international relations i dicate a departure from the traditional state-
centric vision of world politics. Yet a more flexible definition of actorness necessarily leads to 
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a great variety of international actors, going beyond states and international organisations, and 
including among others those administrative sub-units which I call bureaucratic agents. This 
means in this sub-section I will first need to determine a satisfactory definition of 
international actorness, second, justify the exclusion of certain actors for the purpose of this 
research, and, third, provide criteria for distinguishing some others as bureaucratic agents. 
 
(i) A General Definition of International Actorness 
That states qualify as international actors is uncontested, and does not need any further 
discussion.53 They have been, and still are, the key actors in the modern international system. 
The question is rather: what other types of actor are there, and how can we define a wider 
notion of actorness? Various general treatments of international relations explicitly 
acknowledge and discuss the existence of non-state actors, including intergovernmental 
organisations, national liberation movements, transn tional corporations, non-governmental 
organisations and even public opinion.54 Yet efforts at tackling the conceptual challenge of 
defining international actors so as to account for b th states and non-state actors are rare and 
not always satisfying. 
Brian Hocking and Michael Smith discuss the general n ture of actorness in 
international relations and propose three concepts that should allow us “to break away from 
the rather narrow, state-related criteria of actorness,” namely the degree of autonomy of an 
entity, the constituencies it represents, and the influence it can exert.55 These may be helpful 
dimensions for understanding and comparing the chara teristics of different actors, but it fails 
to provide clear criteria for what is an actor and what not. Christopher Hill suggests a more 
specific definition, based on an earlier approach by Gunnar Sjöstedt: “an international actor 
can be said to be an entity which is (1) delimited from others, and from its environment; […] 
(2) autonomous, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions […]; and which (3) 
possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level, such as legal 
personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third 
parties.”56 However, these criteria lead to confusing results. International organisations are, by 
their very nature, not clearly delimited from their member states and are not fully 
autonomous, yet it would seem strange to generally deny their actorness on these grounds. 
                                                
53 See, for example, the discussions of states as main actors of the international system in Merle 1986, chap.1; 
Merle 1988, part 3, chap.1; Hocking and Smith 1990, chap.3; or Holsti 1992, pp.48-52. 
54 See for example Merle 1988, part 3, chap.2 and 3; Hocking and Smith 1990, p.70; Holsti 1992, pp. 52-56. 
55 Hocking and Smith 1990, p.71. 
56 Hill 1993, p.309, original emphases; see also Sjöstedt 1977, especially chap.3. 
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Similarly, transnational corporations and nongovernme tal organisations do not possess 
international legal personality but are nevertheless influential actors in certain international 
contexts. 
As an alternative, I suggest a simpler approach derived from the criteria put forward by 
Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. They discuss at length the issue of actorness, and 
identify a set of five “basic requirements”: first, a “[s]hared commitment to a set of 
overarching values and principles”; second, “[t]he ability to identify policy priorities and to 
formulate coherent policies”; third, [t]he ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in 
the international system; fourth, “[t]he availability of, and the capacity to utilize, policy 
instruments”; and fifth, [d]omestic legitimation ofdecision processes, and priorities, relating 
to external policies.”57 Of these, the first and the fifth criterion are not entirely convincing. 
Shared values and legitimacy are issues within an entity, possibly affecting its stability and 
sustainability over time. Yet their absence does not impede action towards the outside on 
certain issues at a given time. 
Therefore I intend to use the three other criteria p oposed by Bretherton and Vogler for a 
general definition of international actorness, applicable to a wide array of entities that are 
active on the world stage. An international actor then distinguishes itself by its ability to 
formulate policies towards the outside, the availabil ty of policy instruments, and its capacity 
to interact with other actors. This definition can cover all types of actors mentioned above, 
and possibly even more. It could be argued, for example, that it fits all entities of a taxonomy 
elaborated by James N. Rosenau. He divides actors into two large categories: micro-actors, 
i.e. individuals, either as members or leaders of a larger group, or as independent actors, and 
macro-actors, including states, governmental sub-units, all kinds of organisations that go 
beyond states, the “leaderless public”, as visible in opinion polls or riots, and movements.58 
 
(ii) Many Actors, Different Roles 
The general definition of international actorness elaborated above entails the question of 
how to discriminate between all these actors in order to specify the focus of this research. 
Keohane and Nye propose a taxonomy of “actors in world politics” that can be helpful in that 
regard.59 First, they identify three categories: governmental, intergovernmental, and 
nongovernmental actors. This means that, despite the departure from a state-centric approach 
                                                
57 Bretherton and Vogler 1999, pp.37-38. 
58 Rosenau 1990, chap.6. 
59 Keohane and Nye 1971b, pp.730-732. 
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to international relations, “it is useful to retain the governmental-nongovernmental 
distinction.”60 Within this taxonomy, the focus of this research, and of the analytical 
framework, is on the governmental and intergovernmental dimensions. Nongovernmental or 
private actors only matter indirectly, as environmetal factors that constrain public entities. 
Second, Keohane and Nye distinguish aggregate actors, like states and international 
organisations or transnational corporations on the private side, from their respective sub-units. 
Their roles in world politics are indeed very different. Aggregate actors stand for themselves, 
representing entire collective entities, made up of a population, member states or even 
shareholders and business partners. Their sub-units, by contrast, cannot stand by themselves 
and owe their role in international relations to their being part of an aggregate actor, 
regardless of whether they pursue their own narrow organisational interests or those of the 
larger entities they belong to. 
States continue to distinguish themselves among the many types of international actors, 
in that the most elaborate legitimising mechanisms converge on them and in that they dispose 
of the most remarkable concentrations of coercive power. To some extent, international 
organisations, as entities founded by states, also benefit from this authority, although they 
usually do not match states in the scope of their action. 
This difference in the quality of actorness between states and international organisations 
is reflected in international law. Aside from states, international legal personality is attributed 
to international organisations, yet only to the extent required by the purposes for which they 
have been established. In the words of the Internatio l Court of Justice (ICJ): “Whereas a 
State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, 
the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization [i.e. the United Nations] must 
depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents 
and developed in practice.”61 This means that the legal personality of international 
organisations is limited, and variable, according to the goals of each specific organisation, and 
never as complete as that of states. It is important that legal personality, in this sense, is 
implicit to the functions an international organisat on is entrusted with, and it does not have to 
be spelled out explicitly in the constituent treaty.62 Also, it has an objective character, i.e. 
valid not only for the members of the international organisation in question states but also for 
outsiders. The ICJ states that “fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of 
                                                
60 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.41. 
61 International Court of Justice 1949, p.10; the reasoning behind this affirmation is elaborated on pp.9-10. 
62 Nguyen Quoc, Daillier, Pellet 1999, p.586. 
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the international community, had the power […] to bring into being an entity possessing 
objective international personality.”63 Yet the effective treatment of regional organisations 
suggests that this has become extendable to other, and possibly all, international 
organisations.64 
 
(iii) Sub-Units as Bureaucratic Agents 
The distinction between states and international organisations as aggregate actors on the 
one hand, and their sub-units on the other, is of crucial importance for my analytical 
framework. After all, the focus of the research is precisely on the activities of those sub-units 
and not on the aggregate actors themselves. In order to mphasise this distinction, I have 
chosen to use the term “international actors” mostly for states and international organisations 
while the decision-making units in their respective administrative structures are referred to as 
“bureaucratic agents.” Individual officials, listed separately by Rosenau, can be subsumed 
into this latter category. 
Given that the focus of this research is on bureaucratic agents, one may wonder why 
aggregate international actors should be of any relevance whatsoever. An easy answer to this 
would be that the policies of which the implementation gives rise to transnational bureaucratic 
interaction are attached to aggregate actors. Yet ev n the policy-making process can be 
interpreted as rooted in the activities of bureaucrti  agents. Aggregate actors nevertheless 
play a very important role, as they define differenc  and sameness in transnational 
bureaucratic contact and are therefore constitutive of meaning in the interaction. World 
politics swarm with an almost infinite number of bureaucratic agents, yet what determines the 
meaning of their interactions is their respective belonging to larger international actors. A 
bureaucratic interaction is of a totally different nature if it is between two departments of two 
different French ministries rather than between a department of the Italian foreign ministry 
and the Asia Directorate of the Commission’s DG Relex or between a Chinese and a British 
unit. This is to say that bureaucratic interaction, for the purposes of this research, is only 
meaningful once we know that the involved units have different identities, usually as part of 
distinct international actors. 
In the case of states, the identification of the burea cratic agents is rather 
straightforward, leading directly to a set of decision-making units within the central 
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government. Geographical entities within a state, like regions or provinces, may very well 
develop international activities, and may be considere  international actors based on the 
general definition proposed above, yet their role in the making of their state’s foreign policies 
is generally minimal. In the case of an international organisation the situation is more 
complicated. There are bureaucratic entities, e.g. a secretariat or some specialised agencies, 
but aside from this, there are only the member state  below – who are aggregate international 
actors themselves. 
The question is then whether member states can be considered as bureaucratic agents of 
an international organisation and therefore units of analysis in the analytical framework I am 
proposing, or whether I will have to move down to bureaucratic entities below the member 
states in order to be consistent with regard to the lev l of analysis. I argue that, for the 
purposes of this research, member states can be bureaucratic agents and units of analysis, i.e. 
decomposition into smaller units is not necessarily required – although it may be helpful and 
insightful in some cases. Whether or not an entity is itself an aggregate international actor 
does not really matter. It becomes bureaucratic agents as soon as its role in a certain situation 
is defined by its being part of another such actor, which then constitutes the general context of 
the interaction that confers meaning, or, put differently, that defines inside and outside. From 
a more general perspective on the hierarchies of social rganisation, one could argue that 
bureaucratic agency of a social entity is not linked to its qualities as such but results from its 
relationship with others. This means that the framework could also be applied at lower levels 
of social organisation, e.g. with regard to the contact between the sub-units of two different 
ministries in the same state. 
 
1.2.2 Explaining Modes of Engagement and Their Reception 
 
The question is now how to explain, on the one hand, the pattern of engagement, 
developed by international actor A towards international actor B, and, on the other hand, B’s 
reception and potential conditioning of it. In my framework these are processes I and II. A 
variety of complex dynamics has to be accounted for. In the easiest case, both engagement 
and reception may be based on simple routines of the bureaucratic agents in charge. This 
would be the case, for example, when a trade policy matter is discussed between the 
competent ministries of two states. But bureaucrati gents may decide to reconsider their 
routine and develop a new kind of engagement or reception. Also, on both sides, several 
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bureaucratic agents may be involved, each possibly preferring different types of interaction. 
And in each administration there may be competition on which entity should be in charge and 
which diplomatic strategy for engagement or reception o choose. 
 
(i) Organisational Logic and Bureaucratic Politics 
In order to analyse the decision-making behind such patterns of engagement and 
reception, I suggest resorting to a fundamental distinction between two types of mechanisms, 
proposed by Graham Allison as alternatives to the classical model of the state as unitary, 
rational agent, summarised in his “Organizational Process Model” and the “Bureaucratic 
Politics Model.”65 The presentation of these models triggered an intensiv  debate, which 
inspires foreign-policy analysts until today, and Allison received substantial criticism, some 
of which will be discussed below. Nevertheless, the two alternative models are useful in that 
they capture the two basic features of foreign-policy seen as a public decision-making 
process, or two “fundamentally different constraints on rationality.”66 
The Organizational Process Model focuses on the organisational routines that constrain 
the decision-making process, as they result from the “standard operating procedures” of the 
various entities that make up an administration.67 One of Allison’s examples concerns the 
routines of US reconnaissance flights over Cuba that partly determined when the missile 
build-up was recognised.68 Another example could be the EU’s decision to work towards 
recognising Mongolia as a market economy. Although no actor in the EU’s foreign policy 
process is opposed, market economy status has not yet been granted because Mongolia has 
not been able to provide formal evidence that it conforms to the EU’s criteria for a market 
economy.69 The Bureaucratic Politics Model, by contrast, emphasises the constant bargaining 
for influence on policy decisions among the many entiti s within an administration. “The 
necessary decentralization of decisions required for action on the broad range of foreign 
policy problems” has the effect that “power is shared” and leads to “bureaucratic politics: 
bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the 
government.”70 For Allison the factors determining the outcomes of such bargaining are 
                                                
65 Allison 1969; later elaborated in a monograph, see Allison 1971, as well as the second revised edition Allison 
and Zelikow 1999. 
66 Welch 1992, p.118. 
67 Allison 1969, p.700. 
68 Allison 1969, pp.703-705. 
69 Interview EU 20 (Q3 2007); interview with diplomat of an EU member state who has worked on Mongolia 
prior to China. 
70 Allison 1969, p.707. 
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essentially the positions of the persons involved an their personalities.71 Allison uses the 
example of the discussions within Kennedy’s Executive Committee (ExCom) during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, but one could also refer to the fierce bargaining among the Chinese 
ministries concerned by negotiations towards WTO accession.72 
For the purposes of this research, both of these mechanisms can be considered to operate 
in all phases of decision making, i.e. during the formation of options, the actual moment of 
decision, and the implementation of the decision. In a review of Allison’s models, David A. 
Welch argues that the organisational model shows how “organizational routines constrain the 
formation of options” and “how routines affect implementation” but “does not operate at the 
moment of decision.”73 This is definitely true for major foreign policy decisions. The choice 
of one of the options on the table of the ExCom clearly was not a matter of routine, and 
neither was the Chinese decision to pressure the EU towards reconsidering its arms embargo 
on China. Yet with regard to the decisions on who “on the other side” to engage and how, 
decisions may very well be based on organisational routines, unless of course there is a 
conscious design of a new approach. For the bureaucratic politics model, Welch recognises 
that it operates during all three phases of decision making.74 
 
(ii) The Degree of Central Control 
Both of Allison’s models emphasise, in different ways, the divisions within the 
administrative structure of an international agent. What he neglects, though, is that in addition 
to these “centrifugal” tendencies, as one could call them, there is a “centripetal” force, 
represented by hierarchies and central authority. This has also been pointed out by some of his 
critiques. Welch notes that the presence of clear hie archies limits the validity of the 
bureaucratic politics model, in that they reduce throom for bargaining or turn it into 
competing efforts of persuasion towards the higher ranking official.75 He also recalls that 
routines are not only a negative constraint on decision-making but positive and indispensable 
tools of governance in complex situations, and thatey can be modified, often quickly and 
effectively.76 Stephen D. Krasner points to the great potential influence of the top leadership 
in the entire process from option formation, to the actual decision and on to its 
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73 Welch 1992, p.117. 
74 Welch 1992, p.118. 
75 Welch 1992, pp.132-133. 
76 Welch 1992, pp.124-127. 
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implementation.77 In his analysis of US politics, the president can modify, and sometimes 
override, the constraints of both organisational routines and bureaucratic politics.78 
A good way of combining the centrifugal and centripetal logics and linking them to 
transnational bureaucratic interaction is proposed by Keohane and Nye. They discuss the 
influence of “conflict of interest among sub-units” of an administration and “the degree of 
central control by top executive leaders” on transgovernmental coalition building.79 On the 
one hand, conflict of interest within a certain administration creates motivation for 
transnational bureaucratic interaction in that it encourages bureaucratic agents to search for 
allies outside instead of within the administrative structure of their own international actor. In 
Keohane and Nye’s analysis, for this to happen a bureaucratic agent “must perceive a greater 
common interest” with a bureaucratic agent of another international actor “than with at least 
one pertinent agency” within the administrative struc ure of its own international actor.80 On 
the other hand, executive control determines whether t re is the opportunity to engage in 
transnational bureaucratic interaction. To allow for it to happen “control must be loose 
enough to permit this perception [of common interest] to be translated into direct 
[transgovernmental] contacts.”81 
Fig. 2.2 shows this graphically, in a slightly adjusted version of Keohane and Nye’s 
graphical representation. Moving from the top left to he bottom right quadrant conflict within 
the concerned administrative structure diminishes and central control increases, which means 
that both the motivation and the opportunity for transnational bureaucratic interaction 
decrease, making it less and less likely. In between, and including the bottom left and top 
right quadrants, there is a zone with an open mix of motivation and opportunity. 
The distinction between centrifugal and centripetal forces in policy making and 
transnational bureaucratic interaction is far more than an analytical technicality and highly 
consequential. In fact, it points to a profound dilemma that faces virtually any official 
engaged in interaction with bureaucratic agents of another international actor. As Keohane 
and Nye put it, “[e]ven in democratic societies, the borderline between legitimate 
trangovernmental behavior and treason may be unclear.”82 
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This scheme does not pretend to deliver the key to predicting transnational bureaucratic 
interaction. Its main virtue is to complement Allison’s models with the influence of central 
control. Specific outcomes can only be explained in a detailed analysis of organisational 
routines and bureaucratic bargaining as well as the precise role of central control. Careful 
consideration of this latter factor is particularly important since, unlike Keohane and Nye, I 
include contacts between top leaders in transnationl bureaucratic interaction. 
In all this there may be important differences between crisis situations and “business as 
usual.” Intuitively, one could suspect that the topleadership becomes deeply involved in all 
aspects of a certain issue only when it becomes an emergency situation of the highest priority, 
as for example in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis which both Allison and Krasner discuss 
in much detail. Under normal circumstances, by contrast, both organisational routines and 
bureaucratic politics have a stronger impact. But the logic also works the other way, as 
Krasner points out: “In crises when time is short the President may have to accept 
bureaucratic options which could be amended under more leisurely conditions.”83 This means 
that the actual impact of perceived emergency will have to be assessed carefully on a case-by-
case basis. 
In summary, in processes I and II of the framework, the mechanisms based on Allison’s 
organisational and bureaucratic bargaining logics combine to determine in international actor 
                                                
83 Krasner 1972, p.176. 
Fig. 2.2: 
Administrative structure (AS) and transnational bureaucratic interaction (TBI) 
High 
AS: policy fragmentation 
 
TBI: motivation and opportunity 
AS: nationally contained conflict 
 




























AS: national coalition 
 
TBI: no motivation but opportunity 
AS: hierarchical structure 
 




Degree of central control within administrative structure 
Adjusted from Keohane and Nye 1974, fig.1, p.49. 
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A the pattern of engagement towards international actor B, and to shape in B the reception 
and conditioning of it. In addition to Allison’s models, these processes also consider the role 
of hierarchies and central control, and how they may constrain tendencies towards 
transnational bureaucratic interaction. It is important to emphasise the validity of these 
mechanisms for explaining both the pattern of engagement and its reception. Literature in the 
tradition of foreign-policy analysis has mostly cone trated on the active rather than the 
passive dimension of foreign policy, i.e. the development of policies towards the outside and 
not the reaction to approaches from the outside.84 Yet Allison’s models are also applicable 
when analysing the reception of a specific mode of ngagement. For example, organisational 
routines may determine whether a specific issue is dealt with by the diplomat who was first 
approached or passed on to a colleague, a subordinate or a superior, or possibly even to 
another ministry. Bureaucratic politics may intervene in determining which ministry will have 
the honour (the obligation) to be in the press with a popular (unpopular) official visitor. And 
central control constrains both mechanisms. 
 
1.2.3 Direct Relations between Bureaucratic Entities 
 
Unlike the analysis of decision-making inside interational actors discussed in the 
previous sub-section, this third dimension of the framework, or process III, does not consider 
the positions and activities of certain bureaucrati ctors within their respective polities. It 
rather takes their direct relations with their counterparts on the outside as a factor explaining 
the modalities of interaction between international agents. 
 
(i) Preferences, Worldviews and Personal Relations 
To get a grip on this complex reality, I will start f om Keohane and Nye’s treatment of 
transgovernmental relations, yet without following their distinction between 
transgovernmental policy coordination versus coaliti n building. In my view, these are simply 
different points on a continuum from loose to ever more intensive transnational bureaucratic 
interaction. In fact, Keohane and Nye themselves state hat “transgovernmental policy 
coordination shades over into transgovernmental coalition building.”85 They also introduce a 
third kind of transgovernmental relationship, namely “transgovernmental elite networks”, a 
                                                
84 Frankel 1963 is an exception in that he distinguishes “initiative” from “reaction” in foreign policy; pp.178ff. 
85 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.46, my emphasis. 
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potential result of “widespread” policy coordination, but without much further discussion and 
without clearly positioning such networks with respct to the other two types.86 This indicates 
that the concentration on these concepts risks to be limiting rather than enriching, even to the 
point of distorting real phenomena when forcing them into a limited number of specific 
categories. Instead, my goal is to use Keohane and Nye’s analysis to identify factors that 
explain why transnational bureaucratic interaction may emerge and intensify at times, or 
weaken, even to the point of disruption, at others. 
Keohane and Nye point out that “bureaucracies find […] they must deal with each other 
directly” and that “[c]ommunications among governments increase”, including “direct 
contacts among officials of what were once considere  primarily domestic government 
agencies.”87 “[I]nformal communication among working level officials of different 
bureaucracies” for them is “the most basic and diffuse form of transgovernmental policy 
coordination.”88 For me this is simply one end of the continuum of increasingly close 
transnational bureaucratic interaction, and in a way also a precondition for any stronger form 
of cooperation. What are the factors that make interac ion move away from this pole and 
along the continuum? Keohane and Nye mention the role of “common interest, professional 
orientation, and personal friendship” in creating transgovernmental elite networks.89 This 
indicates a three factors that promote strengthening transnational bureaucratic interaction, 
namely shared preferences, matching worldviews, andgood personal relations. The 
perception of overlapping interests can be considered a necessary condition for any 
strengthening of transgovernmental cooperation. It is obvious that this is facilitated by 
commonalities in worldviews, i.e. basic “assumptions” including “images of other actors in 
the world, causal beliefs about how they interact with one another, and prescriptions about 
appropriate courses of action.”90 Equally intuitive is the positive impact of compatible 
personalities and the resulting constructive dynamics in personal relations. As has already 
been pointed out above, this includes for this research also relations between top officials, 
contrary to Keohane and Nye’s view. 
In their discussion of transgovernmental coalition building, i.e. particularly close 
transnational bureaucratic interaction in which “sub-units of different governments […] 
                                                
86 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.46. Their reference to “transgovernmental elite networks” anticipates Slaughter’s 
idea of “government networks” developed about three d cades later. 
87 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.42. 
88 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.44. 
89 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.46, 
90 Mowle 2003, p.562. 
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jointly use resources to influence governmental decisions,”91 the authors also mention another 
factor, namely that the bureaucratic agents “must be a le to combine their resources 
effectively.”92 At first sight, the condition that “political resources (such as funds, prestige, 
information, and consent – where required, for insta ce, by the rules of an international 
organisation) of actors outside a government must be valuable to at least some actors within 
it” 93 may seem again quite intuitive. Yet at the same ti, this is probably the rule rather than 
the exception. At least if we assume that usually transgovernmental relations, based on 
matching preferences and worldviews as well as good personal relations, develop between 
units or persons working on similar issues at similar levels, then the very fact that the 
counterpart is in the place he or she is in implies a multitude of valuable resources. 
So far the discussion has only covered instances of co perative behaviour. In fact, 
Keohane and Nye completely disregard discord and cofli t.94 Yet transnational bureaucratic 
interaction may very well worsen, and this in function of the same factors that explain their 
strengthening. Conflicting preferences or worldviews, or problems in personal relations can 
bring transnational bureaucratic interaction down the continuum towards the simplest forms 
of communication, or even completely interrupt the relationship. This can initiate a dynamic 
of changing patterns in transnational bureaucratic interaction as bureaucratic agents start 
looking for new counterparts in the international actor that is the target of their policy. In 
terms of the substance of foreign policy such irritations are likely to render reaching the 
policy target far more difficult. In the worst case, if a relationship is disrupted and no new 
bureaucratic contact can be established, it may compr ise the entire policy. 
 
(ii) The Role of Perceptions 
An important element in explaining the modalities of transnational bureaucratic 
interaction is perceived reality. Keohane and Nye do not treat this explicitly since they 
concentrate on objective factors, a strategy that promises clearer explanatory statements. 
Stating that “A and B cooperate because they share the same interests” is more 
straightforward, after all, than saying that “A and B cooperate because their perceptions of 
their interests are similar.” Nevertheless, in explaining behaviour of groups or individuals, 
what shapes decisions about courses of action, such as for example whether or not to interact 
                                                
91 Keohane and Nye 1974, pp.46-47. 
92 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.49. 
93 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.49. 
94 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.44. 
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with a certain bureaucratic agent of another internatio al actor, are perceptions about 
objective facts rather than objective facts themselves. This should not be seen to imply that 
perceptions are necessarily wrong or deviate from objective facts. Perceptions that turn out to 
be wrong may very well be adjusted, and often perceptions may be close to observable reality 
from the beginning. But it is important to see that perceptions and objective facts are 
analytically distinct. 
The impact of all factors treated above as determining the evolution of transnational 
bureaucratic interaction, i.e. the match in preferences and worldviews, the quality of personal 
relations, and the compatibility of political resources, can all be linked to perceptions. 
Matching preferences depend on how each bureaucratic agent perceives its own interests and 
those of its counterparts. Worldviews are entirely about perceptions. And personal relations 
hinge on the perceptions of a counterpart’s personal qu lities, like reliability, respect for 
others, tastes, etc. This shines through when Keohane and Nye talk about the “perception” of 
common interests,95 or when they discuss the negative impact on transnational bureaucratic 
interaction when “in a xenophobic society foreign resources are heavily devalued, or regarded 
negatively.”96 
Yet the question of perceptions merits a more thorough discussion. Three types of 
perceptions can be identified as shaping transnatiol bureaucratic interaction. First, it matters 
how bureaucratic agents perceive themselves, their role in the administrative structure they 
are part of, and the international actor they belong t . This means in particular which role they 
ascribe themselves not in the formal hierarchy but with regard to their substantial relevance 
on specific issues, which type of activity they think they are doing, especially whether 
political, technical or representative, how they feel their role in the administration is perceived 
by their colleagues in other units of the same administration, and whether they feel 
underestimated or disrespected by their peers. Second, there are the perceptions of their 
counterparts, their role in their administrative struc ure, and the international actor these 
counterparts are representing. All this influences the factors discussed by Keohane and Nye, 
i.e. a bureaucratic agent’s views on its interests and on the interests of the international actor it 
belongs to, the perception of overlapping interests wi h their counterparts, their worldviews, 
the potential for positive personal relations and whether they perceive political resources as 
compatible and combinable. 
                                                
95 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.48. 
96 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.49. 
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If consideration of these first two types of perceptions is simply a way of getting a more 
accurate view of the factors proposed by Keohane and Nye and already discussed above, the 
third type is a of a different nature in that it con erns perceptions of issues. Issues can be seen 
as “particular items over which states negotiate.”97 While “it would be a mistake to believe 
that issues represent fundamental units of internatio l relations which are discrete and clearly 
defined”, their definition depends instead “on agreem nt among the states involved.”98 This 
means for instance that in US-EU relations at one tim he EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
may be an issue while at another the policies on banan  imports of the EU become an issue in 
their own right. The agreement between two internatio l actors on what is an issue in the 
relations between them does not imply, however, that both sides also share the same views on 
the nature of the issue. Here one could cite the example of the Iranian nuclear programme. It 
is beyond doubt that both Iran and the US agree that this is an issue between them, yet for the 
US it is mostly a matter of regional security and non-proliferation while for Iran sovereignty 
and national prestige play a considerable role. 
For transnational bureaucratic interaction it is crucial how bureaucratic agents perceive 
the nature of a certain issue as these perceptions are directly linked to the logic the agent 
follows when trying to solve problems that arise with regard to the issue in question. If 
bureaucratic agents on both sides share the same issue perceptions they are likely to approach 
problems based on the same logic. This may facilitate solutions despite differences in 
interests. By contrast, when there is a mismatch in issue perceptions, the involved entities are 
likely to approach the issue each with a different logic, communication and mutual 
understanding will be troublesome and problem-solving very difficult. To illustrate one can 
think of a trade dispute. If the bureaucratic agents from both sides agree on the purely 
commercial nature of the problem and that it has to be resolved with reference to WTO rules, 
their interaction will be different from a case in which one of the two side considers it a 
political issue that rather than application of rules requires a bargained agreement between the 
involved parties. 
The interplay of issue perceptions in transnational bureaucratic interaction is highly 
complex and defies any simple classification. Yet for heuristic purposes one can distinguish 
two dimensions of issue perceptions and from there sk tch out some typical interactive 
dynamics (see fig.2.3). On the one hand, perceptions may vary with regard to the political 
significance attached to the issue. This can be seen as a continuum between a purely technical 
                                                
97 Snidal 1981, p.35. 
98 Snidal 1981, p.36. 
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and a purely political pole. Perception of an issue as technical in nature implies that problems 
should be solved with reference to generally accepted rules or on the basis of objective expert 
knowledge. The example above of a dispute considered as commercial in nature and to be 
resolved through application of WTO rules is a good illustration of this. Another example 
could be a dispute on territorial waters which is considered of legal nature and therefore 
submitted to an international court. If an issue is perceived as of a political nature, it means 
that solutions to problems can be found through bargaining and mutual concessions. An 
example could be a dispute on territorial waters in which a party sees vital interests at stake 
and wants to make it part of a larger bargained settlement that balances pay-offs for both 
sides. 
One the other hand, there are the varying degrees of symbolic connotations to an issue, 
i.e. one can imagine a second continuum between a pole of simple, factual issues and one 
with a great symbolic charge. The symbolic dimensio tends to amplify the interests of 
involved bureaucratic agents and therefore reduces their readiness for compromise, be it in the 
context of a rules-based settlement or in a bargaining situation. The integration of the EU air 
transport market can be taken as an example for a symbolically-charged technical issue.99 On 
the one hand, it is a complex technical process of merging and simplifying regulation in order 
to allow for profitability, while on the other hand it touches on national prestige since it puts 
at risk the continued existence of flag carriers, thus complicating and prolonging the entire 
process. The conflicting claims over islands in the South China Sea can serve as an example 
of a symbolically-charged political issue. While there may be room for a bargained solution, 
as the issue is perceived as linked to national sovereignty it is difficult for all parties to agree 
on compromises. 
 
                                                
99 See Woll 2006. 
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How does transnational bureaucratic interaction evolv  in case of matching or 
mismatching issue perceptions by the involved bureaucratic agents? There is no sense in 
discussing in detail all possible combinations of these different types of issue perceptions, 
themselves more illustrative than exhaustive. Yet a few general points are in place. If the 
bureaucratic agents on both sides share the same perc ption of the issue in terms of its 
technical versus political nature, they are likely to approach it in similar ways, which is 
conducive to the continuation and the strengthening of interaction. This means that similar 
issue perceptions facilitate interaction and cooperation in solving any problems, but it does 
not imply that cooperation and solutions can be taken for granted. In the case of technical 
issues, the parties will still have to agree on the applicable set of rules and their interpretation, 
or bargain a final deal on political issues. If there are divergences as to the technical or 
political nature of an issue, communication becomes ore difficult with growing room for 
misunderstandings on problem-solving approaches and maybe on the nature of the problems 
themselves. This is likely to create tensions in transnational bureaucratic interaction, and 
possibly even lead to the complete interruption of contact between the involved bureaucratic 
agents. 
The situation in which matches or mismatches with rega d to the symbolic dimension of 
issue perceptions occur is harder to summarise. Generally speaking, a situation of few 
symbolic connotations for all involved bureaucratic agents, or even none at all, is most 
conducive to smooth transnational bureaucratic interac ion, ceteris paribus. Symbolic 
connotations in the perceptions of an issue tend be culturally determined and case-specific, 
Fig. 2.3: 
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which means their effect on interactive behaviour is hard to predict. For sure, they introduce 
an element of uncertainty in the relationship betwen bureaucratic agents and increase the 
likelihood of miscommunication. This implies that, as soon as an issue gains a symbolic 
dimension, it is better for transnational bureaucrati  interaction if this is the case in the 
perceptions of only one of the involved agents. For example, the interaction of the Chinese 
and Japanese ministries of foreign affairs on the issue of the contested Diaoyu Island would 
probably be easier if one side would not see it as a matter of indivisible sovereignty and 
national prestige. Lastly, interaction is generally most difficult if an issue is symbolically 
charged for both sides, although this may greatly vary depending on degrees and types of 
symbolism. 
In summary, the independent dynamics of transnationl bureaucratic interaction depend 
first and foremost on the factors identified by Keohane and Nye, i.e. the degree of overlap in 
preferences and worldviews, the quality and potential of personal relations, and the 
compatibility of political resources when considering closer forms of cooperation. This 
analytical picture can be completed by linking these factors to perceptions by the involved 
bureaucratic agents of themselves, the international actor they are part of and their 
counterparts. Finally, whether transnational bureaucratic ties continue, strengthen, worsen, or 
are interrupted also depends on matches or mismatches in the perceptions of the issues by 
those agents. In general, it is most conducive for continued contact if there is agreement on an 





In this chapter I first explored a number of existing theoretical approaches for the 
contributions they can make in answering the question  set out in the introductory chapter. I 
found that while some do have something to say about certain aspects of this research, none 
of them can cover all of its aspects. In a second section, I therefore developed a new analytical 
framework starting from the two most promising approaches discussed in the previous 
chapter, i.e. foreign policy analysis and the litera u e on transgovernmental relations. This 
framework proposes to analyse transnational bureaucatic interaction between any two 
international actors by distinguishing three separate processes. First, the policy-making 
process in international actor A determines how its bureaucratic agents initially approach their 
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counterparts in the administrative structure of inter ational actor B. Second, the policy-
making process in B shapes the reception of this initial approach, especially whether it is 
accepted as it is or transformed. For both of these processes, I suggested to explain the 
outcomes, i.e. A’s initial approach and B’s reaction, with reference to three different logics, 
namely an organisational logic focusing on standard operating procedures, a bureaucratic 
politics logic that points to bargaining among decision-making units within an administration, 
and lastly the logic of hierarchy and central contrl hat counteracts to some extend the other 
two. The third process concerns the independent dynamics of direct interaction between 
bureaucratic agents of A and B, in particular the continuation, strengthening, weakening or 
disruption of transnational bureaucratic interaction. Here I concentrate on two logics. First, 
the matching preferences and worldviews, the quality of personal relations, and compatibility 
of political resources between bureaucratic agents of the two international actors, and how 
this relates to their perceptions of themselves, their international actor and their counterparts. 
Second, I consider a logic of interaction as it results from perceptions of the nature of issues 
and their match or mismatch between the bureaucratic agents of A and B. 
Transnational bureaucratic interaction, or the modalities of interaction between the 
administrative structures of two international actors, plays a significant role in determining to 
what extent policy goals can eventually be achieved. It is not the primary goal of this research 
to explain success or failure in foreign policy, but the following chapters will all try to make 
suggestions about links between patterns of transnational bureaucratic interaction and 
performance with regard to the substance of policies. Whether one picks the “right” 
counterpart or not when initially approaching another international actor may have a decisive 
impact on the entire policy – just as the reaction by this counterpart may go far in determining 
which side can further promote its interests. The dir ct contact between bureaucratic agents 
also contributes to the shaping of substantial outcomes. Keohane and Nye point out that even 
rather simple forms of transgovernmental relations may lead to “changes in attitudes” and 
“will at least marginally change policy and affect its implementation.”100 And they add that 
“[e]ven where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and no major deviations from central 
policy positions occur, the existence of a sense of collegiality may permit the development of 
flexible bargaining behavior in which concessions need not be requited issue by issue or 
during each period.”101 
                                                
100 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.45. 
101 Keohane and Nye 1974, p.46. 
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Before moving on to the next chapter, it is important to point to the influence of the 
larger international environment, although it has no direct influence the modalities of 
interaction between the bureaucratic agents of two international actors. Yet the policy 
processes of the involved polities and the dynamics of relations between bureaucratic entities 
may very well be influenced by other international actors and the relations between them. The 
international environment may influence the making of foreign policy within each polity by 
changing interests, beliefs, etc., it may affect the ies between decision-making units and 
individuals by creating norms, supplying (or possibly interdicting) certain venues for 
encounters, etc. and it may impact perceptions. Albeit indirect, this is an important factor, and 




















Chapter II. Fitting China and the EU into the Framework 
 
 
After the more theoretical discussions of the previous chapter, the question arises of how 
the analytical framework matches the international actors that are the focus of this research 
and their interactions. Therefore in this chapter I attempt to fill the abstract categories it 
proposes with substance from what is generally known about foreign-policy making in China 
and in the EU and about the relations between the two. The goal is to demonstrate the 
applicability of the analytical framework and its variables and causal mechanisms before 
moving on to the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
The first section below introduces the Chinese foreign-policy process, i.e. process I of 
the analytical framework, and elaborate how organisational logic, bureaucratic bargaining and 
the degree of central control shape Chinese approaches of the EU. Due to the opaqueness of 
decision making in China, I devote substantial space to the identification of the bureaucratic 
agents involved and their role in the process. The second section will then do similarly for EU 
foreign policy, or process II of the framework, and try to elucidate the EU’s reception of 
Chinese approaches. As there is some more transparecy in the EU’s foreign-policy process 
as well as more previous research available, this section is kept more concise. The third 
section will consider how process III of the framework, the independent dynamics of direct 
transnational bureaucratic contacts, may play a role in defining patterns of interaction between 
China and the EU. 
 
2.1 The Chinese Foreign-Policy Process 
 
For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to understand the nature of the Chinese foreign 
policy process. First, the political system it is embedded in is relatively young. After the end 
of imperial rule in 1911, it took almost four decades of revolution and civil war before 
relative stability returned with the founding of the PRC in 1949. Since then there has been 
constant tension between institutionalisation and personal rule, with recurrent crises. This 
means that the political system of the new state could not mature and find a sustainable 
balance in the decades following its establishment, as has been the case for other states 
founded after the Second World War, like for example the Federal Republic of Germany. It 
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was only after the Cultural Revolution, which can be considered a crisis of extreme personal 
rule, that an evolution began which has led the politica  system more or less continuously to 
the present situation. 
Second, even these developments of the reform era have been slow, very much in line 
with Deng Xiaoping’s step-by-step approach to reform, as reflected in his quote on feeling the 
rocks while crossing a river (摸着石头过河 – mōzhe shítou guòhé). This means we are still 
faced with a system that is to some extent “in the making”, where decision-making processes, 
including on foreign-policy, are still maturing and sometimes changing. Third, although this 
evolution of the past 30 years can be considered as having a strong component of 
institutionalisation, personalities and personal networks still play an important role in Chinese 
politics, and the course of reform, including in particular the pace and direction of political 
and administrative innovation, depends largely on which faction manages to have its members 
in the right places at the right time. Fourth, the Chinese political system is all but transparent. 
As a result, apart from referring to literature on the Chinese political system and foreign-
policy making, which has difficulties keeping pace with the evolution, it is indispensable to 
use as many additional clues as possible to get an understanding of the process during the 
period this research is focussing on. The following sub-sections therefore take some pain in 
elaborating on the membership of various top decision-making bodies, since this can provide 
important hints on the relevance of both the organs in question and the persons involved. This 
is all the more important as the period focussed here, i.e. 2002-2007, begins with a leadership 
transition, from Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as the leadership 
duo formed by the party General-Secretary and the Sate Premier. 
As China is a state, it is beyond doubt that it qualifies as an international actor in the 
context of the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter. Yet with regard to 
bureaucratic agents, things may look a bit confusing initially, as China is an enormous 
country where politics happens on many levels, from the centre down to villages. And indeed, 
the room for external activities by local government, especially provinces, has grown since 
the beginning of reform policy in the late 1970s. They now play a role in the implementation 
of certain policies towards the outside, and some of them actively lobby the central foreign-
policy apparatus for their preferred policies.1 However, “the formulation of foreign policy, 
defense policy, and foreign economic policy still rests with the central authorities.”2 
                                                
1 Cheung and Tang 2001. pp.93-94. 
2 Cheung and Tang 2001, p.97. 
 47
Therefore, the focus in the entire section will be exclusively on the central political level in 
Beijing. 
The first sub-section below will give a brief overview of literature on Chinese foreign 
policy, followed by a general introduction to the institutional structure of policy making in 
China. I then turn to the bureaucratic agents involved in the making of foreign policy, in 
particular with regard to the EU. Lastly, I analyse th  role of these agents in the foreign-policy 
processes based on the three dimensions proposed in the analytical framework, i.e. 
organisational logic, bureaucratic bargaining and the degree of central control. In all this the 
focus is clearly on the central level. 
 
2.1.1 Studying Chinese Foreign-Policy Making – But No Towards the EU 
 
If there is a lacuna in the literature on EU foreign policies concerning how outsiders deal 
with a “big power” EU, and good reasons for choosing China’s policy towards the EU to get a 
better understanding of the issue, this effort can also close a significant gap in the literature on 
Chinese foreign policy. Due to the nature of the political system, the making of Chinese 
foreign policy is particularly difficult to research. Understanding of political processes during 
Mao Zedong’s lifetime was rather limited, and only afterwards did the beginning of reform 
and opening up make possible more thorough investigations.3 Throughout the 1990s a 
growing number of books and articles on the policy processes in China, including on foreign 
policy, was published, although with a clear dominance by Anglo-Saxon, and in particular 
American, scholars.4 In general, the greater density of China hands in the US than in Europe 
has led to a more abundant and more informed literature on China-US relations than on Sino-
European relations.5 With regard to the question of foreign policy processes, this has biased 
the selection of cases towards those that are significa t within transpacific relations rather 
than for Europe.6 
This does not mean that there are no writings at all on Sino-European relations – in fact, 
the next sub-section will provide a detailed review of what has been written on the topic. Also 
                                                
3 Good examples for thorough post-Mao research include Lieberthal 1984 and Barnett 1985. 
4 See for example Lieberthal and Lampton (eds.) 1992, and part 1 in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds.) 1994. 
5 See for example Lampton 2001, Shambaugh 2000 and 2002. 
6 See for example the contributions to Lampton (ed.) 2001, or also the up-to-date and concrete contributions fo 
the China Leadership Monitor. 
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it would be wrong to think that there is no expertise on Chinese policy processes in Europe.7 
However, this expertise has not yet been applied to furthering our understanding of how 
Chinese foreign policy towards Europe is made, and how Chinese decision makers deal with 
the complexities for European integration. 
By contrast, some literature, although limited, does exist on how the Chinese elite 
perceives Europe. It is mostly based on reviews of open sources. Most noteworthy is the 
effort by Stefan Friedrich, who reviews all issues of three Chinese academic journals over 
almost ten years.8 Comments by other authors suggest certain changes ov r time in the 
perceptions. Initially in the 1980s “China’s leaders consistently over-estimated the trend to 
unity within the European Community,”9 and they expected a united Western Europe to 
balance not only against the USSR but also against the US.10 In the early 1990s, it seems that 
Chinese analysts started to perceive the EU more as a tool of the particular interests of big 
members, most prominently France before German unification and Germany since then.11 
Overall, however, the specific role of these perceptions in the policy making process remains 
unspecified and unclear. 
 
2.1.2 The Basic Policy-Making Structures in China 
 
Generally the Chinese political system can be divided into three main pillars or “vertical 
systems:”12 the Communist Party of China (CPC),13 the government or state institutions in 
general, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Each of these pillars has its own 
organisational structure, permeating all administrative levels, from the grassroots of Chinese 
society to the very top. Party and state are often organised in parallel, with organs from each 
side covering similar functional fields at the same level.14 In the military, there is a similar 
                                                
7 See in particular publications by Sebastian Heilmann, nd contributions to the online working paper series 
China Analysis. 
8 Friedrich 2000. 
9 Yahuda 1994, p.267. 
10 Shambaugh 1996, pp.13-14. 
11 See Möller 2002, in particular p.19, but also Pillsbury 2002, p.10. For more on Chinese attitudes towards 
Europe see the literature review in section 2b below. 
12 Lu 2001, p.39. 
13 In many texts the party is referred to as “Chinese Communist Party” and abbreviated CCP; since this will be 
used to designate the Common Commercial Policy of the EU I use “Communist Party of China” and CPC 
instead. 
14 See Heilmann 2004, pp.90-92, especially the graph, p.91. 
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vertical structure as in state and party, yet with the “military region” as additional level above 
the province; functionally it is more narrowly focussed on the security sector.15 
 
(i) Intertwined Systems 
CPC, state and PLA are not three separate institutional edifices. Instead, they are tightly 
and intricately connected, with a pre-eminent role f r the party. First, party committees within 
all state organs can direct activities to a considerabl  extent and dispose of a de facto veto 
power.16 This dominance of the CPC with regard to the state is also reflected in the numerous 
references to the “leadership of the Communist Party of China” in the preamble to the 
constitution of the PRC.17 Second, there is an “organizational framework for the exercise of 
political controls” in the PLA, consisting of “party committees, political commissars, and 
political departments which run parallel to the military chain of command.”18 Also, the Law 
on National Defence of 1997 explicitly places the PLA under the leadership of the party,19 
thus reflecting the party constitution which states hat “[t]he Communist Party of China 
persists in its leadership over the People’s Liberation Army and other armed forces of the 
people.”20 Third, virtually all top positions in both government and PLA are filled with party 
members.21 
In the 1980s, the reformist and liberal-minded state premier and later CPC general 
secretary Zhao Ziyang envisaged a separation of the party from the state, or at least a 
strengthening of state vis-à-vis party organs, including an effort to emancipate government 
entities from the dominance of the party committees within them.22 His mentor Deng 
Xiaoping was not generally opposed to political refo ms of this kind, yet his support was 
lukewarm and not consistent over time, partly because of his misgivings about “bourgeois 
liberalization,” and partly because he did not want to become too vulnerable to the critique of 
his reform course by conservative elements within te party leadership.23 In the end, fairly 
little of this effort at separating party and state survived the demise of Zhao Ziyang in the 
                                                
15 Lu 2001, p.39; Heilmann 2004, pp.156-159. 
16 Heilmann 2004, pp.90-92. 
17 See 1982 Constitution of the PRC, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html 
(consulted 17/08/2009); see also Heilmann 2004, p.75. 
18 Joffe 1999 [in Mulvenon and Yang (eds)], p.40. 
19 Heilmann 2004, pp.153. 
20 “General Programme”, i.e. preamble, of the party constitution. 
21 On concurrent positions and affiliations among the current top leadership, see Miller, H.L. 2003a and2003b, 
and Miller A. 2008a and 2008b; see also Table 3.1 below for a summary. 
22 On reform efforts in the 1980s see Baum 1993, especially pp. 386-390 and 412-415 on efforts at political 
reform. 
23 Baum 1993, pp. 390-393 and 406. 
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context of the repression of 1989. One effect has been a mitigation of the parallel structures of 
party and state in the field of economic policy where government bureaucracies have become 
the key decision making units.24 At the same time the creation of state entities in functional 
fields where previously only party organs were present has multiplied phenomena of “one 
organ, two nameplates” (一个机构两块牌子 – yīge jīgòu, liǎngkuài páizi), meaning that the 
identical group of persons staffs the parallel party nd state bodies.25 
There has also been slow change in the relationship between the party and the military. 
In the face of growing aspiration to military professionalism in the PLA, opposition to tight 
political control has been mounting among Chinese officers.26 This does not mean that 
political and ideological education in the PLA has stopped, but there has been a 
“downgrading” of party committees and political commissars, indicating a “growing 
organizational separation” of the military from the party and “its continued transformation 
into a professionally oriented institution.”27 
 
(ii) The Party as the Backbone 
The CPC can be considered the backbone of the Chinese political system.28 Leaving 
aside its organisation at provincial level or below, arguably of minor influence in the foreign-
policy process, one can discern a distinctive pyramid l structure of the central party 
institutions. At the basis there are the periodical N tional Party Congresses, held now every 
five years, yet less regularly during Maoist times.29 The number of delegates has been 
constantly growing, with more than 1000 already in the decades right after the founding of the 
PRC, more than 1500 since the late 1970s, and more than 2000 at the last three congresses, 
i.e. the 15th in 1997, the 16th in 2002 and the 17th in 2007.30 The party congresses are major 
events of great significance for the political situation of the whole country and its evolution 
until the next congress. First and foremost, this influence stems from the fact that top party 
leaders, i.e. the top leaders of China, are selected or confirmed in the context of National 
                                                
24 Heilmann 2004, p.92. 
25 Lu 2001, p.46, fn.18; also mentioned in Shambaugh 2008b, p.837. 
26 Joffe 1999, p.40. 
27 Joffe 1999, pp.40-41. 
28 Unless noted otherwise, the following paragraphs on party organisation are based on Heilmann 2004, pp.80-
95, and Lieberthal 1995, pp.159-162. 
29 See table in Heilmann 2004, p.86. 
30 See the official government website http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/225868.htm (consulted 
18/04/2009). 
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Party Congresses. Second, the congress discusses major issues of ideology and policy and 
may decide ideological adjustments or fundamental policy shifts. 
Yet in these activities of the party congress, there is not much room for spontaneous 
initiatives or input from the party basis. With regard to leadership selection, its role is, in 
principle, to elect the Central Committee (CC) and the Central Discipline Inspection 
Commission (CDIC).31 Yet, in practice, most CC and CDIC members are simply the first- and 
second-ranking officials of a number of important party, government and military bodies.32 
This does not mean that membership is for all of them an automatic privilege of their office: 
candidates are handpicked in a long process of consultation among party leaders. At the last 
two party congresses a few candidates to each organ did actually get eliminated during 
preliminary elections,33 but competition nevertheless remains very limited. Similarly, 
decisions on ideology or policy simply constitute endorsements of the result of lengthy 
preparatory work and deliberations at the top of the party. The outcomes of party congresses, 
therefore, do not usually come as surprises, or if they do, it is only for outsiders, due to the 
secrecy of intra-party decision-making processes. 
Above the party congresses, halfway up the pyramid of central party organisation, is the 
CC. Over the past 40 years its membership has been close to 200, or slightly above, 
representing party, state and military organs from central level and below.34 The CC meets 
about once or twice a year. In its first session, right after its constitution by the party congress, 
the new CC proceeds to the election of all higher party officials, including the General 
Secretary and the members of the Politbureau (PB), the Politbureau Standing Committee 
(PBSC), the Secretariat, as well as of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC).35 In 
reality, very much like for the election of the CC itself by the party congress, nominations 
have usually been agreed on beforehand. The CC resembles a party congress also in that its 
meetings “discuss and announce policies rather than decide them.”36 It can be understood as 
the highest legitimising organ between the party congresses, dealing typically with major 
policy issues that are potentially controversial but not so fundamental as to need endorsement 
by the full party congress. For example, a contested reform of state-owned enterprises was 
                                                
31 Art.19 of the party constitution; see government website http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49109.htm 
(consulted 18/04/2009). 
32 See government website china.org.cn, 21 Oct. 2007, “Central Committee increases women and minority 
alternate members”, http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229152.htm (consulted 19/04/2009). 
33 See government website china.org.cn, 20 Oct.2007, “8% of nominees eliminated in primary elections”, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229028.htm (consulted 19/04/2009). 
34 See table in Heilmann 2004, p.86. 
35 Art. 22 of the party constitution; see government website http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49109.htm 
(consulted 18/04/2009); see also Miller, H.L. 2003a and Miller, A.L. 2008a. 
36 Lieberthal 1995, p.160. 
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discussed and endorsed in a slightly softened version at the 4th plenum of the 15th CC in 
September 1999.37 Similarly, the 17th CC in October 2008 discussed the controversial reform 
of land rights and in the end produced a fairly moderate final document.38 Under the CC there 
are a number of commissions and offices with a functio al focus, somewhat similar to 
ministries in a government, like for example the General Office, providing administrative 
support for the CC, the CDIC, the Politics and Law Commission, the Propaganda Department, 
etc. The CC’s Leading Small Groups (LSG) play a particular role in the policy process and 
will be discussed below. 
The next body above the CC is the PB. Almost all of its members “are among the 
twenty-five to thirty-five people […] who form the top power elite.”39 The PB of the 16th 
party congress in the fall of 2002 had 24 full plus one alternate member, of which nearly 
about a fourth were party secretaries from provincial level and two generals of the PLA.40 The 
17th party congress in the fall of 2007 nominated a PB of 25 members with no alternate 
member, with the same proportions for representatives from the provinces and the military.41 
In the first decades after the foundation of the PRC, regular PB membership tended to be 
around 20 plus a few alternate members, but after Mao’s death there was an upsurge in 
regular membership to about 30, but it was brought down to 15 in the late 1980s, from where 
it has slowly increased to the current levels.42 For most of the period since the foundation of 
the PRC, public information about the frequency of PB meetings and the issues debated has 
been scarce. During periods of increased transparency, i.e. the late 1980s before the violent 
crackdown in 1989 and since the last leadership transition, there is evidence that the full PB is 
meeting about once per month.43 The full PB does discuss and decide many top policy issues, 
yet it is not usually, nor necessarily, involved in all regular decision-making or in handling 
urgent issues that require immediate attention, in part because many of its members have 
other tasks besides top central leadership and are not based in Beijing.44 To some extent, it 
                                                
37 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, 29 Sept. 1999, “WTO strategy holds clues to reform”. 
38 覃爱玲(Tán Àilíng), 南方周末(Nánfāng Zhōumò – Southern Weekend), 
“30年：从人的解放到土地的解放,争议“新土改”(30 nián: cóng rénde jiěfàng dào tǔdìde jiěfàng, zhēngyì 
“x īn tǔgǎi” – 30 years: from the liberation of people to theliberation of land, debating the “new land reform”)“. 
39 Lieberthal 1995, p.161. 
40 See Miller, H.L. 2003a. 
41 See Miller A.L. 2008a. 
42 For a listing of PB membership since the founding of the PRC, see the annex of MacFarquhar (ed) 1993. 
43 Miller, H.L. 2004a, pp.2-3; Miller H.L. 2004c, p.1. 
44 Lu 2001, p.42; see Miller, H.L. 2003a, 2004c, 2008a, and 2008b for name lists and functions in the PBs of the 
16th and 17th party congresses. 
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simply ratifies decisions that come from the next higher party organ, the PBSC, but it may 
also serve as a legitimising body for issues on which the officials at the very top are divided.45 
Constant effective leadership is left to the PBSC, at the pinnacle of the pyramid of party 
organisation, the “decision-making core group among the top leadership.”46 The evolution of 
its membership since the last PBSC under Jiang Zemin’s leadership is represented in Table 
3.1. Both the 16th and 17th party congresses designated nine members of the PB to be part of 
this powerful body, excluding in both cases the representatives from the provincial level as 
well as the generals, and with all its members residing in Beijing.47 For most of the history of 
the PRC it has been composed of six or seven members, with a peak at ten and above during 
the Cultural Revolution.48 Each member of the PBSC usually concentrates on one large policy 
field. These responsibilities are not published but they can either be derived from concurrent 
positions or they emerge from the themes of the officials’ public appearances49. Concerning 
the frequency or contents of PBSC meetings, there has never been much publicity, nor is there 
now. Based on occasional references to such meetings in the Chinese press, it appears that it 
meets far more frequently than the full PB, possibly as often as once a week.50 The PBSC 
takes final decisions on all policy issues that do not need legitimisation by the PB, or even the 
CC, and manages major emergencies. 
 
                                                
45 See Miller, H.L. 2004a, pp.7-8. 
46 Miller, H.L. 2004a, p.7. 
47 See Miller, H.L. 2003a; and Miller, A.L. 2008a. 
48 See the annex of MacFarquhar (ed) 1993. 
49 See Miller H.L. 2004c  and Miller, A.L. 2008b. 
50 Miller, H.L. 2004a, pp.3-4. 
Table 3.1: Members of PBSC and their concurrent position  in party and state 
Other positions or functional 
responsibility in PBSC: 
Person (and rank 
order) on 15th PBSC 
Person (and rank 
order) on 16th PBSC 
Person (and rank 
order) on 17th PBSC 
General secretary of the CPC (formally of the CC) 
President of the PRC 
Chairman of the CMC 
Jiang Zemin (1) Hu Jintao (1) Hu Jintao (1) 
Chairman of the NPC (formally of the NPCSC) Li Peng (2) Wu Bangguo (2) Wu Bangguo (2) 
Premier of the State Council Zhu Rongji (3) Wen Jiabao (3) Wen Jiabao (3) 
Chairman of the CPPCC Li Ruihuan (4) Jia Qinglin (4) Jia Qinglin (4) 
Executive secretary of CC Secretariat 
Vice-president of PRC 
President of Central Party School 
Hu Jintao (5) Zeng Qinghong (5) Xi Jinping (6)b 
Secretary/chairman of CDIC Wei Jianxing (6)a Wu Guanzheng (7) He Guoqiang (8) 
Executive vice-premier of State Council Li Lanqing (7) Huang Ju (6) Li Keqiang (7)c 
Member in charge of ideology and propaganda [No separate appointment] Li Changchun (8) Li Changchun (5) 
Member in charge of state security [No separate appointment] Luo Gan (9) Zhou Yongkang (9) 
Notes: 
a) also member of the secretariat. 
b) not formally designated as vice-president of PRC. 
c) explicitly put in charge of macroeconomic policy. 
Sources: 




The PB and the PBSC are assisted in their work by the Secretariat of the CPC which 
“plans and supervises the implementation of decisions made by the Politburo.”51 After the 
15th and 16th party congresses it consisted of eight officials, most recently only seven, 
including the general secretary of the party and one ther member of the PBSC who oversees 
its work.52 Formally, the Secretariat belongs, like the PB itself, to the CC of the party. Its real 
political influence has been fluctuating over time.53 During the civil war and the early years of 
the PRC it was the supreme decision-making body, much like the PBSC today. The 8th party 
congress in 1956 then made the Secretariat an executive agency at the service of the PB 
involved in the management of the party, the state and the military. During the Cultural 
Revolution it was abolished, but revived in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping in order to 
outmanoeuvre his more conservative opponents in the party leadership. At the 12th Party 
Congress in 1982, general secretary Hu Yaobang managed to enthrone a particularly powerful 
Secretariat with twelve members, almost all of whom had parallel positions in the State 
Council. This effort at minimising the role of the aging PB proved to be not very successful. 
Also, the structure was at odds with state premier Zhao Ziyang’s goal of separating party and 
state. Therefore, Hu’s purge at the 13th Party Congress in 1987 triggered a downsizing and 
considerable reduction of the Secretariat’s political weight, largely in favour of the PBSC.54 
Since then the Secretariat has mostly been limited to providing staff support to the PB and 
managing internal party issues, with no sign of any durable comeback so far.55 
Among the numerous other party bodies, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission 
deserves mention, the task of which is to enforce respect of party rules and to investigate 
cases of violations.56 It has been most prominently involved in anti-corruption investigations, 
including at the very top of the leadership. This puts it in a rather powerful position within the 
CPC, which is reflected in the fact that its secretary is usually a member of the PBSC. The 
CDICs elected at the last two party congresses haved between 120 and 130 members.57 
Lastly, it should be noted that there is an official rank order of top officials which shows that 
                                                
51 Lu 2001, p.43. 
52 See the “Who’s Who of the Party Leadership” on the official website of the 17th congress, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227112.htm; the page includes links to similar information from the 
two previous congresses. 
53 For a short summary see Lu 2001, pp.42-44. 
54 Hamrin 1990, pp.190-191 and 239. 
55 Lieberthal 1995, p.161, Lu 2001, p.44. 
56 Lieberthal 1995, pp.162-163. 
57 See the listings on the official website; see http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/48800.htm for the CDIC 
of the 16th party congress in 2002, and http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/229165.htm for that of the 
17th in 2007. 
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a hierarchical structure based on individuals and their personal authority transcends the 
distribution of officials on different leadership organs. 
 
(iii) State Organs and Their Connection to the Party 
A similar pyramid of organs can be found in the state pillar of the Chinese political 
system.58 At its base is the main legislative organ, the National People’s Congress (NPC). The 
NPC convenes once every year, usually in March, for about two weeks. During most of the 
history of the PRC, a new NPC has been constituted ev ry five years, with the exception of 
the Cultural Revolution period.59 Since the late 1970s the first assembly of a newly elected 
NPC is held at the beginning of the year following a National Party Congress, i.e. the 9th NPC 
first convened 1998, the 10th in 2003 and the 11th in 2008.60 Membership has been around 
1200 for the first two NPCs in 1954 and 1959, yet since the 1960s it has been mostly around 
3000.61 Within the NPC the military is over-represented an the body as a whole is dominated 
by the party. 
The NPC has the power to elect and recall the top officials of all executive organs of the 
state, in particular the President and the Vice-President, upon nomination by the President the 
State Premier, and upon nomination by the latter th Vice-Premiers, State Councillors and 
Ministers.62 These elections take place at the constitutive meeting of every new NPC. 
However, much like in the case of the party congress, there is no truly competitive election 
process, and the NPC mostly confirms previously establi hed nominations. Most of the top 
positions in the government are filled de facto when the party leadership is confirmed and 
portfolios distributed in the context of the preceding party congress. For any positions that 
may have been left open, consultations within the new party leadership are likely to determine 
the future office holders before the NPC. 
With regard to the NPC’s legislative functions, budget power, and review of national 
development plans,63 the NPC mostly ratifies decisions that have already been prepared (and 
de facto taken) in advance by its Standing Committee (NPCSC). Due to the enormous size of 
                                                
58 Unless noted otherwise, the following paragraphs on the structure of state organs are based on Heilmann 2004, 
pp.95-102 and 133-143, Lieberthal 1995, pp.162-163, and Central Government Directory of the People’s 
Republic of China, issues 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. 
59 See also art. 60 of the Constitution of the PRC. 
60 See the government website http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/History/node_2870.htm for historical 
information as well as http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm for the current NPC 
(both consulted 21/04/2009). 
61 See table in Heilmann 2004, p.135. 
62 Art.62 and 63 of the Constitution of the PRC. 
63 Art.62 of the Constitution of the PRC. 
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the full NPC and its short annual meeting period, the bulk of activity is located in the NPCSC. 
In fact, the constitution stipulates that the legislat ve power of the state is exercised both by 
the NPC and the NPCSC, although the former has the (theoretical) option to “alter or annul 
inappropriate decisions” by the latter.64 During the last two legislatures, the NPCSC has 
consisted of between 170 and 180 delegates.65 Membership is a full-time position and not 
compatible with any other government offices.66 The NPCSC convenes approximately every 
two months. Overall, the influence of the top leadership on the NPC is considerable. 
However, since the beginning of reform policies in the late 1970s the influence of the NPCSC 
has grown considerably, in part due to the growing legislative activity.67 
In parallel to the NPC, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
is also meeting annually during the same time period. It started with a relatively limited 
membership of a few hundred in the early days of the PRC but quickly grew to over 1000 
members by 1959 and consistently a little over 2000 over the past 25 years.68 It is considered 
a “united front organization”, i.e. including non-communist parties and groups alongside the 
CPC, like for example a number of recognised parties, ethnic groups, representatives from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and some overseas Chinese. It would be wrong to conceive of 
them as real opposition groups though, as everything appens “[u]nder the leadership of the 
CPC.”69 Therefore the CPPCC is largely a consultative institution debating certain issues that 
may later feed into central or local policies. It originated in the mid-1940s as an effort to 
promote cooperation among contending political groups in China and prevent civil war, and 
was maintained in the early years of the PRC as a tool to provide wider legitimacy to the new 
regime.70 The Cultural Revolution interrupted the activities of the CPPCC but sessions 
resumed in the 1980s, including some strong pro-democracy activism prior to 1989.71 
The executive organs of the central government are usually referred to as the State 
Council. They can be roughly divided in two: first, the “Inner Cabinet” consisting of the State 
Premier at the head, four Vice-Premiers, and five State Councillors; second, the “Outer 
Cabinet” comprising currently 28 ministerial level bureaucracies, including most notably the 
                                                
64 Art.58 and 62 of the Constitution of the PRC. 
65 See Heilmann 2004, p.134 for the CC of the 10th NPC; for the 11th NPC see government website 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2847.htm (consulted 21/04/2009). 
66 Art.65 of the Constitution of the PRC. 
67 On the changing role of the NPC, see Tanner 1998. 
68 See the official CPPCC website, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brf_intro/jianjie_2.htm, on “Composition 
of the CPPCC” (consulted 21/04/2009). 
69 Official CPPCC website, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brf_intro/jianjie_1.htm on “Nature and Position of 
the CPPCC” (consulted (21/04/2009). 
70 Hamrin 1990, p.230; Teiwes 1993, p.26-27. 
71 Hamrin 1990, p.230. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the People’s Bank of China, i.e. the central 
bank, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of State Security, which is involved in 
intelligence work, and many other ministries and commissions. The Inner Cabinet is assisted 
by the State Council General Office, a purely administrative organ. As in the case of the 
PBSC, each member of the Inner Cabinet concentrates on specific policy fields that are not 
publicised and have to be inferred from concurrent positions, background, or public 
appearances. In the Outer Cabinet the responsibilities of minister-level officials are implicit to 
the body they are heading. 
The Inner Cabinet is tightly connected with the party’s PBSC and PB (see Table 3.2). 
Since the 9th NPC, first convened in March 1998, both the State Pr mier and the Executive 
Vice-Premier have been members of the PBSC, and overall about two-thirds of the positions 
in the Inner Cabinet are held by members of the PB, i.e. all Vice-Premiers and one or two 
State Councillors72. Accordingly, functional responsibilities of top officials are coordinated 
between these three organs. This means that aside from the State Premier and the Executive 
Vice-Premier with overarching leadership tasks, the other members of both the Inner Cabinet 
and the PB cover the same policy fields in both organs. One of the remaining State 
Councillors serves as State Council Secretary General with the mostly administrative task of 
heading the State Council General Office. The others are assigned additional functional fields. 
In terms of political power and status the Inner Cabinet, although top organ of the State 
Council, remains below the top body of the party, in particular the PBSC, confirming the 
general rule of CPC leadership vis-à-vis the state. The higher position of the PBSC is also






                                                
72 In the State Councils of the 9th and 10th NPCs it was seven out of ten members of the Inner Cabinet, in the 
current State Council it is six out of ten. Before that only the State Premier was in the PBSC and less PB 
members held positions as Vice-Premiers or State Councillors. 
73 For example, Luo Gan became State Councillor in 1998 and moved on to be a member of the PBSC in 2002; 
Zhou Yongkang became State Councillor in 2003 and moved to the PBSC in 2007; there is no evidence of 
movement in the opposite direction. 
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Table 3.2: Members of the State Council’s Inner Cabinet and their responsibilities 
Position in 
Inner Cabinet 
9th NPC (1998-2003) 10th NPC (2003-2008) 11th NPC (2008-) 
Zhu Rongji  (PBSC) 
 
Wen Jiabao (PBSC) 
 
Wen Jiabao (PBSC) 
 
State Premier Overall economic management 
Foreign affairs in general 
Overall economic management 
Foreign affairs in general 
Overall economic management 
Foreign affairs in general 
Li Lanqing  (PBSC) 
 
Huang Ju (PBSC) 
 




Economic management Economic management 





Qian Qichen (PB) 
 
Wu Yi  (f) (PB) 
Minister of Public Health 
Hui Liangyu  (PB) 
 
Vice-Premier Foreign affairs 
Taiwan Affairs 
Foreign economic relations 
Public health 
Agriculture and rural affairs 
Wu Bangguo (PB) 
 
Zeng Peiyan (PB) 
 







Development of western region 
Revitalization of the northeast 
Industry and energy 
Industry and energy 
Wen Jiabao (PB) 
Member of CPC Secretariat 
Hui Liangyu  (PB) 
 
Wang Qishan (PB) 
 
Vice-Premier Macroeconomic policy 
Finance 
Agriculture and rural affairs International finance 
Foreign economic relations 
General Chi Haotian (PB) 
CMC Vice-Chair, Minister of Defence 
Zhou Yongkang (PB) 
Member of CPC Secretariat 
Liu Yandong (f) (PB) 
 
State Councillor External security, military, defence Internal Security 
Legislation 
Private sector 
Luo Gan (PB) 
Member of CPC Secretariat 
General Cao Gangchuan, (PB) 
CMC Vice-Chair, Minister of Defence  
General Liang Guanglie 
Member of CMC, Minister of Defence  
State Councillor Internal security 
Legislation 
External security, military, defence External security, military, defence 




Ma Kai  
State Council Secretary-General 
State Councillor Foreign economic relations Foreign relations 
Taiwan affairs 
Government administration 
Ismail Amat Hua Jianmin 
State Council Secretary-General 
Meng Jianzhu 
Minister of Public Security 
State Councillor Ethnic affairs 
Minorities 
Government administration Internal security 
Legislation 
Wang Zhongyu 
State Council Secretary-General 




State Councillor Government administration Education 




Sources: Central Government Director of the PRC, 2006-2007 and 2007-2008; official leadership biographies on government website 
www.china.org.cn; biographies on Hong Kong-based web service www.chinavitae.com; Miller, H.L. 2003a; Miller, H.L. 2003b; Miller, H.L. 
2004b; Miller H.L. 2004c; Miller, A.L. 2008a; Miller, A.L. 2008b; 人民日报 (Rénmín Rìbào – People’s Daily), 19 March 1998, 
“九届全国人大一次会议举行第六次全会 决定新一届国务院组成人员 (Jǐujiè quánguó réndà yīcì huìyì jǔxíng juédìng xīn yījiè 
Guówùyuàn zǔchéng rényuán – 9th NPC, 1st annual meeting, holds 6th plenary session and decides new State Council staff”.  
 
(iv) The Military Hierarchies 
On the military side, the Central Military Commission (CMC) is “the country’s highest-
level military organ” and “responsible for the making and coordination of defense policy”, 
approaching in power and status the PBSC and the Stat  Council.74 It is chaired by China’s 
                                                
74 Cheung 2001, pp.61-62 and 68. 
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top political leader, in the reform period first Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s, who handed 
this position to Jiang Zemin in 1989, who then, in turn, ceded his place to Hu Jintao in 2004.75 
The two generals of the PLA with seats on the PB serve as Vice-Chairmen. One of them, 
typically with a background at the head of the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), 
concentrates on top security issues and military strategy, as the “chief warfighter”, while the 
other serves as “chief military politician”, representing the PLA’s interests among the top 
leadership in Beijing.76 Either the latter or another top officer on the CM also holds the 
positions of State Councillor and Minister of Defenc . Hu Jintao’s tenure as civilian Vice-
Chairman between 1999 and 2004 was unusual but can be understood as part of the training 
for succession to Jiang as Chairman.77 A similar set-up may well repeat itself in the context of 
the next major shift to a younger top leadership around 2012-2013. Likewise, the nomination 
of Xu Caihou as third Vice-Chairman in 2004 may have been intended to support the “chief 
military politician” Cao Gangchuan and prepare Xu to take over the role in 2007.78 
Historically, membership of the CMC has fluctuated considerably, with a peak of more 
than 60 in the late 1970s.79 Since the 15th party congress in 1997 the number has been varying 
between seven and ten. With the exception of the civilian top leader at the helm, and possibly 
a successor-in-the-making as Vice-Chairman, all members of the CMC are high military 
officers. Apart from two PB members and one State Councillor and Minister of Defence, the 
CMC usually includes the holders of the following military positions: the directors of the 
PLA’s four general departments, i.e. GSD, the General Political Department (GPD), the 
General Logistics Department (GLD), and the General Armaments Department (GAD), as 
well as, since 2004, the Commanders of three service branches of the PLA, namely the Air 
Force, the Navy and the Second Artillery which contr ls the strategic missiles.80 Aside from 
this institutional distribution, a pattern emerged in the 1990s that balanced political officers, 
i.e. with careers as political commissars or leading members of party committee in the PLA, 
and operational officers on the CMC.81 Yet the decision to add the three service branch 
commanders in 2004 seems to reflect a growing emphasis on an operational background.82 In 
                                                
75 Cheung 2001, pp.62-68; see also Mulvenon 2005. 
76 Mulvenon 2003, p.23. 
77 See Miller, H.L. 2005  and Mulvenon 2005. 
78 Mulvenon 2005, p.7. 
79 Cheung 2001, pp.62-64; see also Caprice 2008. 
80 Caprice 2008, p.3; Mulvenon 2005, p.6. 
81 Caprice 2008, p.2. 
82 Caprice 2008, p.3. 
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addition, a common theme of most CMC members over th  past decade seems to be 
experience relevant either conflict with Taiwan or c unter-terrorism.83 
The CMC meets once a week, mostly without attendance of its chairman, i.e. including 
only members from the military.84 In addition there are enlarged conferences of the CMC, 
attended by “several hundred top commanders from around the country”, with two possible 
functions: either as “year-end review sessions”, in a way parallel to the plenary sessions of the 
party’s CC, or as “extraordinary meetings to unveil major initiatives” that take place only 
“once or twice every decade.”85 During the weekly meetings “[d]ecisions on major military 
and defense issues are often made and later ratified at nlarged CMC gatherings.”86 
Over the past decades, “there has been a noticeable ffort by the Chinese leadership to 
coincide changes in CMC membership with the National Party Congresses.”87 Nevertheless, 
additional shifts do occur, which accounts, at least in part, for the fluctuating membership. For 
example, in 1999 top leader Jiang Zemin introduced his designated successor Hu Jintao as 
Vice-Chairman to the CMC, and also added two generals as ordinary members, probably in 
preparation of the massive retirement of older members that could be expected for 2002.88 
The shifts of 2004, which saw Hu Jintao take over th  chairmanship from Jiang Zemin, Xu 
Caihou advance from an ordinary member to be Vice-Chairman, and the commanders of the 
three service branches added, increased the number of CMC members from eight to ten. 
The CMC is today one of the cases of “one organ, two nameplates.”89 Originally a pure 
party organ, a parallel state CMC was founded in 1983 in the context of Zhao Ziyang’s efforts 
of strengthening the state, but it could not gain any significant influence. Today all members 
of state and party CMC are identical. 
The CMC is assisted by the General Office, a largely administrative body with a staff of 
two to three hundred.90 While it is not directly involved in policy-making, “it wields 
considerable influence by controlling the flow of information and documents, as well as 
organization and agendas of key CMC meetings.”91 Below the CMC, the most important 
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87 Caprice 2008, p.1. 
88 Mulvenon 2003, p.22. 
89 See Cheung 2001, pp.64 and 69. 
90 Cheung 2001, p.69. 
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organs of the PLA are its four general departments a d the service branches.92 As the key 
executive arm of the CMC, the GSD is the most powerful among them. Through its various 
Intelligence Directorates the GSD is involved in information gathering and analysis, while its 
Operations Directorate draws up operational plans for security contingencies. Aside from this 
direct impact on the making of security, and by extent foreign, policy, the GSD is also the key 
implementing agency of security policy, in particular with regard to force management. 
 
Table 3.3: CMC members and concurrent positions 
15th CPC Congress (1997-2002) 16th COC Congress (2002-2007) 17th COC Congress (2007-) 
Jiang Zemin, Chair Jiang Zemin, Chair 
(until 2004) 
Hu Jintao, Chair 
(since 2004) 
Hu Jintao, Chair 
CPC General Secretary 
PRC President 
Member, PBSC 
 CPC General Secretary 
PRC President 
Member, PBSC 
CPC General Secretary 
PRC President 
Member, PBSC 
Hu Jintao, Vice-Chair (1999-2004) Guo Boxiong, Vice-Chair Guo Boxiong, Vice-Chair 
Executive Secretary, CPC Secretariat 
PRC Vice-President 
Member, PBSC 
Member, PB Member, PB 
Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chair Cao Gangchuan, Vice-Chair Xu Caihou, Vice-Chair 
Member, PB 
Member, CPC Secretariat 
State Councillor 
Minister of Defence 
Member, PB 
Member, PB 
Chi Haotian, Vice-Chair Xu Caihou, Vice-Chair (since 2004) Liang Guanglie 
State Councillor 
Minister of Defence 
Member, PB 
Director GPD (2002-2004) 
Member, CPC Secretariat 
State Councillor 
Minister of Defence 
Fu Quanyou Liang Guanglie, Chen Bingde 
Director, GSD Director, GSD Director, GSD 
Yu Yongbo Li Ji’nai ,  Li Ji’nai 
Director, GPD Director, GAD (until 2004) 
Director, GPD (since 2004) 
Director, GPD 
Wang Ke Liao Xilong  Liao Xilong  
Director, GLD  Director, GLD 
Wang Ruilin Chen Bingde (member since 2004) Chang Wanquan 
Deputy Director, GPD Director, GAD (2004-2007) Director, GAD 
Cao Gangchuan Qiao Qingchen, (member since 2004) Jing Zhiyuan 
Director, GAD Commander, Air Force Commander, 2nd Artillery 
Guo Boxiong (member since 1999) Zhang Dingfa (member since 2004) Wu Shengli 
Executive Deputy Director, GSD (since 1999) Commander, Navy Commander, Navy 
Deputy Director, GSD 
Xu Caihou (member since 1999) Jing Zhiyuan (member since 2004) Xu Qiliang 
Executive Deputy Director, GPD (since 1999) Commander, 2nd Artillery Commander, Air Force 
Sources: Central Government Directory of the PRC, 2006-2007 and 2007-2008; official leadership biographies on government website 
www.china.org.cn(consulted 22.04.2009); biographies on Hong Kong-based web service www.chinavitae.com(consulted 22.04.2009); 
biographical information on website http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla.htm (consulted 22.04.2009); Mulvenon 2003; 
Mulvenon 2005; Mulvenon 2006; Fong Tak-ho, AsiaTimes, 2 Oct. 2007, “China reshuffle sends message to Taiwan”. 
 
The GPD is primarily responsible for party control ver the PLA, especially by 
overseeing the political commissars. Its Liaison Directorate, originally in charge of contact 
with nationalist forces during the anti-Japanese war in the 1930s, “has a special role in 
gathering and analysing political and economic intelligence concerning Taiwan.”93 The GAD 
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is responsible for arms procurement and research as well as the import and export of military 
material, while the GLD takes care of PLA infrastruc ures. The service branches, in particular 
Air Force and Navy, have played a considerable role in military modernisation and doctrinal 
changes since the late 1980s. Their increased influence is reflected in the accession of their 
commanders to the CMC in 2004. 
 
2.1.3 The Bureaucratic Agents of China’s Foreign Policy 
 
The Chinese foreign-policy process cuts across these three pillars, involving most 
importantly party and state, but also the military to a certain extent. It also includes several 
levels of central policy making, in particular the c ntral leadership, a set of intermediate 
coordinating bodies, and some of the central state bur aucracies.94 The following paragraphs 
will discuss these different horizontal layers of the foreign-policy process. 
 
(i) The Central Leadership 
According to Lu Ning, a Chinese diplomat-turned-scholar who provides the most 
detailed accounts of China’s foreign-policy making, in the Chinese political system the notion 
of “central leadership” (中央领导 – zhōngyānglǐngdǎo) is rather strictly defined.95 It 
comprises the paramount leader, the leadership nuclear ircle, the members of the Politburo 
Standing Committee, and the other members of the Politburo “particularly those who live in 
Beijing and those who work in the Secretariat.”96 This means that the most powerful spheres 
in China still gravitate around party organs, although, as the previous sub-section has 
demonstrated, state and party may often be hard to distinguish, especially at the very top. 
Paramount leaders in China have primarily distinguished themselves by their obvious de 
facto authority and influence rather than simply by their formally held positions. Even after 
passing State Presidency to Liu Shaoqi in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward, 
Mao still retained supreme authority. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping was considered paramount 
leader for almost twenty years although he held no top party or state position except for the 
chairmanship of the CMC. Among the other top officials the paramount leader tends to 
                                                
94 See Lu 1997 and 2001. The following discussion of the main actors in Chinese foreign policy making draws 
heavily on his detailed analysis of the process. 
95 Lu 2001, p.40, fn.4. 
96 Lu 2001, p.41. 
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designate on an informal basis one or two persons who surround him as a leadership nuclear 
circle, involving generally the State Premier or the General Secretary of the CPC, or both.97 
As the personal authority of the paramount leader has been declining since Mao, the nuclear 
circle also seems to have lost influence, in favour f the other elements of the central 
leadership.98 
Who then is dealing with what in the central leadership? Lu Ning distinguishes six 
functional “systems” (系统 – xìtǒng) in the Chinese governing structure, each of which is 
assigned to one member of the PBSC.99 In his analysis, these six systems cover: first, military 
affairs and defence; second, legal affairs and internal security; third, administrative affairs, 
“which is responsible for industrial and agricultural production, finance and commerce, 
foreign affairs, health, education, science, sports, and so on”; fourth, propaganda, including 
“media and cultural affairs”; fifth, “United Front” issues, a heading that is understood as 
covering everything related somehow to the idea of ll-Chinese unity, including in particular 
“non-communist political parties, religion, and minorities, as well as Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Macao affairs”; and sixth, mass organisation affairs, i.e. “unions, youth, women’s 
organizations, and other associations.”100 Verification of this division in six functional policy 
fields and respective responsibilities at the top is all but obvious, as the tasks of top leaders 
are not publicised. Yet a careful analysis of the current and past positions held by members of 
the central leadership and the themes of their public appearances suggests a more diversified 
picture, with further divisions of policy fields and a wider distribution of responsibilities. 
For the leadership teams after the 15th, 16th and 17th party congresses this is partly 
visible in tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.101 Looking only at the period at the centre of this re earch, 
i.e. 2002-2007, security strategy, military affairs and defence were certainly an important part 
of the general leadership responsibility of Hu Jintao, especially since 2004 when he was 
promoted from Vice-Chairman to Chairman of the CMC. Yet as number one leader he had 
many other tasks, and the two Vice-Chairmen of the CMC on the PB, generals Guo Boxiong 
and Cao Gangchuan, took care of this policy field in a more continuous fashion. By contrast, 
two members of the PBSC were active in the second of Lu Ning’s systems, legal affairs and 
internal security. On the one hand, Wu Bangguo, involved in the legislative process as 
Chairman of the NPCSC, on the other hand Luo Gan, who as concurrently secretary of the 
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CC’s Politics and Law Commission and wielded significant influence both in legislative and 
enforcement matters. Two regular PB members supported them, respectively, Wang Zhaoguo, 
executive Vice-Chairman of the NPCSC, and Zhou Yongka , State Councillor and Minister 
of Public Security. 
Lu Ning’s administrative affairs system, in which he lumps together a large number of 
very different policy fields, was distributed among many top officials in various positions. 
Aside from the State Premier Wen Jiabao’s leadership role in the management of the 
economy, PBSC member and executive Vice-Premier Huang Ju was deeply involved in 
questions of finance and the reform of state-owned enterprises. In this he was assisted by 
regular PB member and Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan who as also focussing on specific 
government policies to revitalise the industries of the northeast, to develop western China and 
in the field of environmental protection. PB member Hui Liangyu was in charge of agriculture 
and rural affairs while Ms. Wu Yi, his colleague onthe PB, was specifically responsible for 
foreign economic relations, but had also been put in charge of health issues in the aftermath of 
the SARS problem in 2003. Foreign affairs, as well as issues related to Taiwan, were an 
important aspect of both Hu Jintao’s and Wen Jiabao’s remit as PRC President and State 
Premier respectively, but again only one part of their many tasks. Yet no-one else in the PB 
was in charge of this policy field, the highest ranked official with a foreign and Taiwan affairs 
remit being State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan. Similarly, education and science were not taken 
care of by any of the PBSC or PB members, but rathe by State Councillor Ms. Chen Zhili. 
Ideology and propaganda were indeed covered by one of the PBSC members, supported, 
however, by PB member Liu Yunshan who was also directo  of the party’s Propaganda 
Department. United Front issues were also the focus of the work of PBSC member, Jia 
Qinglin who was concurrently chairman of the CPPCC, the main United Front body. Lastly, 
Lu Ning’s sixth system, mass organisation, had no presence on the PBSC, but seems to have 
been the responsibility of PB member Wang Zhaoguo wh  as also president of the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). 
Since Lu Ning proposed his analysis in 2001, the perceptions and priority of some issues 
may have changed, like for example Taiwan affairs with the election of president Chen Shui-
bian who favoured formal independence of the island. Nevertheless, the division of policy 
fields and the distribution of responsibilities within the central leadership appears more 
complicated than suggested by him. Also, he leaves out the question of internal party matters, 
an important dimension of the work of the top leadership. In addition to Hu Jinato, for whom 
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a supervisory role in this policy comes with his positi n as CPC General Secretary, this is the 
focus of the work of two other PBSC members, Zeng Qinghong, who directs the work of the 
party Secretariat and Wu Guanzheng who heads the party CDIC. In addition, alternate PB 
member Wang Gang is also involved in party affairs s Secretary of the CPC’s General 
Office.  
It is conspicuous that during this period there wasno-one at the very top of the Chinese 
political hierarchy, i.e. in the PBSC, with an exclusive focus on foreign affairs. For both PRC 
President Hu Jintao and State Premier Wen Jiabao this policy field was part of their 
overarching leadership responsibilities, for Hu probably more its strategic dimension, for Wen 
rather the economic aspects. PBSC member Huang Ju was involved with regard to 
international economic issues, especially the financial side. A clear external focus only 
appears at the level of regular PB member and Vice Premier Ms. Wu Yi who concentrated on 
foreign economic relations. The security dimension of international affairs was also covered 
in the PB, by the two generals, whereby it appears that Guo Boxiong was involved in strategic 
planning while Cao Gangchuan covered import and export of armaments and respective 
negotiations. By contrast, general foreign affairs work was being taken care of only outside 
the PB by State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan.  
This distribution of responsibilities among the top central leadership has a number of 
implications for foreign-policy making. First, day-to day work on foreign affairs in general 
happens below the central leadership, with no direct oversight by the PB and with no direct 
access to it. Second, the economic dimension of external relations is directly supervised by a 
member of the PB. This may reflect, at least in part, the priority given to this specific aspect 
of foreign affairs. It certainly ensures that interational economic issues can be directly 
brought to the attention of the central leadership. Third, for both general foreign affairs and 
external economic relations the assignation to members of the State Council rather than 
members of the CPC Secretariat indicates a relativey strong position of the state 
bureaucracies in foreign-policy making and relatively marginal role of party bodies. This does 
not mean, however, that within the state bodies, like for example the MFA, the CPC 
committees do not play a crucial role. This is in line with observations by Lu Ning.102 
At the same time, however, the PBSC and the full PB most certainly do treat foreign-
policy matters. Public statements on the agenda of PB meetings never mention foreign affairs, 
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except insofar as they may be part of “other matters.”103 But the regular PB study sessions, 
whose themes are public, regularly cover internatiol affairs.104 Also, it seems that the thin 
foreign policy expertise, in particular in the PBSC, is balanced to some extent by a team of 
diplomatic advisors working directly for the General-Secretary, most of whom have a 
background in the MFA, and including, in particular,  group of former ambassadors to 
European countries for EU-related issues.105 All this suggests that, as indicated by Lu Ning, 
the final decision-making power on all major foreign affairs issues lies with the PBSC, while 
the PB discusses issues that need a stronger legitimacy.106 
 
(ii) Intermediate Bodies: Coordination or Policy-Making? 
Below the central leadership, a set of intermediate coordinating bodies is involved in 
foreign-policy making, the so-called Leading Small Groups (LSG) (领导小组 
lǐngdǎoxiǎozǔ).107 LSGs do not only exist in the foreign-policy area but in virtually any policy 
field. They may be attached to a variety of bodies, most prominently the State Council, the 
PLA or the CPC CC and they are often focussed on very specific problems, short term issues, 
or emergencies.108 Their precise role in the policy process is not entir ly clear though. “At the 
time for their creation in 1958, the functions of the LSGs were not very well defined.”109 In 
1987, a reform of CPC CC institutions classified them as “decision-making consulting 
bodies.”110 Their actual influence may depend very much on the circumstances: the personal 
status of LSG members, the issue in question, and whether it is routine or a crisis situation.111 
The assessment of their role is made even more difficult by the fact that, with very few 
exceptions, names of LSG members are officially publicised.112 As in other cases, however, 
inference from past practice and compilations of references in various types of media can give 
a rough idea of LSG membership.113 
For the making of foreign-policy in general, i.e. not with a specific economic focus, the 
CC’s Foreign Affairs LSG (FA LSG) plays a crucial ro e. It has been in existence since 1958, 
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with an interruption during the Cultural Revolution.114 Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister 
(and PB member) Chen Yi served as its director, but since the beginning of reform this 
position has been held by officials from higher levels of leadership.115 For a while the PRC 
President was at its head, with the State Premier among his deputies, but from 1988 State 
Premier Li Peng held the post of director, while one of the Vice-Premiers (who was also PB 
member) and the Foreign Minister served as deputies. When Zhu Rongji replaced Li Peng as 
State Premier in 1998, Jiang Zemin took over the dir ctorship of the FA LSG, with Zhu and 
Vice-Premier (and PB member) Qian Qichen as his deputi s. There are hardly any indications 
concerning which people were filling top positions after the 16th party congress in 2002, but 
probably Hu Jintao took over as director.116 Inferring from the previous patterns, it seems 
likely that State Premier Wen Jiabao served as his deputy. He may have been the only one, 
since the highest official in charge of foreign affairs, State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan, was not 
member of the PB and did probably not have sufficient political status. Since the 17th party 
congress, his designated successor, Xi Jinping, member of the PBSC and PRC Vice-President, 
may have become deputy director.117 
For the period under study, evidence on the membership of the FA LSG is particularly 
scarce, but some inferences can be made from the limit d information on the periods before 
and after. For the period from 1998 to 2002,118 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan was among the 
members, as the second highest foreign affairs official below the group’s deputy head Qian 
Qichen. This would suggest that after the 2002-2003 leadership transition, Tang, who had 
become State Councillor, was joined by new Foreign Mi ister Li Zhaoxing. Ms Wu Yi, who 
was promoted from alternate member to regular member of the PB in 2002 and from State 
Councillor to Vice-Premier in charge of foreign economic relations, is likely to have 
continued on the LSG. It is possible that in both periods she was joined by the responsible 
minister, i.e. Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guangsheng before 
the transition and Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai afterwards.119 Furthermore, General Cao 
Gangchuan, who replaced General Chi Haotian on the PB, as State Councillor and as Defence 
Minister, probably also took his post on the FA LSG. Xu Yongyue remained Minister of State 
Security and most likely continued on the group. 
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These deductions from previous membership are supported by the more ample evidence 
on FA LSG membership since the reshuffle of top leadership positions in 2007-2008.120 Both 
the new State Councillor with a foreign affairs remit, Dai Bingguo, and the new Foreign 
Minister, Yang Jiechi, are members. There is no longer a PB member and Vice-Premier with 
the exclusive focus on external economic relations like Wu Yi, but Minister of Commerce 
Chen Deming appears to be on the LSG, just like the new Minister of State Security, Geng 
Huichang. The new State Councillor and Minister of De ence, Liang Guanglie, who unlike his 
predecessor is not in the PB, also appears to be a m mber. The listing for this latest period 
also includes top officials from the propaganda and United Front policy field. They are 
plausible but not corroborated by previous evidence. On one post evidence is contradictory: 
the Director of the CPC International Liaison Department has recently been included, 
although his predecessor had reportedly lost membership in 1998 as a consequence of the 
diminishing role of the party in foreign affairs.121 A reversal of such a decision is not 
impossible. 
The FA LSG is “not a standing institution and has no permanent staff,” and it relied, in 
the past, on the State Council Foreign Affairs Office122 for administrative support. This put 
the office in a rather influential position, reflect d by the ministerial rank of its head.123 Yet 
after a failed attempt to expand this influence, in 1998 the office was moved from the State 
Council to the party’s CC where it concentrated on p licy consulting, and since then the FA 
LSG is assisted by MFA staff.124 
The CC’s Finance and Economy LSG (FE LSG) is a parallel institution, with a similar 
gatekeeper and supervision function, although, unlike the FA LSG, it nominates its Secretary 
General and deputies from among its members, thus solving the problem of administrative 
support.125 Its predecessors date back to the late 1950s. Compared to the FA LSG they all had 
higher-profile leading members, including Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai as Directors, both PBSC 
members, and with several deputy directors and members who were in the PB.126 Yet it was 
only after the beginning of reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s that the FE LSG 
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“has […] become an increasingly important locus for the making of China’s foreign economic 
decisions and for their coordination and implementation.”127 
For most of the 1980s the FE LSG was headed by PBSC member Zhao Ziyang. While 
he was State Premier he had one of the Vice-Premiers as his deputy, presumably the one 
focussing on economic issues. After he became CPC General Secretary in 1987, his deputies 
were his two colleagues on the PBSC State Premier Li Peng and Vice-Premier Yao Yilin 
(who had already been in this position in the early 1980s. Jiang Zemin probably took over as 
FE LSG director shortly after Zhao’s fall. From 1994 on a strange leadership constellation put 
Zhu Rongji, Vice Premier in charge of economic refom and PBSC member, at the head, with 
two deputies: State Premier Li Peng, also on the PBSC, and Vice-Premier and PB member 
Wu Bangguo. When Zhu became State Premier in 1998, there was no change of personnel at 
the top of the FE LSG, except for the departure of Li. After the 2002-2003 central leadership 
transition, the new State Premier Wen Jiabao, who had previously acted as the group’s 
Secretary-General, took over as its director, initially with Ms. Wu Yi as his deputy. After her 
retirement in 2007 she was replaced by Li Keqiang, Vice-Premier, PBSC member and 
designated successor of Wen. 
In terms of general membership of the FE LSG, once more the evidence is particularly 
scarce for the period under review.128 But unlike for the FA LSG, here the indications from 
the periods before and after suggest a considerable upgrading, both in terms of political status 
and functional relevance. With regard to political status, the director Zhu Rongji was the only 
PBSC member in the group in the period after the 15th party congress, while after the latest 
reshuffle there are two of them. Functional relevance of the FE LSG members under Zhu 
limited, since it many of its members were high officials with financial or economic 
experience in the past but current positions in the NPC and CPPCC, i.e. no direct involvement 
in the economic policy. The members with most direct xposure to related policy making 
were the Vice-Premier responsible for economy and fi ance, Wen Jiabao, the Minister in 
charge of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Director of 
the CC Finance Office. Currently the group includes three Vice-Premiers, focussing 
respectively on agriculture, industry and energy, and finance and foreign trade, the State 
Council Secretary General, who had previously been Mi ister of the NDRC, the current 
Minister of the NDRC, his colleague from the Ministry of Finance, the Governor of the 
People’s Bank of China, as well as the heads of various financial regulators. From these very 
                                                
127 Lu 2001, p.47. 
128 Miller A.L. 2008c, p.14. 
 
 70
different situations it is difficult to infer the composition of the FE LSG between 2002 and 
2007. Since the change in personnel was probably related to the leadership transition 2002-
2003, one could suppose that it was close to the current situation. In any case, foreign 
economic relations enjoyed a prominence they had neither before nor after due the position of 
Ms. Wu Yi as Deputy Director. 
Two other LSGs that no longer exist deserve short mention. The WTO LSG had been 
operating from 1993 to 1998 but was abolished when State Premier Zhu Rongji personally 
took over leadership on the WTO issue. Its abolition is interpreted as an attempt to undermine 
the influence of its chairman who appeared overly po-WTO.129 There has also been a LSG 
dealing with military sales abroad, created in 1989. Yet it was abolished during the leadership 
reshuffle of 1998, and its functions were shifted to the Commission of Science, Technology, 
and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND). This latter had previously been “under the 
dual leadership of the CMC and the State Council,”130 but since then has only been part of the 
Outer Cabinet of the State Council. 
 
(iii) The Central Bureaucracies 
Below the LSGs, foreign-policy making involves a number of ministries of the State 
Council, most notably the MFA, “the most important foreign affairs institutions in the 
formulation and implementation of China’s foreign policy.”131 Among the bureaucracies 
involved in foreign relations it plays a dominant role, including handling sensitive issues and 
relations with countries on behalf of the central le dership, whose prerogative these questions 
are in principle.132 The MFA is headed by a minister, six or seven Vice-Ministers and several 
Assistant Ministers, all of which are usually career diplomats who moved up the hierarchies 
of the MFA. The Vice-Ministers and Assistant Ministers divide oversight of the various MFA 
departments among them. As in most foreign ministrie  departments may either specialise on 
a functional policy field or on a region. Policy towards the EU is dealt with by the Europe 
Department, and in particular its EU Division. Betwen 2003 and 2008 the Vice-Minister in 
charge was Zhang Yesui. The MFA manages China’s embassies abroad, including in the EU 
where China has one in every member state as well as a separate mission to the EU in 
Brussels. 
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Apart from the MFA, the most important ministry is the MOFCOM, dealing with 
foreign economic relations. Unlike in the case of the MFA, not all of its ministers have 
developed their careers entirely within the ministry. Their backgrounds tend to look more like 
those of the top officials in the PB, and they seem to have more of a chance to move up than 
their colleagues in the MFA. Both Bo Xilai, minister between 2003 and 2008, and his 
successor Chen Deming have held top positions in the provinces before their nomination at 
the head of MOFCOM. Ms Wu Yi, minister from 1993 to 1998, had held top positions in the 
petroleum industry until a few years before she entered the MOFCOM, but like Bo Xilai she 
managed to enter the PB. Only Shi Guangsheng, who held t e post between 1998 and 2003, 
had spent most of his professional career in the MOFC M. Otherwise the administrative 
division is similar as in the case of the MFA. Yet aside from the Europe Department, two 
other units seem to be influential in policy making towards the EU: the Fair Trade 
Department, which is dealing with the growing number of WTO disputes between China and 
the EU, and the Foreign Trade Department, which is concerned with trade policy formulation 
and trade diplomacy in general.133 Many Chinese embassies include a commercial section 
staffed by MOFCOM personnel as well as sometimes officials from the NDRC. In the EU this 
is the case for the embassies in most of the bigger member states, and also the mission to the 
EU. 
Compared to the MFA and MOFCOM other bodies at a similar level play only minor 
roles.134 The Ministry of State Security has competences that are strictly confined to the 
intelligence field. The CPC International Liaison Department is in charge of relations with 
other Communist Parties around the world. It was influe tial prior to 1989, but it has been 
declining since then.135 With regard to organs of the PLA, it should suffice to point out that 
the military’s influence on foreign policy is strictly limited to the “defense and national 
security arenas” where, in turn, it “retains a powerful voice.”136 Within the PLA’s general 
departments the particular interests of different departments (intelligence, arms purchase, 
etc…) are coordinated by the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the GSD.137 
 
 
                                                
133 Interview China 1, Beijing Q2 2007. 
134 Yang 1995, p.91. 
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137 See Lu 2001, pp.54-55 and Cheung 2001, pp.80-82. 
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2.1.4 Analysing China’s Foreign Policy Process 
 
Since the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s, the Chinese policy process has 
changed substantially. During the lifetime of Mao Zedong, it was highly centralised, 
gravitating around himself as the dominant figure, in particular with regard to foreign policy. 
At the same time, especially during his latter years, the tidal changes of infighting between 
the different factions around him periodically bore through on policy making, including with 
regard to major issues of foreign policy.138 Yet in 1985, less than ten years after Mao’s death, 
it could be observed that “the basis for making major policy decisions has been considerably 
broadened,” with day-to-day policy-making shifting away from the Politburo and its Standing 
Committee to state and party bureaucracies.139 In addition, efforts were made to improve 
coordination among different entities involved in policy-making with a new emphasis on 
professionalism.140 
The study from which these remarks are taken is also n indicator of the growing 
openness of the Chinese leadership towards the efforts of foreign researchers. The author, US 
scholar A. Doak Barnett, was one of the first foreign rs to get permission and support to do a 
series of interviews with high officials in Beijing in 1984, including State Premier Zhao 
Ziyang. Up until the beginning of reform, beyond the central role of Mao and the changing 
influence of different factions, little was known o details, including for example the precise 
roles of influential Prime Minister Zhou Enlai or of the central party bodies.141 
Admittedly, Barnett’s study falls into a special phase of the reform period, with a 
particularly strong CPC Secretariat, ongoing efforts at political and administrative reform, and 
no major social frictions yet.142 But the most recent in-depth study of Chinese foreign-policy 
making shows that the trends observed by Barnett have been continuing and deepening since 
then, and despite the crisis of 1989 and situations f internal and external tension. This 
collective effort, edited by David M. Lampton, covers a wide variety of specific issues, 
ranging from public opinion to the influence of international regimes, and draws on access to 
policy makers and documents unimaginable at the times of Barnett’s study. In his 
introduction, Lampton elaborates two general trends from the contributions to the volume: 
first, the elite directly involved in the making of foreign policy is “thickening”, second, 
                                                
138 See Lieberthal 1984, pp.47-55; see also Goldstein 1990. 
139 Barnett 1985, pp.2-3. 
140 Barnett 1985, pp.3-4. 
141 Barnett 1985, pp.7-8; see also Lieberthal 1992, p.1. 
142 Reform-related social tensions erupted for the first t me in 1985; see Baum 1993, pp.381-386.  
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individuals and entities which are not directly part of the process “have more space to act 
internationally”, and therefore “generate issue andproblems and exert pressures to which the 
central foreign policy elite must respond.”143 Reminiscent of Barnett’s analysis, he sees “four 
‘-izations’” behind these “twin developments,” namely “professionalization, corporate 
pluralization, decentralization, and globalization.”144 
 
(i) The Organisational Logic in Chinese Foreign-Policy Making 
Not many details are known about organisational routines within the Chinese governing 
bodies, and the few available descriptions are mostly lder than ten years. Yet while the role, 
composition and relative power of various bureaucratic gents in the foreign-policy process 
have been changing frequently, it is unlikely that the internal rules and procedures of organs 
that nevertheless existed continuously underwent similar transformations. In fact, in some 
cases, recent evidence from interviews confirms certain organisational processes. 
Starting from the top, i.e. the PBSC and the PB, we do have recent indications about the 
frequency of their meetings, as already mentioned above. Given that foreign policy is just one 
of many policy areas the PBSC is dealing with, and not the exclusive focus of any of its 
members, it is likely that the weekly meetings do not leave much time for in-depth debate on 
related issues. This is even truer for the PB, which meets only on a monthly basis. In addition, 
there are accounts from the 1980s on how top party bodies proceed in making final 
decisions.145 The emphasis is on collective discussion towards consensus where votes only 
serve to assess the degree of dissent among the members. For the PB, and most likely for the 
PBSC as well, the agenda is set by the General-Secretary and circulated beforehand, along 
with documentation on the various agenda items. During the meeting for each agenda item, 
the member who proposed it speaks first, followed by other members with experience in the 
same field. Then a discussion follows in which those with doubts about the proposal speak up 
and others may try to persuade them. The General-Secretary speaks last, usually in favour of 
the proposal since he agreed to have it on the agend . His opinion weighs heavier than those 
of the other members. At the end a vote is called. If it is unanimous, or close to, the proposal 
is adopted, if not decision is postponed. There are no simple rules as to how many dissenting 
voices can be tolerated for a decision to be adopte. It depends on how strong the opposition 
is and on whether it includes members directly working on the issue. This collective, 
                                                
143 Lampton 2001, p.4. 
144 Lampton 2001, p.4. 
145 The following points are based on Miller, H.L. 2004a, pp.4-7. 
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consensual mode of decision-making seems to have endur d through the eras of Deng 
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, as visible in various comments on party reform.146 
While the State Council does not play a separate role in foreign-policy decision making, 
the LSGs do. According to Lu Ning, the FA LSG serves as a “forum for the members of the 
central leadership in charge of foreign affairs – the politicians – to meet face to face with the 
leading officials of the various party, government a d military foreign affairs institutions – the 
top bureaucrats.” 147 He calls it a “central processing unit”, where thebureaucracies in party, 
government and military submit all issues that need to be decided by the central leadership 
and from where all foreign affairs activities of the PRC are coordinated.148 This position 
provides it with considerable influence. Although it does not make any decisions by itself, “its 
policy preferences and recommendations are likely to have an important impact on the final 
outcomes of the decision-making process,” whereby “ratification […] by the central 
leadership is sometimes simply a formality.”149 This key role of the FA LSG was confirmed 
by a European interviewee based in Beijing, who emphasised its de facto influence, especially 
in light of the limited foreign-policy expertise among the members of the PB and PBSC.150 
There are no such detailed accounts on the work of the FE LSG, but it most likely fulfils a 
similar gatekeeper function with regard to external economic relations. One interviewee 
pointed out that the FE LSG collects input from bureaucracies at ministerial level and also 
organises wide consultations with concerned governmntal bodies, interest groups, academic 
experts, etc. prior to any big decisions by the central leadership.151 
Below the LSGs, the central bureaucracies, with their pool of experts on specific 
foreign-policy issues, also play a substantial role with regard to the preparation of policy 
proposals and even more so in policy implementation. In the MFA, “a vigorous system of 
strict discipline and hierarchic grading is applied”, with “clear channels and procedures for 
policy consultation and decision.”152 This means that the communication from working leve  
towards the higher levels of hierarchy is strictly regulated.153 First, documents are submitted 
by the administrative unit, i.e. the department or the ministry, not by individual officials. 
Second, they only contain one proposal or evaluation with no options offered, i.e. the 
                                                
146 Miller, H.L. 2004a, p.6. 
147 Lu 2001, p.46. 
148 Lu 2001, pp.46-47; see also Lu 1997, p.12. 
149 Lu 2001, p.46. 
150 Interview EU 25, Beijing Q3 2007. 
151 Interview China 16, Beijing Q4 2008. 
152 Yang 1995, p.95. 
153 For this and the next paragraph, see Lu 2001, pp.31-32 as well as Yang 1995, pp.95-96. 
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involved officials have to reach a consensus on what to recommend through discussion and 
consultation. 
Third, this leads to a characteristic process by which issues travel up and down the 
hierarchies. It starts with the desk officer directly responsible for the matter who drafts a 
document based on instructions from the heads of his or her division and in consultation with 
other concerned officials of the department. After approval and signature by leading officials 
of the department, it is sent up to the responsible Vic -Minister or Assistant Minister, and 
possibly further up, depending on the issue. If a matter concerns more than one department, 
inter-departmental consultations take place prior to the drafting, and the signature of the heads 
of all involved departments are required before the lead department sends the document up. 
The Vice-Minister in charge of the lead department then consults the colleagues responsible 
for the other involved departments before deciding how to pursue. Fourth, how high a 
document travels depends on the whether the policy issues it contains fall within existing 
policy guidelines for a certain level or not. For it to move up it needs the signatures of at least 
two leading officials, e.g. the director of a department and the deputy in charge of the issue 
and similarly at the ministerial level for matters that are outside the existing instructions for 
the ministry. If there is disagreement the document is handed back down with the views of the 
higher level officials. 
There are no similarly detailed accounts for other ministries but procedures probably 
look very similar. In fact, some of the workings described above may point to general patterns 
in Chinese politics. One Chinese interviewee with a b ckground in the General 
Administration of Customs, a bureaucracy at ministerial level under the State Council, 
described the “Chinese meeting style” like this: during a given period of time everyone 
present has the opportunity to speak; then the Chair summarises, concludes and decides; if an 
issue is too controversial the decision is postponed.154 This looks like a simple various on the 
consensual decision-making based on collective discussion mentioned above, although 
possibly with less discipline at lower levels of hierarchy. Similarly, the procedure for 
preparing documents we have seen in the MFA corresponds roughly to the way central 
political documents are prepared in successive steps: selection of a group of drafters, 
instructions from above, collective drafting by the group, check by the leader and revision if 
necessary, submission to the competent authority for approval, and lastly, dissemination155. 
The impact of a policy proposal may depend significantly on how far and to whom the 
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document is circulated. In this process personal contacts may play a crucial role,156 as well as 
the personal initiative of top leaders.157 
When a matter is primarily in the area of competence of a bureaucracy other than the 
MFA, it deals with it independently, unless  it has sensitive political implications or falls 
outside pre-existing foreign policy guidelines, in which case the MFA has to be consulted.158 
If more than one bureaucracy is involved, for example MFA, MOFCOM and the PLA’s GAD 
on trade in military materials, or MFA and MOFCOM on major commercial issues, a similar 
process as described before at the departmental level happens at the level of the ministries, 
whereby inter-ministerial consultations at working level shape the drafting and signatures of 
all concerned ministers are necessary for a document to move higher up.159 
All this suggests that the flow of policy proposals up and down the hierarchies should be 
rather slow in the Chinese foreign-policy process. The many horizontal divisions that put the 
central leadership, who makes final decisions, at enormous distance from the working level of 
bureaucracies, where the bulk of policy preparation is happening, are reinforced by significant 
procedural obstacles, in particular the need to arrive at a consensus among all involved 
officials at all levels. By contrast, vertical divisions, i.e. between different functional fields, 
like between ministries or various departments within a ministry, certainly exist but should be 
expected to be bridged to some extent by the constant consultations. 
 
(ii) Bureaucratic Politics: Fragmentation and Bargaining 
Yet the dynamics of the Chinese foreign-policy process go beyond procedures. They are 
not caught in the organisational logic. In fact, the generalised rule of consensus through 
consultation provides for bargaining venues at all levels of the decision-making process, in 
which the involved entities may pursue, at least to some extent, their separate interests. This 
can mean different things, depending on the context, like not being excluded from a certain 
policy, impose the point of view of one’s own organisation, or become the entity in charge of 
some initiative. It may occur in the consultations between a functional and a regional 
department of the MFA, when MOFCOM, MFA and GAD are trying to find agreement on 
military exports, as well as in the discussions among the members with different institutional 
backgrounds in the LSGs and the top leadership bodies. 
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Such bargaining dynamics in Chinese politics have be n studied extensively and 
described as “fragmented authoritarianism.” This model was initially developed in the late 
1980s with regard to economic policy in post-Mao China, but was later applied to other policy 
fields, including foreign policy. According to Kenneth Lieberthal, one of the main proponents 
of this approach, 
“[t]he fragmented authoritarianism model argues that authority below the very peak of the 
Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based 
and […] grew increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in the late 1970s […] 
Structurally, China's bureaucratic ranking system combines with the functional division of 
authority among various bureaucracies to produce a situ tion in which it is often necessary to 
achieve agreement among an array of bodies, where no single body has authority over the 
others.”160 
Specifically, the decentralisation of budget authority and personnel management in the 
early years of reform, the “general decline in the us of ideology as an instrument of control” 
as well as the “encouragement given to many organs to become increasingly self-supporting 
through bureaucratic entrepreneurship” have all contributed to strengthening the “tendency of 
bureaucratic units to work vigorously to promote and protect their own interests in the policy-
making process.”161 This fragmentation is “most severe in the domain from the ministries 
through the provinces”, while “[a]bove the ministries and below provinces” the system is still 
“characterized by extraordinary concentrations of pwer.”162 A key implication of this 
increased fragmentation is “increased bargaining in the Chinese bureaucratic system” since “a 
search for consensus among various organs” is necessary “in order to initiate and develop 
major projects.”163 Overall, “[t]he reforms since the late 1970s have produced only very 
limited progress toward institutionalizing the political system.”164 
Certainly, there has been ongoing institutionalisation in the nearly two decades since 
fragmented authoritarianism was first proposed. Its key assertions seem to remain valid 
though. With regard to foreign-policy making, a more recent comment describes fragmented 
authoritarianism as a system in which “a complex matrix of relevant bureaucracies and 
interests [produces] decisions through extensive bargaining and coordination; efforts to gain 
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consensus dominate.”165 The same author also provides an example of an extended 
bureaucratic bargaining process, namely the final ph se of China’s WTO negotiations, when 
the contradictory interests of the many ministries prevented a consensual solution, a deadlock 
that could only be overcome through intervention of the central leadership.166 This means that 
fragmented authoritarianism “remains an apt description of much of the political process in 
China despite twenty years of unprecedented change.”167 
In such processes of bargaining for influence, personal relations may matter a great deal. 
In fact patron-client networks are pervasive at all levels of Chinese politics, a point elaborated 
by literature on elite and factional politics.168 Yet it is virtually impossible to trace such 
networks consistently through all administrative level involved in policy-making. 
Consequently this approach has mostly been used to analyse politics at the top and to account 
for major policy changes, purges of high leaders or leadership transitions.169 Nevertheless it 
represents a factor that has to be borne in mind when analysing bureaucratic bargaining.170 
 
(iii) The Role of Central Control 
If the concentration of political power has decreased in the years since the beginning of 
reform, the central leadership remains the powerful sphere of Chinese politics – as visible for 
example in its exclusive privilege to make final decisions on major foreign policy issues. How 
does this power articulate itself in the era of refo m then? 
It is first and foremost the power to define the fundamental directions and goals of 
foreign policy. Lu Ning suggests a military metaphor in this connection. The central 
leadership makes trategic decisions which “often consist of no more than a vague concept, 
basic policy orientation, broad policy guideline or l ng-term policy goal – just ‘the bones’ of 
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policy.”171 By contrast, government bureaucracies at lower levels, in particular relevant 
ministries, then decide the tactics, i.e. “work out detailed plans for realization of leadership’s 
policy goals, adding the ‘flesh and blood’ to China’s foreign policy.”172 There is therefore a 
certain degree of freedom for the central bureaucracies in policy implementation, even to the 
degree of allowing space for “subversion” on the part of dissenting bureaucracies as Lu Ning 
sees it.173 This may come in various ways, like consciously preparing ambiguously worded 
policy proposals, creative interpretation of policy guidelines, or slightly biasing reports on 
policy effects. From this point of view, decisions on how to engage the EU should probably 
be considered tactical issues with a comparatively high degree of discretion at the level of the 
ministries. 
Yet the central leadership still gets involved in various ways. First, “[t]he highly 
centralized decisionmaking power has created much inertia in the bureaucratic foreign affairs 
establishment toward taking initiatives in the formulation of major foreign policies”, and as a 
result “[m]ost major foreign policy initiatives have originated from the top.”174 This 
reluctance to use the possibility to propose policies to higher levels may also be related to the 
procedural obstacles. Second, given the fragmented nature of the policy process in China, it 
may occur that the involved decision-making units at the level of the central bureaucracies 
cannot reach an agreement through bargaining. Then, if the central leadership values progress 
in the respective field, it will have to intervene. This may happen in several ways, with 
distinct effects. 
In a first scenario, such an intervention of the central leadership may simply take the 
form of an arbitration between different policy proosals. An example for this would be the 
decision-making around China’s adhesion to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as 
discussed by Bates Gill.175 While the MFA argued that “China’s international stature and 
image as a responsible great power were at stake and required a constructive position on the 
CTBT” the PLA and the “defense-industrial community […]argued that China was ‘not 
technically ready’ to sign.”176 There was direct bargaining between the two involved 
bureaucracies but “the Chinese leadership was convinced by the MFA arguments and decided 
against the military’s recommendation for continued t sting.”177 
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In a second scenario, the intervention of the central leadership may lead to an upward 
migration of the policy issue, away from the central bureaucracies to the central leadership, 
especially if the latter becomes aware, at a given moment, of the high strategic ramifications 
of an issue. In principle such a situation might occur even without a bargaining problem at the 
working level. In this case, the “tactics”, e.g. the choice of who to engage in the EU and how, 
would be almost entirely back in the offices of the foreign-policy officials in the central 
leadership. The respective ministries would still have an important advisory and facilitating 
function (e.g. the MFA through its network of diplomatic missions) but most decisions would 
be made at the top. 
A third scenario would be a combination of the first two. On the one hand, the central 
leadership has to intervene in a deadlocked internal bargaining process, and the concerned 
entities continue their work in accordance with the authoritative decision from above. On the 
other hand, the issues also travels to the top, either because the Chinese leadership has 
recognised its importance or because international partners have raised the issue at the top 
leadership level, in which case decisions about the modalities of engagement would have to 
made both at the ministry-level and at the very top. It is likely that in such a situation LSGs 
play a particularly important role. As example one could refer to the WTO negotiations 
between China and the US.178 Due to the large scope of the WTO-related issues and the 
divergent interests of concerned ministries, the int rnal bargaining got stuck. Once speedy 
WTO membership had become an issue of strategic importance to the Chinese leadership, it 
intervened in favour of the pro-WTO MOFCOM (MOFTEC at that time, i.e. Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation) against more protectionist ministries (like for 
example the Ministry of Information Industries). This enabled the WTO Department of the 
MOFTEC to pursue its own approach, but it also result d in a direct involvement of the top 
leadership in negotiations with the US: State Premier Zhu Rongji himself delivered a 
generous offer to the US leadership during an official visit.179 
Lastly, one can distinguish two different basic modes of policy making in contemporary 
Chinese politics. Under the normal mode “decision making is shaped by experts and external 
policy advisors, with participation of a variety ofdifferent internal actors, the shifting of 
important administrative competences to lower levels of government, as well as multiple 
types of international cooperation.”180 This mode corresponds to the strategic-tactical 
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metaphor above, with a certain leeway for the central bureaucracies. By contrast, under the 
crisis mode, decision making becomes highly centralised with a dominant role for the highest 
leaders, somewhat reminiscent of the policy process in Mao’s times. This mode will typically 
kick in as a reaction to situations that are perceived as a threat to the stability of the political 
system, like for example the repression of 1989 or the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996. It does 
not necessarily touch decision making in all policy fields but may be limited to the arenas 
from which the threat is emanating, like in the case of the reaction of the SARS epidemic of 
2003 after the initial attempt of a cover-up had become public. However, in relations between 




This section has presented process I of the analytic l framework developed in the 
previous chapter, i.e., in the context of the present r search, the Chinese foreign-policy 
process. I have introduced the basic structures of the Chinese political system, discussed in 
some detail the bureaucratic agents involved in foreign-policy making, and analysed the 
foreign-policy process based on the three causal mechanisms proposed by the framework, 
namely organisational logic, bureaucratic bargaining a d central control. 
The Chinese foreign-policy process includes elements from all three main pillars of the 
political system, i.e. party, government and military, and it develops across a long ladder of 
hierarchy, reaching from the working level of central bureaucracies to the very top of central 
leadership. While the power to make final decisions is firmly concentrated at the top, the 
preparation of policy proposals as well as policy implementation is largely done in the 
relevant ministries, although LSGs and possibly even higher levels may be involved. 
Organisational factors, in particular procedures for preparing documents and sending them 
towards higher levels of authority, appear to deepen th  horizontal divisions in this process, 
there is ample room for bureaucratic bargaining, and the central control over the activities of 







2.2 The Foreign-Policy Process in the EU 
 
This section presents the foreign-policy process of the EU. In the analytical framework 
introduced in the previous chapter this corresponds to process II, as it determines the 
reception, and possibly modification, by the EU of the initial approach by China. The political 
system of the EU has been slowly but constantly changing since the early years of European 
integration, including with regard to foreign policy, a process that is still ongoing. In fact, 
with the Lisbon Treaty ratified by the large majority of member states, although with 
politically complicated situations in some of the rmaining ones,181 further changes in 
decision-making on the EU’s external relations are lik ly over the next few years. This means 
the EU is a political system still “in the making”, much like China, although for very different 
reasons. 
The similarities do not go much further though. Unlike China, the EU is an international 
organisation not a state, whose actorness in international relations is not equally all-
encompassing. Instead its competences, including with regard to external relations, are 
defined in or derived from the founding treaties in their current version. These treaties also 
establish rigid procedures as to how policies in the different fields of EU external action are 
made. At the same time, a multitude of bureaucratic gents is involved in the EU foreign-
policy process, even more than in China and with a less rigid hierarchy, which gives rise to 
variable patterns of policy making. In this, personal relations certainly do matter, but not in 
the same way as in Chinese politics. The top leadership is far less coherent than in China, 
including Brussels-based fonctionnaires, political nominees from the member states in EU 
positions, as well as administrative and political personnel representing the members in 
Brussels. Career patterns like in China, where officials move up slowly but steadily in the 
central hierarchies, sometimes to the very top, are close to impossible in Brussels – which 
also implies that the tracing of careers and concurrent positions is far less meaningful. 
In the first sub-section I will present an overview of the literature on EU foreign 
policies. This will be followed by a general introduction to the EU’s political system, 
including certain external as well as internal aspects. The third sub-section will then turn to 
                                                
181 At the moment of writing, ratification is not complete in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, and Poland; 
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the distribution of foreign-policy competences within the EU and the basic rules and 
procedures for foreign-policy-making. Lastly, I will analyse the EU’s foreign-policy process 
through the lenses proposed by the analytical framework, i.e. differentiating between 
organisational logic, bureaucratic bargaining, and the role (or absence) of central control. 
 
2.2.1 Studying EU Foreign Policies – But Not From the Perspective of Outsiders 
 
The growing impact of the EU in contemporary international affairs has been affirmed 
in a growing body of literature, including on issue of traditional “high politics”. In his 2001 
study Roy Ginsberg makes the point that the EU is not o ly an economic power but can also 
have a more general political impact on the outside world. Through intensive case studies of 
the EU’s policies on the conflict in former Yugoslavi , towards the Middle East and towards 
the US, he comes to the conclusions that the EU is “a complex, partial, sui generis, and 
evolving international political actor capable of having different degrees of political impact 
even in the absence of a fully formed CFSP within a political union.”182 
If Ginsberg is explicitly emphasising the special nture of the EU, not comparable with 
any other phenomenon in international relations, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler apply 
a more general concept to the EU, namely internatiol actorness, and verify the EU’s 
actorness in a number of case studies. In the end, they carry Ginsberg’s point even further: the 
EU has capabilities, an international presence and opportunities to act, in part due to 
expectations from third actors. It even exercises international leadership on certain issues, “is 
urged to act, is blamed for its immobility, and is frequently told to resist US hegemony.”183 
The general picture of an EU that has impact in international affairs over a wide array of 
issue-areas, although to a varying degree, is confirmed in other volumes and studies.184 The 
literature on the EU as a “civilian power” also supports the argument that the EU has not only 
an economic but a political impact on the world at large.185 
The policy making processes behind this impact of the EU on international affairs have 
been a subject of academic research for longer already – and have at times themselves created 
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doubt about the potential of actual EU influence in the world.186 The basic formal rules for 
foreign-policy making result directly from the treaties,187 and how they function in practise 
for the different external policies of the union, i.e. CCP, development cooperation and CFSP, 
has been described by various scholars,188 including also detailed analyses of different voting 
regimes on EC external relations.189 With regard to CFSP, its extra-treaty origins in the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), the resisted communitarisation of non-EC “high 
politics” during the Maastricht negotiations, and the role of the Commission, which has 
nevertheless been growing in these issues, have been th  subject of detailed analysis, for 
example by Simon Nuttall.190 Michael E. Smith has gone further in arguing that a fairly 
integrated institutional foreign policy framework has evolved, despite the formal exclusion of 
CFSP from the densely regulated Community sphere, with even a considerable degree of 
”legalisation.”191 
At the same time, other scholars emphasise the importance of informal processes in 
European foreign-policy making. Thus, it has been argued that a new integrative dynamic has 
resulted from the institutionalisation of CSFP through so-called “Brusselisation.”192 Despite 
the avoidance of the Community method, in the Brussels-based institutions a new elite is 
emerging, closely cooperating among each other and thi king “European” rather national. But 
also the continuing informal influence of individual member states has been studied. 
Catherine Gegout, for example, has pointed out the s rong influence by big member states in 
close consultation with the US.193 
The complex overlap of processes at the common, European level and of the continuing 
national foreign policies in individual member states has also been researched.194 Brian 
White, suggests to analyse European foreign policy as an interactive foreign policy system 
with three subsystems: member states foreign policy, a supranational Community foreign 
policy, i.e. the CCP and development cooperation under the first pillar, and an 
intergovernmental Union foreign policy, i.e. the CFSP under the second pillar.195 Others have 
                                                
186 See for example the thorough review of treaty provisi ns on CFSP in Hill 1993 and 1998. 
187 For details on the making of European foreign policies see chapter 4. 
188 Among the more recent examples, see Vanhoonacker 2005 and Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, in particular 
pp.57-61. 
189 See for example Jupille 1999, Meunier 2000 and 2005. 
190 See Nuttall 2000, in particular chapter 3, and Nuttall 1996 in the role of the Commission. 
191 See Michael E. Smith 2004, and especially Michael E. Smith 2001 on legalisation. 
192 See Allen 1998 and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002. 
193 Gegout 2002. 
194 See especially Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White (eds.) 2004. 
195 White 2001; chap.1 succinctly introduces his overall conceptual framework; see also White 2004. 
 85
observed processes of European socialisation, or Europeanisation, whereby national foreign 
policies align themselves with an emerging common European position.196 
What emerges from this literature, despite the different emphases, is the considerable 
complexity of foreign-policy making in the EU, and especially the multitude of institutional 
actors who legitimately represent the EU, or part of i , towards the outside: the organs of the 
Presidency, the High Representative (HR) for CFSP and the Council Secretariat, the different 
DGs of the Commission, ministries of member states, etc… How do outsiders deal with an 
EU that has a growing influence as an integrated entity but maintains complex and 
fragmented decision-making processes? So far, neither academic nor more policy-oriented 
literature provide any satisfying answers to this question. In academia, the writing on the 
EU’s consistency in external relations is the closest one can get.197 This literature is indeed 
concerned with the face, or better the many faces, th  EU is showing to the world. Yet while 
it assesses the issue, analyses its reasons and often makes suggestions on how to improve 
consistency, it does not focus on how outsiders deal with the complexities and inconsistencies 
of EU foreign policy. 
In policy-oriented writing, the most ambitious effort in this direction has been the 
volume Global Views on the European Union, edited by Martin Ortega for the Institute for 
Security Studies. It provides a wide array of outside impressions and assessments of the EU in 
international affairs, but the contributors only give marginal evidence of the process of 
engaging such a complex polity.198 
 
2.2.2 Grasping a Complex International Organisation 
 
The current political order of the European integration scheme is the result of more than 
five decades of continuous evolution starting shortly after the end of the Second World War. 
As much of the remainder of this section will deal with complexities in European foreign 
policies that emerged as a result of the tortuous paths of European integration, this sub-section 
will begin with a brief overview of the history of European integration. In a next step, I will 
turn to the issue of EU’s international actorness. For the EU this is a more tricky question than 
for China. As a state, China’s quality as international actor can hardly be contested, and no 
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further discussion on this issue was warranted in the previous section. In the case of the EU, 
however, literature has not been unanimous on its actorness, and few comments are in place 
on how the definition of international actors suggested in chapter II applies to the EU. Lastly, 
this will lead to a discussion of the EU’s main bureaucratic agents and some general features 
of the EU’s political system. 
 
(i) The Origins and Evolution of the EU 
The history of European integration looks in many ways like a textbook example for the 
historical institutionalist claim that the growing cost of revising institutions in a path-
dependent process leads to a layered institutional structure.199 The current EU has four 
predecessors in the form of older international organisations for regional integration in 
Europe, and all of them continue to exist today under the roof of the EU. The European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by the Treaty of Paris (signed April 1951, in 
force July 1952), and the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) by the two Treatis of Rome (both signed March 1957, 
in force January 1958)200, all of them with Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and 
the Netherlands as members. 
The fourth organisation, the Western European Union (WEU), has been developed out 
of the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultura  Cooperation and Collective Self-
Defence, signed in March 1948 (in force August 1948) by Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and the UK.201 In August 1954 the French National Assembly rejectd the treaty 
on a European Defence Community on which the members of the ECSC had agreed in May 
1952.202 As a reaction, the original signatories together with Germany and Italy agreed on the 
accession of the latter two to the Brussels Treaty and decided a number of amendments that 
led to the creation of the WEU. These measures werecontained in the Paris Agreement of 
October 1954, strangely enough the result of a confere ce in London. It remained a marginal 
organisation, often in the shadow of the more impressive North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), and was only rediscovered as a useful institutional container for the defence 
dimension of European integration in the 1990s. 
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The 1960s and 1970s saw important developments. With regard to the ECSC, EEC and 
Euratom, more institutional integration was achieved through the Treaty Establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, also known as Merger 
Treaty, which was signed in April 1965 and entered in force in July 1967.203 By July 1968, 
the customs union was completed,204 and by implication, the EEC had to be “a single entity in 
global trade.”205 Shortly thereafter, the Davignon Report, adopted at the meeting of Foreign 
Ministers Luxemburg in October 1970, started foreign policy cooperation on traditional “high 
politics”. It created a pattern of consultation and coordination outside the treaties that would 
come to be known as European Political Cooperation (EPC). The 1970s then saw important 
developments in the Communities towards more supranational governance, i.e. expanding 
roles for the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ.206 
The next major step in European integration was the Single European Act (SEA) (signed 
in February 1986, in force in July 1987). At that time, the membership of the Communities 
had grown from the original six, i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands, to twelve members, as Denmark, Ireland and the UK had accede to the treaties in 
1973, followed by Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The SEA included 
amendments to the treaties of the three Communities, ECSC, EEC, and Euratom, along with 
EPC provisions.207 From the point of view of the Communities, the SEA expanded the use of 
qualified majority voting (QMV) in Council decisions, increased the role of the EP, created 
the Court of First Instance to alleviate the burden of overstretched ECJ, and, most 
importantly, up the specific target of completing a common internal market by 1992208. With 
regard to foreign-policy, it “did little more than consolidate previous EPC practices, but it was 
significant that they were included in an instrument that also amended the Treaty of 
Rome.”209 This means the SEA gave a formal treaty basis to EPC, without however 
integrating it into the Communities. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, or Treaty on European Union (TEU) (signed in February 
1992, in force in November 1993) brought significant changes in many ways. Most visibly, it 
created the European Union (EU), as a general roof f r all integration efforts that have 
evolved out of the original Communities. Like the SEA, it also amended the treaties of the 
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Communities, and dealt in a separate title with general foreign policy cooperation, re-named 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instead of EPC.210 Another title was devoted to 
cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), a new fi ld of cooperation, covering issues 
like asylum and immigration policy, judicial cooperation, and police cooperation.211 In this 
way the TEU created the characteristic three-pillar structure of the EU that can still be 
observed, i.e. with the Communities as the first, CFSP the second, and JHA the third pillar. 
More concretely, with regard to the Communities, the Treaty of Maastricht renamed the 
old EEC European Community (EC), and the related traty, which had taken on far wider 
scope than the more specialised ECSC and Euratom treaties, therefore became the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEC). At the same time, it also provided for some 
innovation on procedures and policies, e.g. by extending the use of QMV, strengthening the 
roles of the EP and ECJ, and expanding the policy areas covered by the Communities, most 
importantly through the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).212 In the field 
of cooperation on foreign policy in general, the new CFSP provided a more ambitious 
framework than the old EPC, for example by defining specific policy instruments.213 
The TEU signed in Maastricht mentioned the WEU as “n integral part of the 
development of the Union”, and requests it “to elabor te and implement decisions and actions 
of the Union which have defence implications.”214 In a declaration annexed to the treaty, 
members of the WEU, in the meantime nine after accession of Spain and Portugal in 1990, 
stated that “WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as 
a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”215 The declaration 
specified that “WEU is prepared, at the request of he European Union, to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications” and, for this 
purpose, provided for a number of measures to ensur close cooperation between the 
institutions of EU and WEU.216 To enhance WEU operations, institutional innovations were 
initiated, like a “WEU planning cell”, semi-annual “meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence 
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Staff”, “military units answerable to WEU”, or “enhanced cooperation in the field of 
armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency.”217 
The following treaties, i.e. the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in October 1997, in force in 
May 1999) and the Treaty of Nice (signed in February 2001, in force in February 2003), left 
the basic institutional structures unchanged but introduced amendments in all three pillars. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam expanded the use of QMV, transferred certain JHA issues into the 
first pillar, and strengthened the institutional setting for CSFP, most visibly by creating the 
post of the High Representative for CFSP.218 With regard to WEU, the treaty defined for the 
first time for what ends its operation capabilities might be used, namely “humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.” 219 These were the so-called Petersberg Tasks, listed for the first time in June 
1992 by the WEU.220 The Treaty of Nice was mostly about anticipating enlargement and 
adjusting the institutions accordingly, in particular the weighted votes in the Council.221 Since 
the Treaty of Maastricht Austria, Finland and Sweden had joined the EU in 1995. The further 
expansion with the accession of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, and lastly Bulgaria and Romania in 
2007, was already foreseeable. 
In the defence field, the British-French agreement of Saint-Malo in December 1998 had 
cleared the way for further cooperation.222 Subsequently the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999 set up what came to be known as the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), including in particular the projected commitment of military capabilities from 
member states and the establishment of an EU Military Staff and EU Military Committee, the 
former to implement military activities of ESDP, the latter as a military policy making 
body.223 At the Nice European Council meeting these measures were confirmed224 and the 
reference to the WEU as “an integral part of the development of the Union” taken out of the 
TEU.225 
The latest attempts to change the treaty base of European integration are linked to the 
efforts of the European Convention, meeting between F bruary 2002 and July 2003, at 
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drafting a constitutional document for the EU. The main merit of the resulting Constitutional 
Treaty, signed by the member states in October 2004, was the integration of all European 
treaties in one and the clarification of competences and procedures, including with regard to 
CFSP as will be discussed below. After its failure in referenda in France and the Netherlands 
during May and June 2005, most of its provisions were incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty 
which, however, takes the old, and confusing, approach of amending the existing treaties. 
 
(ii) The EU as an International Actor 
While investigating the nature of the EU as an entity in international relations, some 
scholars have voiced scepticism as to whether it can be considered a fully-fledged actor. In a 
pioneering study on the issue Gunnar Sjöstedt concludes, after a lengthy discussion of criteria 
for international actorness and related evidence in the European case, that “the Community 
[…] seems to be some sort of half-developed internaio l actor.”226 It “performs actor 
behaviour irregularly and only under certain conditions” while “the structural prerequisites for 
the performance of actor behaviour are only fulfilled partially.”227 Christopher Hill adopts a 
similar perspectives when he states that the “dramas over the Gulf, the Uruguay Round and 
Yugoslavia seem to show that the Community is not a effective international actor, in terms 
both of its capacity to produce collective decision and its impact on events”, and concludes 
that “a coherent [European foreign-policy] system and full actorness are still far from 
realization.”228 
By contrast, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, in a book entirely devoted to 
exploring EU actorness, come to the conclusion that“the EU is a global actor of some 
significance.”229 Not only do their specific criteria for actorness differ from the definitions by 
Sjöstedt or Hill, they also place more emphasis on the social dimension, i.e. how interaction 
with others can be constitutive of actorness. They account for this with the concepts of 
presence and opportunity: “Presence conceptualizes the ability of the EU, by virtue of its 
existence, to exert influence beyond its borders”, in particular “to shape the perceptions and 
expectations of others;”230 while “[o]pportunity refers to the external environment of ideas 
and events that enable or constrain purposive action.”231 Hill also refers to presence, “a 
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consequentialist notion which emphasizes outside perce tions of the Community and the 
significant effects it has on both the psychological and the operational environment of third 
parties,”232 but in his analysis this leads to dangerously exaggerated expectations rather than 
to enhanced actorness. 
Based on my definition of international actorness in the previous chapter, basically a 
simplified version of Bretherton and Vogler’s approach, there can be no doubt that the EU 
should be counted as an international actor. As will emerge from the next sub-section, the EU 
fulfils all three criteria as it actively formulates policies towards the outside, has policy 
instruments at its disposal, and can interact with other actors. Should it be treated as a separate 
type of actor, a category of its own? Hill suggests that it is “less than a state, but more than a 
conventional inter-governmental organization (IGO),”  233 and Bretherton and Vogler conclude 
their book with the observation that the EU “remains […] sui generis.”234 In my view it is not 
necessary to create a new category for the EU, as much as it may be true that it is unique 
among international organisations. The discussion of international actorness above has 
already pointed to the variety in the quality of actors in international relations. The actorness 
of international organisations is not necessarily of the same scope as that of states, and the EU 
certainly cannot match its members or any other state in this regard. At the same time, given 
the variability of purposes and functions of international organisations, the quality of 
actorness may also vary between them. From this perspective, the EU is probably “more of an 
actor” than most, if not all, other international organisations, due to wide range of its 
activities, but this does not mean it cannot be part of the larger group of international 
organisations. 
International law can help grasp these different degre s of actorness. If states possess 
“the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law,”235 the EU, as 
an international organisation, should be considered to have legal personality only to the extent 
this is needed for the pursuit of its purposes and functions as specified in its constituent 
treaties.236 Many of the goals and activities of the EU spelled out in the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) can be interpreted as requiring legal personality to an impressive extent, in 
particular those of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including most 
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importantly the conclusion of agreements with third states or international organisations,237 
but also the Petersberg Tasks mention earlier. As legal personality can also be simply implicit, 
it should not be a major concern that the TEU does not mention legal personality explicitly. 
The matter appears in a different light when one considers that this was certainly a very 
conscious choice, given that the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), 
predecessor of and continuing basis for the TEU,238 formally states that “[t]he Community 
shall have legal personality.”239 This means there is considerable confusion as to the precise 
legal status of the EU in international relations. The next revision of the treaties, probably 
based on the Lisbon Treaty, will clarify the situation and explicitly assign legal personality to 
the EU.240 In the meantime one could see a de-facto or “nascent” legal personality.241 In 
practice, however, most formal activities are still carried out through the European 
Community (EC), as visible for example in that so-called “mixed agreements” with third 
parties, i.e. including a political dimension that f lls under CFSP and therefore outside the 
reach of the TEC, are nevertheless concluded by the EC.242 
In summary, the EU can be considered international actor for the purposes of this 
research. As an international organisation, it belongs to a category for which the scope of 
actorness cannot match that of states. For the EU, this is reflected in the current uncertainties 
concerning its legal personality. At the same time, however, the EU stands out from other 
international organisations in that it has a much wider range of activities and therefore a more 
complete type of actorness. 
 
(iii) The Main Bureaucratic Agents of the EU 
In the previous chapter I pointed out that the burea cratic agents of an international 
organisation include both the institutional entities belonging directly to the organisation and 
the member states. In the case of the EU, bureaucratic agents at Union level have considerably 
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increased in number, especially in the field of CFSP as will be seen below. Yet the main 
entities have remained the same over the past decades. 
At the top, as the highest political authority, there is the European Council, consisting of 
the heads of state or government of all member states nd the President of the Commission, 
assisted by the Foreign Ministers and a Commission member. This entity had not been 
established in the original treaties that founded the communities. The final statement of the 
summit meeting in Paris in 1974 recognised “the need for an overall approach to the internal 
problems involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe” and 
that it was “essential to ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the 
Communities and in the work on political co-operation”, and therefore provided for a regular 
summit mechanism, “three times a year and whenever necessary, in the Council of the 
Communities and in the context of political co-operation.”243 The formal establishment of the 
European Council as part of the treaties only happened with the SEA in the mid-1980s, which 
also reduced the frequency of meetings to two instead of three per year.244 Under current 
treaty provisions it “shall provide the Union with e necessary impetus for its development 
and shall define the general political guidelines thereof.”245 The TEU and TEC also stipulate 
some more concrete functions of the European Council, like for example the nomination of 
the President of the Commission,246 and the decision of common strategies under CFSP.247 
The treaty provisions are such that the “whatever interpretation the European Council gives to 
its role […] it cannot be challenged by the Court of Justice.”248 Overall, the European Council 
has been powerful as “the guiding force of the European integration process”, but at the same 
time limited in its activities in that it only meets wo or three times a year and takes decision 
by consensus.249 
Hierarchically below the European Council is the Council of Ministers, or simply the 
Council. Since the beginning of European integration, t has been the key decision organ of 
the communities and later the EU. It consists of “a representative of each Member State at 
ministerial level, authorised to commit the governme t of that Member State.”250 Currently it 
meets in nine different formations, depending on the policy field under discussion; for 
instance, Foreign Ministers meet in the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
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(GAERC), Ministers of Economics and/or Finance in the Economic and Financial Affairs 
(Ecofin) Council, etc.251 The Council Presidency rotates among member states, each holding 
it for six months.252 Because of its numerous functions, instead of referring to single treaty 
provisions, it is more instructive to distinguish four basic aspects of the Council: first, it has a 
legislative function as it votes on all internal norms created by the EU as well as external 
agreements; second, it also works as an executive in that it intervenes in policy 
implementation by the Commission, the main executive body, through its numerous 
committees; third, it complements the European Council i  defining the general orientation of 
the EU; lastly, it serves an arena in which cooperation in new policy fields can be 
discussed.253 
The Council is directly assisted by two bodies. First, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives of the member states (COREPER) “shall be responsible for preparing the 
work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council.”254 In 
practice, there are two COREPERs and both hold weekly meetings.255 In one formation, 
national delegations are headed by the Permanent Representatives themselves, with 
responsibilities for the GAERC, the Ecofin and JHA Councils, or any other politically 
sensitive issues. The other formation deals with more technical matters, and consists of 
Deputy Permanent Representatives as leaders of delegations. Second, the Council Secretariat, 
a comparatively small bureaucracy with about 2500 officials, provides administrative 
support.256 It is headed by the Secretary-General who is concurrently High Representative for 
CFSP.257 The present Secretary-General of the Council, Javier Solana, is also Secretary-
General of WEU although this is not stipulated in the treaties.258 The Deputy Secretary-
General is responsible for running the Council Secretariat on a day-to-day basis.259 The 
Council Secretariat may have, at times, a certain influence in the policy process. On the one 
hand, there is staff from the Secretariat on the committees that intervene in the Commission’s 
work, on the other hand, some of its officials work directly for the Secretary-General which 
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allows for rather direct input foreign-policy matters or even an “executive role in the planning 
and organization of military and civilian crisis management operations.”260 
The main executive organ of the EU is the European Commission. All EU legislation 
and virtually all other types of documents, statements, or agreements, are elaborated to a large 
extent by the Commission. At its top, there is the College of Commissioners, with 27 
members, one from each member state.261 Before the last two rounds of enlargement in 2004 
and 2007, there were 20 Commissioners, including two from each of the five biggest 
members, i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, and o e from the ten others.262 The 
President of the Commission needs a unanimous nomination by the European Council and 
approval from the EP, whereas the full College of Cmmissioners requires qualified majority 
in the Council and approval by the EP.263 A Commissioner’s term of office is five years and is 
renewable.264 Each of the Commissioners is assigned a specific portfolio and in fulfilling the 
related tasks, he or she is assisted by the cabinet, a small team of at most six officials,265 
intended “to act as a bridge between the college and the services, and thus between the 
political and the apolitical.”266 Below the cabinets is the Commission bureaucracy of more 
than 20000 officials, divided into more than 30 Directorate-Generals (DGs) and specialised 
services.267 
The powers of EP have been continuously increasing i ce the beginning of European 
integration, especially as the use of the so-called co-decision procedure has been 
expanding.268 Based on this procedure, also known as Art.251 procedure, legislation not only 
needs parliamentary approval, but the EP also has the faculty to amend proposals.269 The EP’s 
membership has also been growing as a result of enlargement, from little over 500 at the time 
of the Treaty of Maastricht to well over 700 at present.270 Elections are held every five 
years.271 
The EU’s Courts, i.e. the ECJ and the Court of First In tance, are highly influential, 
though largely limited to matters of the Communities. They have been, and still are, a crucial 
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force that ensures implementation of EU legislation, a d in doing so is contributing to 
deepening integration, sometimes against the resistance of member states.272 In fact, the 
significant increase of cases in front of the Courts over the past 30 years can be considered 
one indicator of deepening in European integration.273 
Aside from those mentioned thus far, there are other bureaucratic agents at Union level, 
yet mostly with more restricted areas of activity, like the Committee of Regions, the European 
Investment Bank, the Court of Auditors.274 The European Economic and Social Committee, a 
consultative body including representatives of employers and employees but also other 
interest groups, like consumers or environmentalists, works on a wide range of issues and 
tries to influence EU policy making.275 Its impact, however, is very limited. Some more 
specialised bureaucratic agents in the foreign policy field will be discussed in the next sub-
section. 
This leaves us with a last but crucially important group of bureaucratic agents: member 
states. Formally they do not have a direct say as individual member states, but only as 
members of the Council and the European Council. In practice, however, these two organs 
play key roles in the EU’s decision-making process which confers individual member states 
considerable influence over policy output. This is particularly clear in policy fields where the 
decisions are taken by unanimity.276 Yet even in the case of QMV individual member states 
can influence the outcome through their decision whether or not to join coalitions within the 
Council and thereby to create or destroy the necessary qualified majority.277 In addition, as 
member states maintain, being aggregate international actors in their own right, their own, 
independent contacts with third actors, they are lik ly to find themselves more often 
discussing EU issues with outsiders than any EU-level institution. 
 
2.2.3 The Institutional Structures of EU Foreign Policy 
 
EU foreign policies fall under two wider categories. First, there are those in policy fields 
within the scope of the EC, i.e. the first pillar. They include most prominently the Common 
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Commercial Policy (CCP) and development cooperation. Second, there are the policies within 
the issue-areas covered by the CFSP, and located in the second pillar of the EU. The CFSP is 
supposed to cover the more sensitive political, strategic and security-related issues of 
traditional “high politics.”278 Policy-making procedures, and the respective formal ole of EU-
level institutions and member states ministries, are different for each of these EU foreign 
policies and so is the distribution of competences b tween the EU itself and its member states. 
One crucial issue of the EU’s political system is how much power states entrust to 
collective decision-making, thereby giving up their faculty to make independent decisions by 
themselves. In practice, there is significant diversion between policy areas, including different 
aspects of EU foreign policy, as to the degree to which the member states maintain a voice or 
agreed to cede power to EU level. To make sense of this, one can refer to two models well 
established in the study of European integration, namely intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. Both have been used as theories explaining regional integration, but also as 
analytical categories describing modes of decision making. In this latter perspective, I suggest 
to interpret them as ideal-types of collective decision making. Intergovernmentalism then 
represents the ideal-type where decisions are made exclusively through direct negotiation 
among member states, while under supranationalism, the opposite ideal-type, decisions are 
made exclusively by supranational institutions. On the continuum between the two, the further 
one moves from the intergovernmental towards the supranational pole, the less member states 
determine the outcome of policy-making and the more supranational institutions will have an 
effective independent impact on it. This can help understand the differences between the 
different external policies of the EU. 
 
(i) Foreign Policies in the First Pillar: Supposedly Technical 
The CCP has been a feature of European integration since the EEC treaty of 1957, 
which already provided for a common external tariff. Overall, it is “by far the most integrated 
of the EU’s external policies,”279 i.e. it is the closest to the supranational ideal-type, as it 
accords greatest prominence to EU institutions and limiting most severely the influence and 
independence of single member states. 
The CCP is based on “uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff 
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in 
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measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be 
taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.”280 In implementing the CCP the Commission 
disposes of an exclusive right of initiative, and the Council can accept Commission proposals 
by QMV.281 By contrast, if the Council wishes to amend the proposal it needs to do so by 
unanimity.282 This corresponds to the so-called consultation procedure, which takes its name 
from the consultation of other EU bodies, most importantly the EP, although in the case of the 
CCP this is not a formal treaty requirement.283 
Agreements with third actors are an important part of he CCP. For this purpose the 
Commission serves as the central negotiator. During the negotiations it has to consult 
regularly with a special committee of the Council, the so-called Art.133 Committee.284 The 
specific powers of this committee are not spelled out in the treaty, but it can be understood as 
representing the Council, i.e. the authority that will eventually accept or reject a negotiation 
outcome. This puts it in a powerful position, allowing even for adjustments of the negotiation 
mandates, although “anything that is especially sensitive or political is normally referred to 
COREPER and, if necessary, the GAERC.”285 Both the negotiation mandate for the 
Commission and the final acceptance of the terms of the agreement generally follow the 
procedure outlined in the previous paragraph, i.e. th  Council decides by QMV upon 
Commission proposal.286 
In general, CCP is a field of exclusive EC competence, which has been established by 
relevant ECJ case law.287 This means that member states should never act on these issues 
except when in an EU function, like when holding the Council Presidency or simply as a 
member of the Council. They may pass legislation in these fields only when empowered or 
instructed to do so by the EU.288 There are limits to this, however, which are spelled out 
specifically with regard to trade-related agreements. As opposed to trade in goods, the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements on trade in services and commercial aspects of 
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intellectual property require unanimity in the Council.289 More generally, “[t]he Council shall 
act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the 
adoption of internal rules.”290 
The policy field of development cooperation and humanitarian aid is also fairly 
integrated, with the Commission as the main implementing agency. But, unlike for CCP, there 
are no limitations on independent activities by memb r states, meaning it is further away from 
the supranational ideal-type. In this area, decision making follows the co-decision 
procedure.291 This means that the Commission still has the exclusive right to initiate policies, 
but adjustments in the initial draft are arranged btween the Council and the EP, putting the 
Commission in a much weaker position than under the consultation procedure. The Council 
decides mostly by qualified majority voting, with very few exceptions.292 With regard to 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid competenc s are mixed.293 The activities of 
the EU and its members states should be “complementary” and coordinated.294 In this, 
development cooperation differs from other areas of mixed competence, which are barred for 
member states once the EU has become active.295 
 
(ii) The Second Pillar: How High the Politics? 
The decision-making rules with regard to the second category, i.e. policies falling under 
the purview of the CFSP, appear simpler at first sight. Decisions on the instruments of CFSP 
generally require unanimity in the Council, with very few exceptions, and thus maintain a 
veto for each single member state.296 In CFSP, competence formally remains with the 
member states,297 and it can be considered the least integrated fielof foreign policy since the 
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formal influence of EU institutions is strictly limited.298 All this suggests a situation close to 
the intergovernmental ideal-type. Yet in practice th historical evolution leading up to the 
current CFSP has created numerous bureaucratic agents that participate in the preparation of 
policy options and in the implementation of policies, thus making the effective influence on 
policy output difficult to trace. Their intervention may move policy making in specific 
situations more towards the supranational pole of the continuum. The following sub-section 
will discuss to what extent such informal processes may actually matter. Here I will introduce 
the historical evolution of general foreign-policy ooperation and the various bureaucratic 
agents involved. 
The Communities have never included provisions for foreign-policy cooperation in 
general. As a result, common external action of member states initially did not go beyond 
clearly defined technical fields, like for example trade in goods, aside from the limited 
defence cooperation within WEU. Yet efforts to extend cooperation to traditional “high 
politics”, i.e. politically sensitive or security-relevant issues, started as early as in the 1960s. 
Early attempts, including French plans for a political secretariat and the Fouchet Plans which 
were based on idea of regular meetings of heads of state or government, all failed, mostly 
because of resistance by smaller member states.299 
Eventually in December 1969, a summit meeting in The Hague instructed Foreign 
Ministers “to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political 
unification.”300 The result was the Davignon Report, elaborated by Political Directors of the 
Foreign Ministries and adopted at the meeting of Foreign Ministers Luxemburg in October 
1970, which proposed that “the Governments should decide to cooperate in the field of 
foreign policy”301 and outlined the basic features of EPC, i.e. regular meetings of Foreign 
Ministers, the establishment of a Political Committee, consisting of the Political Directors of 
Foreign Ministries, as well as a network of European Correspondents, i.e. an official within 
each Foreign Ministry designated to liaise on EPC issues with counterparts in the other 
Foreign Ministries.302 This structure was elaborated upon subsequently, e.g. with regard to 
frequency of meetings and cooperation among embassies in the capitals of third states, most 
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importantly through the Copenhagen Report of July 1973 and the London Report of October 
1981.303 
Initially it was attempted to keep general foreign-policy cooperation strictly separated 
from the institutions, rules and procedures of the Communities. The Davignon Report only 
provided for regular consultation with and reporting to the EP,304 as well as consultation of 
the Commission “if the activities of the European Communities are affected by the work of 
the Ministers.”305 In practice, it turned out soon that a clear division between economic and 
technical issues, under the Communities, and politica  ones under EPC was not practicable.306 
This led to a progressive rapprochement. The Copenhagen Report confirmed the participation 
of the Commission in meetings of Foreign Ministers that concerned “questions affecting the 
activities of the Communities.”307 The London Report then finally declared that the 
Commission is “fully associated with political cooperation, at all levels.”308 Nevertheless, 
foreign-policy cooperation never became part of the Communities, despite the inclusion of 
EPC in the SEA and its subsequent elaboration as CFSP by the Treaties of Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice. 
As created by the Treaty of Maastricht, the new CFSP was already considerably more 
ambitious than the old EPC. For the first time it defined instruments for common foreign 
policy: on the one hand, common positions, to which member states have to conform their 
national policies;309 on the other hand, joint actions, which “commit Member States in the 
positions they adopt and the conduct of their activity.” 310 Also, foreign policy was brought 
closer to the Communities. The Commission received a right of initiative,311 although not 
exclusive as for many policy fields under the Communities, and it was to participate in 
external representation of the EU on CFSP matters, together with the so-called Troika 
consisting of the past, present and future Presidency.312 The tasks of the EPC’s Foreign 
Minister meetings were now entrusted to the General Aff irs Council which therefore became 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), and the previously separate 
working groups of the Communities and EPC were merged.313 Decision making still required 
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unanimity, with the exception that for the implementation of joint actions the Council could 
now decide by unanimity to take decisions on certain matters by QMV.314 
At the administrative level, the EPC Secretariat was merged with the Council’s General 
Secretariat, within which a unit for CFSP was created.315 The Political Committee of EPC 
retained its core function in CFSP, but in preparing the GAERC meetings it entered in conflict 
with COREPER. After some initial tensions over how to structure competences between the 
two it was agreed that the Political Committee would be responsible for the substance of 
foreign policy while COREPER was to take care of all institutional, legal, financial and 
Community aspects. In this COREPER was to be assisted by a group of foreign policy 
counsellors from member states based in the Permanent Representations who also participated 
in the meetings of the Political Committee. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam elaborated upon the provisins on CFSP. First, to common 
positions and joint actions, it added a third policy tool: common strategies, “to be 
implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in 
common” and which “set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by 
the Union and the Member States.”316 Second, for any decisions implementing previously 
adopted common strategies, joint actions or common p sitions, the amendments replaced 
voting by unanimity with “reinforced” QMV, i.e. requiring not only the usual number of 
favourable weighted votes, but also that these votes represent at least two thirds of member 
states.317 Nevertheless, individual member states can still object to a decision by QMV on the 
grounds of “important and stated reasons of national policy”, in which case the Council may 
decide by unanimity to refer the case to the European Council.318 Third the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced the concept of constructive abstention, i.e. the possibility for any state 
to abstain from voting, with the result that it will not be bound by the decision but engages not 
to act against the policy.319 As a result there is potentially a degree of flexibility in the scope 
of member states participating in specific CFSP activities. Not all of these innovations have 
been successful though, with only very few common strategies adopted and hardly any use of 
QMV or constructive abstention.320 
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The changes the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced withregard to bureaucratic agents 
have been more visible. Aside from the creation of High Representative (HR) for CFSP, 
concurrently Secretary-General of the Council,321 in a declaration attached to the treaty a 
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, later renamed the Policy Unit, was established 
under the responsibility of HR, with the task of monit ring and analysing developments 
relevant for CFSP and suggesting policy options.322 Also, the Troika was reformed to include 
the Presidency, the HR, and the Commission, i.e. usually the Relex Commissioner, as well as 
the incoming Presidency, “if need be.”323 
For the Nice European Council Summit in December 2000 CFSP was not on the agenda, 
and accordingly the Treaty of Nice contained few provisions in this field. It only introduced 
“enhanced cooperation”, i.e. the possibility for a group of at least eight member states to 
strengthen cooperation beyond the existing treaty provisions and for this purpose “make use 
of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms” of the EU, as long at it respects the objectives 
and norms of the EU and the rights of its member state .324 There was some minor change 
with regard to the Political Committee as well. As a result of the development of ESDP it was 
renamed Political and Security Committee (PSC) and put in charge of “political control and 
strategic direction of crisis management operations.”325 Subsequently, the composition of this 
committee has been modified, so that it now meets in two different formations: in the 
traditional formation, with attendance of Political Directors from national Foreign Ministries, 
it still gets together about five times a year; by contrast, a new Brussels-based formation 
meets far more frequently, at least twice per week, and consists of permanent delegates from 
member states’ Permanent Missions in Brussels as well as representatives of the 
Commission’s DG Relex and the Policy Unit in the Council Secretariat.326 
This means that, aside from the GAERC as formal decision maker, at present the 
following bureaucratic agents participate in the EUforeign policy process under CFSP. First, 
the HR does not have any specific powers, but high v sibility and direct access to top leaders 
from member states. Second, COREPER, with its special responsibility of preparing Council 
meetings, is involved in CFSP mostly with regard to institutional, legal, financial and 
Community aspects. Third, the PSC is in charge of policy substance, and the combination of 
high-profile sessions with Political Directors and the permanent Brussels formation promises 
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significant impact. Fourth, within the Council Secrtariat the Policy Unit assists the HR and, 
therefore, plays a crucial role in the formation of p licy options. 
Fifth, the Commission also has considerable influence in the CFSP process. This is 
partly due to its formal association with CFSP, its right to initiate policies, its role in external 
representation, its presence in the PSC, and its strong position in the Community sphere 
which cannot be separated from “high politics”. At the same time, it is also related to the 
Commission’s role as central negotiator for all agreements the EU wants to conclude with 
third actors, i.e. not only in the field of CCP.327 Lastly, the EP may have an impact, although 
it has no formal function, as the democratic conscien e of the EU, i.e. representing public 
opinion. 
 
2.2.4 Analysing the EU Foreign Policy Process 
 
This section has so far presented an unusual international actor with a foreign policy 
process that involves numerous bureaucratic agents based on complex rules and procedures. 
The challenge is now to dissect this process so as t  evaluate how useful the three logics of 
policy making proposed in chapter II are in this context. Therefore I will examine the 
organisational logic, bureaucratic bargaining and the role of central control in the EU’s 
foreign-policy process. 
 
(i) The Organisational Logic in the EU 
The organisational logic already manifests itself in some of the basic policy-making 
procedures outlined above. Most importantly, with regard to CCP the procedural norms 
provide the Commission with the powerful tool of what has been called formal agenda-
setting.328 As Commission proposals can be accepted by the Council with a qualified majority 
but revised only with unanimity, the alternatives are t best a long bargaining process among 
member states in the Council or possibly no policy at all, if no consensus can be reached. If 
the Commission is considered a liberal player in trade politics, a fair assumption since it is 
less subject to particular national interest groups than governments, this decision-making 
mode tends to produce more progressive outcomes since more conservative member states are 
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outvoted with regard to both the negotiating mandate and the final outcome.329 Yet this effect 
depends very much on the majorities among member states. In cases where there is no clear 
qualified majority in favour of change there have been instances of strong pressure by certain 
member states on the Commission.330 
The procedural dimension is not confined to the treaty-based roles of the various EU 
bodies though. In CCP, the bulk of policy preparation is done by the Commission. This policy 
drafting follow certain rules, albeit not as strict as the collective discussion-consensus model 
in the Chinese administration.331 The process begins in the DG responsible for the issue in 
question, or, if it concerns more than one DG, in the lead DG. Initial policy drafts are 
prepared by the desk officer responsible for the topic, from where they move up the 
hierarchies of the DG. If other DGs are involved, this phase also includes inter-DG 
consultations. When all involved officials at all relevant levels in all concerned DGs are 
satisfied with the proposal it goes to the cabinet of the responsible Commissioner, from where 
it may be sent back to the DGs for revision. Once th  cabinet and the Commissioner are 
satisfied, the proposal is examined by the weekly meeting of all chefs de cabinet, at which 
further amendments may be done. As a last step the Coll ge of Commissioners may accept 
the proposal, reject or amend it, or send it back to the lead DG for further work. In this entire 
process within the Commission, strong foreign policy expertise should not be taken for 
granted. Staff rotate continuously, even across DGs, which makes accumulation of specialised 
knowledge and skills particularly difficult. The situation is different in the cabinets of the 
Commissioners who deal with external issues, but also in the College of Commissioners as a 
whole, external relations represent only a small part of their business. 
After acceptance by the Commissioners “standard procedure in the Council is for the 
proposal to be referred initially to a working group of national representatives for detailed 
examination.”332 Once the working group has considered the proposal, which does not 
necessarily imply approval, it is sent upwards to COREPER where its general policy and 
political implications are considered. From here thproposal may be either sent back to the 
working group for further examination or submitted o the Council for voting. 
In other fields of foreign policy, the Commission loses this agenda-setting power. In 
CFSP, the absence of clear procedures in a situation with numerous bureaucratic agents has a 
significant impact and may lead to unclear or even co tradictory policies. The case of the 
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Commission Communication on China of October 2006 can illustrate this problem.333 This 
document discussed all aspects of relations with China, including issues that fall under the 
purview of CFSP, like regional security in East Asia, the situation in the Taiwan Straits, or 
nuclear non-proliferation policies. The document had  strong critical undertone, e.g. 
expressing the EU’s dissatisfaction with the EU-China human rights dialogue or concerns on 
a lack of transparency in China’s military expenditure, and some provocative aspects, for 
example in that Taiwan was listed under the heading “International and Regional 
Cooperation”. The Policy Unit in the Council Secreta iat did not approve of these choices, 
which did not fail to cause major displeasure on the Chinese side.334 It could not oppose the 
publication, but prepared a far less critical text for the Council Conclusions of December 
2006.335 
In general, COREPER and the PSC discuss China at least once a year ahead of the EU-
China summits.336 Aside from this, another organisational aspect areth  continuous 
consultations within the EU. There are numerous institutionalised loci for this end, depending 
on the policy field in question. With regard to China, the following regular consultations take 
place:337 
- Weekly meetings of the Asia Committee (COASIE) at the level of first 
secretaries of member states’ permanent representations; 
- Monthly meetings of COASIE in the format of Asia Directors from national 
capitals; 
- Mutual briefing of all EU actors (Brussels-based institutions as well as member 
states) on their meetings with Chinese counterparts; 
- Periodic informal meetings of China experts, both from Brussels and from 
member states. 
 
(ii) Bureaucratic Bargaining in EU Foreign Policy 
With regard to CCP, bargaining may happen at any stage of policy-making, including 
for example within DGs of the Commission. Nevertheless the clearly structure policy process 
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tends to limit bargaining opportunities. The most important moment of bureaucratic 
bargaining in CCP is ahead of voting in the Council when member states in favour of a 
proposal try to form a qualified majority whereas those opposed try to obstruct it.338 This may 
happen in various contexts, like working groups or COREPER but also in a GAERC meeting 
itself. 
In the context of CFSP the absence of clear procedures allows for a great variety of 
bargaining options, including not only member states as in CCP but also the various Brussels-
based bureaucratic agents. While member states resited the integration of CFSP in the 
Communities, they could not, for reasons of efficien y in decision-making and effectiveness 
in implementation, avoid the creation of specialised administrative entities, a development 
that has been termed “Brusselisation.”339 Although they do not have powers like those of the 
Commission under CCP and no direct influence on actual decision-making, these policy-
making units may have a significant impact on policies. This is visible for example in the 
resistance of smaller member states against the proposal of making the HR chair of the PSC, 
as they feared that this would create an all-too-influe tial bureaucratic agent.340 
The question is how to assess this influence of “brusselised” entities and under what 
conditions it may grow or decrease. Compared with the formal agenda setting power of the 
Commission under the consultation procedure, their influence can be described as “informal 
agenda setting” as discussed by Mark Pollack.341 From this perspective, bureaucratic agents at 
EU level are seen as policy entrepreneurs that construct focal points around which member 
state bargaining in the Council can converge. Pollack identifies four factors that strengthen an 
agent’s informal agenda setting power: information asymmetries favouring the agent; the 
small distributional consequences of the issue involved; the high costs of delayed decision-
making; and the existence of coalitions with sub-natio l actors lobbying member states to 
accept the proposal. 
Even a cursory look at some evidence on CFSP suggests that these factors are 
effectively at work. In the Macedonian crisis of 2001, the HR, the Policy Unit and the EU’s 
Special Envoy had the critical impact that shaped an eventually successful EU policy.342 First, 
information was clearly asymmetrical in favour of the institutional actors. While the Swedish 
Presidency did not even have an embassy in Macedonia, the Special Envoy could develop 
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strong expertise on the issue, the Policy Unit had a permanent presence there and the HR was 
in regular contact with the Macedonian leadership trough a shuttle diplomacy between 
Brussels and Skopje.343 Second, distributional effects of crisis management were small for 
member states, with no strong divisions within the Council on specific ways of dealing with 
the crisis. Greece was the only member state that might have been biased in favour of one of 
the ethnic groups, but for this neighbouring country the costs of civil war in Macedonia were 
likely to be much higher than those of a second-best s ttlement. As a result member states 
took a constructive approach to crisis management.344 Third, there was time pressure, as any 
delay risked to lead to civil war and substantial costs, mostly for Greece, but not only, in 
particular as huge numbers of refugees had already left the country.345 Lastly, while there 
were no decisive coalitions with sub-national actors, effective links with Macedonian 
authorities provided the institutional actors with a greater authority in promoting specific 
policies in the Council.346 
By contrast, in the run-up to the Iraq War 2002 and2003, the constellations with regard 
to the factors behind informal agenda setting were virtually diametrically opposed, and EU 
level bureaucratic agents were not allowed to play any significant role.347 This does not mean, 
of course, that if the HR had been allowed to play a role on Iraq the EU would have adopted a 
common stance on the matter. But the comparison of the Macedonian and the Iraq cases, does 
allow us to extrapolate on conditions that are likely to favour informal agenda setting by the 
Brussels-based CFSP institutions: first, when there is a small-state Presidency and the foreign 
policy issue is related to a small, peripheral state and/or issue; second, when economic and 
strategic interests of all member states are similarly small and any gains of a specific member 
state from a particular approach or solution are negligible compared to the likely costs of 
inaction or failed CFSP action; third, when the costs of inaction (and possibly eruption of a 
full-scale crisis) are high and immediate; and fourth, when specific personalities, services or 
units of the EU institutions have a particularly hig  profile in the concerned state or region. 
This last point may be quite a decisive one as these actors actively shape third party attitudes 
and expectations, and failure to live up to them would significantly undermine the EU’s 
credibility in international affairs. 
                                                
343 Piana 2002, pp.212, 214 and Ahlbrecht 2004, p.262. 
344 See Piana 2002, p. 214. 
345 Ahlbrecht 2004 mentions 100000 refugees by April 2001; p.264. 
346 Both Piana 2002 and Ahlbrecht 2004 emphasise the high profile of Javier Solana in Macedonia. 
347 See Crowe 2003, especially pp.541-543. 
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Second pillar bureaucratic agents at the Union level se m particularly well-placed to 
engage in informal agenda setting. They are permanent, Brussels-based actors, with a long-
term view on issue-areas and policies, and with the possibility of accumulating specifically 
European expertise that may lack in national foreign ministries. Yet we should keep in mind, 
though, that not only EU institutions but also membr states, most importantly the Presidency, 
can embark on informal agenda setting.348 
At the same time, the Commission may also function as an informal agenda setter on 
CFSP. It is unclear to what extent it has actually used its formal right of initiative under CFSP 
but there is strong evidence of substantial input from the Commission into the CFSP 
process.349 Several other origins of Commission influence on CFSP can be distinguished. 
First, insofar as the TEU calls for consistency of all external relations of the EU, and mentions 
that “[t]he Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such 
consistency,”350 the Commission has an indirect impact that is wider than its explicit 
competences under the TEC. Second, this impact may become more direct when the question 
is no longer one of consistency but of complementarity, i.e. when CFSP decisions call for 
implementation through EC action (e.g. economic sanctio s as a “stick” or development 
cooperation as a “carrot”) which will be designed by the Commission and adopted through the 
Community method. 
The combination of a need for consistency and informal agenda setting may provide for 
significant Commission influence on CFSP. Indeed in certain circumstances the Commission 
seems to be even better placed than the CFSP institutions to act as a political entrepreneur. It 
is the oldest supranational institution of European integration and has accumulated an 
unparalleled expertise on European issues and Europe’s relations with third countries, 
including in their political dimension.351 This provides it in many instances with an 
information advantage. At the same time it has developed close links both with sub-national 
actors (which may be important in specific issues of international affairs such as human 
rights) and more importantly with decision-makers in third states, mostly through its 
extensive network of delegations. 
                                                
348 See on this Pollack 1997, p. 126: “Anyone can be apolitical entrepreneur […]”. 
349 Nuttall 2000 discusses evidence of Commission input into the CFSP process. However, even in Brussels it 
seems unclear whether any of this input can be counted as a formal initiative under Art.22 (p.256). 
350 TEU Art.3. 
351 See Nuttall 2000, pp.253-257 on Commission efforts to tructure and streamline its work on the political 
dimension of EU foreign relations. 
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Clearly, the case of complementarity between second and first pillar provides for the 
greatest influence of the Commission in CFSP-related d cision making. Sanctions are the 
most prominent example where such complementarity is necessary. Economic sanctions have 
become a widely used tool of coercing third states. The TEC explicitly states how to proceed 
in this case.352 First, the fundamental decision to impose sanctions s taken in the Council by 
unanimity, through a common position or joint action in the CFSP framework. Second, the 
specific design of the policy implementing the CFSP decision is taken through the 
consultation procedure under EC. This confers to the Commission its classical formal agenda 
setting power, i.e. its proposal can be passed withqualified majority but amended only by 
unanimity. As a result the Commission is the crucial actor in designing a policy of economic 
measures against a third state, meaning that often “th  outcome of the policy corresponds to 
the Commission’s interest, and not the member states’ interests.”353 An extreme example is 
the follow-up of the European Council decision to impose sanctions against Russia after the 
Chechen crisis in 1999. As the Commission did not want to interrupt trade with Russia it 
simply never presented any policy proposal to that end, and sanctions never came about.354 
A second important case of complementarity is the use of economic incentives to induce 
political cooperation with the EU. The most important tools to this end, the common 
commercial policy and development cooperation, are within the first pillar. The specific 
formal influence of the Commission in this situation depends on the applicable decision-
making procedure as discussed in the previous section, but the Commission is in any case the 
central negotiator of any agreements with third state ,355 and, in addition to that, the 
implementing agency for any form of development cooperation or humanitarian aid. This may 
also add to the Commission’s leverage when trade inc ntives or development cooperation are 
used in relation with CFSP. In the Macedonian crisis, for instance, the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement was a highly attractive “carrot”, which provided the Commission with 
a central role in the settlement of the Macedonian crisis.356 
In summary, bureaucratic bargaining is pervasive in EU foreign policy. Aside from 
bargaining within some bodies, like the Commission, the most important bargaining venue is 
the Council, be it with regard to a matter to which QMV is applicable like CCP or a case 
                                                
352 TEC Art.301. 
353 Gegout 2004, p.237. 
354 Gegout 2004, p. 237-238. 
355 See Bretherton and Vogler 1999, pp.56-59, and Vanhoo acker 2005, pp.74-78, on agreements beyond trade 
in goods. 
356 Piana 2002, pp.212-213, and Ahlbrecht 2004, p.263. Piana 2002 also mentions the good cooperation between 
the HR Solana and the Relex Commissioner Patten as crucial for the smooth EU policies. 
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where unanimity is required, like CFSP. In CFSP in bargaining among the many involved 
bureaucratic agents is more common than in CCP, although the involved players and their 
actual influence depend very much on the situation. First it depends on the opportunities for 
informal agenda setting and how well the concerned administrative as policy entrepreneurs 
can make use of them. Second, with regard to the Commission, influence depends also on the 
degree to which a certain CFSP matter is related to first pillar policies.  
In the EU’s relations with China, there is evidence of competitive bargaining involving 
members states as well as Brussels-based bureaucratic agents. Several interviewees pointed to 
the ambiguous nature of relations among EU members with regard to China policy, featuring 
both intensive cooperation and substantial competition.357 Complaints were also voiced by 
officials from Commission and the Council Secretariat about the other intruding on one’s own 
turf.358 Related to these statements were usually attitudes that minimised the role of the 
interviewee’s own institution. 
With regard to informal agenda setting on CFSP issue , one should note that relations 
with China tend to be a topic to which all member states attach great importance, and that 
emergency situations, which could create opportunities for informal agenda setting because of 
the need for fast and efficient action, have not yeoccurred in China-EU relations. 
Nevertheless the other factors, namely a small state Presidency and strong personal relations, 
may indeed favour the influence of Brussels-based bureaucratic agents.  
Several interviewees have pointed to the binding nature of formal procedures and 
limited scope for informal agenda setting in relations with China.359 Indeed there appears to 
be a link between rule-obedient behaviour and the opportunity for informal influence. One 
interviewee in the Commission and one in the Council Secretariat stated explicitly or implied 
that informal influence within the EU setting depends crucially on trust, i.e. any attempt to use 
it to promote a hidden agenda bears the risk of back-firing by destroying trust and precluding 
informal influence in the future.360 Two interviewees also pointed out that intra-EU 
cooperation is both dense and transparent, precisely to create the necessary trust, which also 
implies that hidden agendas can be spotted rather easily.361 
                                                
357 Interview EU 1, Berlin Q1 2007; Interview EU 2, Berlin Q1 2007; Interview EU 5, Berlin Q1 2007; Interview 
EU 6, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 9, Brussels Q1 2007. 
358 Preliminary Interview EU 3, Beijing Q3 2006; Interview EU 6, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 7, Brussel  
Q1 2007; Interview EU 9, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 13, Brussels Q1 2007. 
359 Preliminary Interview EU 3, Beijing Q3 2006; Interview EU 6, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 7, Brussel  
Q1 2007. 
360 Interview EU 6, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 7, Brussels Q1 2007. 
361 Interview EU 2, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 7, Brussels Q1 2007. 
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As regards complementarity between the second and first pillars, there have been no 
economic sanctions against China. Also the EU is not i  a similarly strong position as for 
example towards the Balkans, where economic incentiv s through the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements can be used. Overall the relationship with China is more balanced 
and any use of conditionality risks to compromise substantial interests at home. In fact, one 
interviewee pointed out the difficulty of using trade tools for political goals in such an 
important economic relationship as the one between China and the EU362. There is a 
considerable development cooperation activity under EC leadership, which certainly has 
political motivations. But rather than providing direct leverage, it probably needs to be 
interpreted as aiming at soft influence in the longer term. 
 
(iii) The Logic of Central Control 
In the case of China, we found clear evidence of the successful countering of centrifugal 
forces based on organisational logic and bureaucratic b rgaining through the centripetal force 
of central control. For the EU, there is no centre that could play this role. In fact, clear 
hierarchies only exist in the context of policy-making procedures as outlined in the previous 
sub-section. 
This is not a trivial statement, and neither does it question the usefulness of this third 
logic of policy making in the analytical framework though. To the contrary, the absence of 
effective central control is an important aspect of EU policy making. It means that the 
inefficiencies related to the operation of the organis tional logic and bureaucratic bargaining 
in policy making are virtually unchecked. If in the EU a proposal gets stuck in complex 
procedures or blocked due competing views of different bureaucratic agents, nothing can be 




The EU foreign policy system resists any simple description or analysis. Nevertheless 
from the preceding discussion a number of points emerge that are relevant in the context of 
the framework adopted for this research. First, EU foreign-policy making is based on a clear-
cut ensemble of rules that assign competences, define procedures, and in particular establish 
                                                
362 Interview EU 15, Brussels Q1 2007. 
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routines of cooperation, coordination and exchange. In the absence of a strong central 
executive, this formal structure is hard to modify from above, even in times of crisis. This 
may contribute to a vision of issues that is more a function of intra-EU rules than of foreign 
policy substance. At the same time, however, the necessity to cooperate may create links 
between the different administrative entities, and opportunities to overcome some of the 
limitations of formal organisational structures. Second, the various competing perceptions, 
habits, beliefs, and interests of bureaucratic actors within the EU’s foreign policy apparatus 
provide for a huge bargaining arena. It is hard to elineate any typical bargaining processes 
since incentives depend greatly on particular situations. For example, in one circumstance a 
bureaucratic actor may have an incentive to overstat  i s influence because it provides a 
chance for publicity at a low price given limited real power with regard to a certain issue. In 
another situation the same actor may have to understat  its influence since it would be 
damaging to be held accountable for public promises. Thirdly it should be added that, despite 
the absence of a single top executive, individuals in various positions have a certain leeway to 
bend rules and procedures in favour of their organisational interests and to gamble for 
influence in the bureaucratic bargaining game. 
One may wonder whether, from the point of view of the analytical framework, the EU is 
therefore a good choice if the aim is to study transnational bureaucratic interaction. I contend 
that it is. First of all, we should recall that structures and processes within any aggregate entity 
of social organisation are complex, confusing and sometime contradictory. Second, the EU is 
at least as good a case as any other international org nisation – all of which share the 
characteristic that they are constituted by other international actors, namely states, aside from 
their own administrative bodies. Third, since the EU is far more integrated than virtually any 
other international organisation, with a wide array of issues subject to joint decision making, 
it provides more incentive for outsiders to engage it. This means it is probably a better 
candidate than other international organisations. Fourth, one could even argue that the EU is 
an exceptionally good case for the study of bureaucratic interaction. A key aspect of this 
research is the problem of choice: when internationl actor A engages actor B, A’s policy-
makers have to decide somehow which of B’s policy-makers to engage and how. The obvious 
diversity within the EU in the form of its member states emphasises this variety of options 




2.3 Independent Dynamics of Direct Interaction Between China and the EU 
 
In this last section of chapter III, my attention turns to the process III of the analytical 
framework, namely the independent dynamics of direct interaction between bureaucratic 
agents of different international actors. The main mechanisms had been identified as based on 
the quality of personal relations, degree of similarity in preferences and worldviews, and 
lastly matches or mismatches in issue perceptions. How should one expect the various types 
of transnational bureaucratic dynamics that I discus ed in the previous chapter to work in the 
context of China-EU relations? 
 
2.3.1 Transnational Bureaucratic Interaction: Grounded in Recent History 
 
Certainly, there is a history of cooperation between Chinese bureaucratic entities and 
their counterparts in the EU, despite the comparatively short time since the establishment of 
official diplomatic relations. At a very basic level, it is fair to assume that from this past 
experience each Chinese ministry has established its own patterns of action on European 
matters, including particular interlocutors and struc ured approaches for interaction with them. 
For example, overall the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) can be expected to have 
experience of diplomacy towards the foreign ministrie  of the EU member states (especially 
the bigger ones), and, as a consequence, at the EU l vel more affinities with the Council, the 
Council Presidency and the Council Secretariat, i.e. institutions close to member states and 
their interests, than with a truly supranational body like the Commission. The Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), by contrast, is likely to have stronger ties with the Commission, its 
main counterpart in the context of the 1985 EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement, 
and, although to a lesser extent, with economic ministr es of member states. 
In general, Chinese officials have developed a wide array of personal relations with 
officials from other international actors. With the entry of China into many specialised 
international organisations as well as informal groupings, they have become part of a growing 
array of functional networks in Slaughter’s sense.363 These have prepared the ground of 
improving personal ties and possibly converging preferences and worldviews as parts of the 
same epistemic community. Towards the EU, the numerous technical dialogues established 
                                                
363 An indicator of this is for example the nomination f Chinese economist Lin Yifu as chief economist of the 
World Bank; see Richard McGregor, Financial Times, 21 Jan. 2008, “Top Chinese economics set for Bank job”.
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over the past two decades have certainly contributed to the shaping of such networks.364 
Several interviewees, both in China and the EU, indicated friendly personal relations with the 
counterparts from the other side, including cases in which friendships continued after the end 
of professional contacts.365 At the leadership level, personal relations are particularly 
important given the growing importance of summit diplomacy in China’s foreign relations.366 
Such patterns of historically-established relations between decision-making units on 
both sides as well as personal networks are likely to shape bureaucratic interaction between 
China and the EU on many specific issues. Aside from the direct contact between officials, 
this may also influence the definition by Chinese decision makers of other parameters of 
international bargaining, like “carrots and sticks”, ide-payments, etc. For example, the MFA 
may be more likely to see options for side-payments i  international venues like the UN or 
interregional fora like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) or the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) while the MOFCOM should be expected to focus more on side-payments in the WTO 
or the targeting of European enterprises with business in China and strong lobbying positions. 
In the Chinese system of governance, individuals and their personal standing in the 
hierarchy is of crucial importance, for example when after internal deliberation a final 
decision is made by the head of a group or institution and not necessarily through voting.367 
Of equal importance, and linked to this first point, are personal relations.368 This key role of 
individuals and personal relations in Chinese governance is reflected in China’s relations with 
the outside, including with the EU. Not only is it common to see foreign leaders who appear 
particularly well disposed towards China as “friends of China,”369 it also seems that Chinese 
diplomats take a great interest in good relations with their EU counterparts, and personal ties 
have been improving considerably over the past 10 years.370 
 
                                                
364 For a useful summary of dialogues, see Commission 2003b, Annex I, p.27. Since then a half-yearly strategic 
dialogue and a dialogue on Africa have been added. 
365 Interview EU 2, Berlin Q1 2007; Interview EU 7, Brussels Q1 2007; Interview EU 9, Brussels Q1 2007. 
366 See for example Plischke 1986; Devin 2002, p.219; Zhang 2006; Wu 2007, chap.3. 
367 Interview China 4, Beijing Q2 2007; compare also Yang 1995, p.95, on strict hierarchy and importance of 
position in the “line of command” for an individual’s influence; a common statement by Chinese intellectuals is 
that China is not a society governed by law (法治 – fǎzhì) but by individuals (人治 – rénzhì). 
368 See Guo 2001. 
369 Like in Europe among others former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, former Italian Prime Minister and 
Commission President Romano Prodi, or former French president Jacques Chirac; see for example Andreas 
Lorenz, Spiegel Online, 23 May 2006, “Merkel macht freundlichen Wind”; also mentioned in Interview China 
15, Beijing Q4 2008. 
370 Interview China 9, Beijing Q3 2007; Interview EU 1, Berlin Q1 2006; Interview EU 2, Berlin Q1 2006; 
Interview EU 7, Brussels Q1 2006; Interview EU 9, Brussels Q1 2006. 
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2.3.2 The Role of Perceptions 
 
A final element identified as a potentially important factor in direct interactive dynamics 
between bureaucratic entities from different international agents are perceptions. In general, it 
seems that in China-EU relations there are discrepancies between self-perception and 
perception by the other, like for example on human rights in China or on the EU’s adherence 
to commercial liberalism.371 It has been argued that Chinese perceptions of the EU are often 
marked by “cognitive dissonance”, or a “natural proclivity to selectively look for 
confirmation of one’s pre-existing beliefs and to reject evidence that contradicts these 
beliefs”,372 an affirmation that is equally valid for European perceptions of China; visible for 
example in the tendency to emphasise the continuing authoritarian nature of the regime rather 
than the continuous reform and opening. 
More generally, how do Chinese policy-makers and consultants perceive the EU and the 
different entities within it? From the interviews with Chinese policy consultants it appears 
that there is a strong awareness of the divisions among member states of the EU and a 
conviction that Chinese foreign-policy makers have a differentiated approach to these 
entities.373 Two interviewees pointed out that the understanding of European integration has 
matured and that in general there is less confusion,374 and one confirmed that Chinese 
diplomats are trying to benefit from the many European actors by playing them out against 
one another.375 One complained about confusion but implicitly confirmed a rather detailed 
knowledge about European integration on the Chinese sid  by referring to engagement of 
different entities on different issues depending on f rmal competence within the EU (in 
particular member states versus Commission).376 The general images of different European 
entities that emerged were the following: European integration is seen as a positive 
development, and often China is shifting contacts in certain issue-areas towards the EU 
because it is more convenient to deal with one interlocutor than with all member states 
separately.377 The Commission is seen as a very good partner for Chinese officials,378 yet 
none of the interviewees had any opinion about the rol of the Council or the Council 
                                                
371 See Shambaugh 2008a and Zaborowski 2006 on perceptions in China and the EU respectively. 
372 Shambaugh 2008, p128. 
373 See Preliminary Interview China 2, Beijing Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006; 
Preliminary Interview China 4, Shanghai Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 5, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
374 Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 4, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
375 Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
376 Preliminary Interview China 1, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
377 Preliminary Interview China 1, Shanghai Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
378 Preliminary Interview China 1, Shanghai Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 2, Beijing Q3 2006. 
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Secretariat in China-EU relations. The largest three member states are also seen as excellent 
partners for China, in particular on global issues since they are strategic players.379 Smaller 
member states are seen as more troublesome, since they are not bound to China by important 
economic interests, but nevertheless China is starting to engage them as well on specific 
commercial issues.380 
These statements are significant, in particular in light of some literature on Chinese 
foreign policy which points out a general scepticism concerning international cooperation and 
institutions. In fact, Iain Johnston identifies a “hardening of the Chinese realpolitik discourse 
through to at least the mid-1990s,”381 and Elizabeth Economy points to a consensus among 
most scholars of Chinese foreign policy that “despite an overall reorientation toward more 
active participation in global regimes, China remains ambivalent, if not suspicious, of global 
governance.”382 More recently, however, scholars have identified a reversal in Chinese 
approaches to multilateralism and international institutions.383 
These overall perceptions may also cause differences in views on the nature of issues, 
e.g. whether something is technical or security-relevant or whether a meeting with the Dalai 
Lama is interference in internal affairs or a friendly gesture to promote human rights in China. 
In general, there is certainly a lot of room for a mismatch of mutual perceptions at the level of 
bureaucratic entities. As will be discussed in the following two chapters both sides have 
complex decision-making structures with both intricate formal distribution of competences 
and often opaque informal patterns. This may easily lead to misperceptions, e.g. by the 





In China-EU relations, there seem to be signs of independent dynamics in direct 
bureaucratic interactions. History, or previous experience of interaction, is an important factor 
                                                
379 Preliminary Interview China 2, Beijing Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006; 
Preliminary Interview China 5, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
380 Preliminary Interview China 2, Beijing Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 5, Shanghai Q3 2006. 
381 Johnston 1999, pp.13-14; see also Johnston 2003 on discussion of Chinese scepticism towards multilateralism 
in the 1990s. 
382 Economy 2001, p.232. 




in determining modes of engagement. Also personal rel tions appear to be of particular 
importance. With regard to perceptions, there are signs of mismatches. 
Detailed conclusions on these various dimensions will be drawn from the empirical case 
studies. In anticipation, it can already be noted that, in general, very strong forms of 
transnational bureaucratic interaction, like for example transgovernmental coalitions in the 
sense of Keohane and Nye, are rare at best. Interviewees from Commission, Council 
Secretariat and member states denied any instances of individual entities from within the EU 
trying to strike deals with China behind the back of their European colleagues.384 Overall the 
dense structure of consultation in the EU tends to keep the competitive dynamics among these 




The goal of this chapter has been to discuss how China and the EU fit into the analytical 
framework developed in chapter II. I considered successively all three processes distinguished 
by the framework, i.e. foreign-policy making in China and in the EU, as well as direct 
transnational ties between bureaucratic agents fromb th sides. It appears that the variables 
and causal mechanisms identified within each of these processes are of relevance in the 
empirical context of this research, with caveat thacentral control is a difficult concept in the 
context of EU politics. A secondary aim was, in the first two sections, to introduce the 
technicalities of foreign-policy processes in China and in the EU. This is an indispensable 
background for the following empirical chapters. 
In the conclusion of the chapter on the analytical fr mework I mentioned the potential 
indirect influence of the international environment o  transnational bureaucratic interaction. A 
few comments on the international environment of China-EU relations may therefore be in 
order here. First, this relationship is relevant in terms of global politics. In the face of an 
improving understanding between China and the EU and deteriorating transatlantic relations, 
some observers have identified a new emerging China-EU axis or the dawn of a new era in 
which the Eurasian space between China and the EU would become more central to global 
affairs than the transatlantic one,385 or seen the shaping of a new strategic triangle.386 Yet this 
                                                
384 Preliminary Interview EU 3, Beijing Q3 2006; Interview EU 2, Berlin Q1 2007; Interview EU 6, Brussels Q1 
2007; Interview EU 7, Brussels Q1 2007. 
385 See Shambaugh 2004 and Xiang 2004. 
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implies not only an influence of China-EU cooperation on the rest of the world but also an 
outside influence on bureaucratic interaction betwen the two. A first important factor are 
other major players on the world stage, like the US or Russia, and their attitudes and policies 
towards China and the EU. For example, depending on the quality of relations with the US, 
Chinese decision-makers may prefer to engage EU entities with a transatlantic inclination 
rather than those favouring a more independent EU or vice versa. Second, international 
institutions do shape the China-EU interaction. It may matter a great deal, for instance, that 
Chinese, British, and French diplomats all attend UN Security Council meetings, whereas 
Commission officials do not. Similarly, in the economic realm, the important interactions 
between China and the EU on trade-related issues may be influenced by what is happening in 


















                                                                                                                                              





















































































Chapter III. China-EU Relations From the Cold War to Present 
 
 
The goal of this chapter is to provide the larger context in which the two case studies of 
the following chapters have to be located. This effort has two dimensions. First, it will 
introduce the historical context, i.e. the evolution f China-EU relation from immediately 
after the Second World War to present. To do so, I divide these six decades into four periods 
based on key dates and events that brought fundament l changes in the relationship. Second, I 
will analyse the state of the relationship during the period under research, based on existing 
literature on China-EU relations.  
 
3.1 Sino-European Relations – a Historical Overview 
 
3.1.1 Cold War – Slow Contacts between Western Europe and “Red China” 
 
Formal relations between the group of countries that are members of the EU today and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) go back to theimmediate aftermath of the 
establishment of the latter in 1949. Most Eastern European countries, under Soviet influence 
at that time, established diplomatic relations with the PRC “within three months of its birth”, 
namely Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.1 
Second, within a year, a number of non-socialist countries followed suit, i.e. Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.2 Even the UK, one of the most decried imperialist 
countries, recognised the PRC in 1950 and sent a chargé d’affaires to Beijing, although full 
diplomatic relations were only established more than 20 year later.3 Third, by 1965, an 
additional three European states, France Norway and Yugoslavia, had set up diplomatic 
relations with the PRC.4 
Relations with Western European states were overshadowed by the logic of Cold War 
bipolarity. This changed only after the Sino-Soviet split and the development of closer 
                                                
1 Liu 2001, p.7. 
2 Liu 2001, p.8. Together with Switzerland diplomatic relations were also established with Liechtenstei who has 
entrusted since 1919 most of its foreign policy to its Swiss neighbours. 
3 Liu 2001, pp.10-11. 
4 Liu 2001, p.58. 
 
 124
relations between the US and the PRC.5 Actually the Chinese leadership attempted repeatedly 
to build closer links with Western Europe in order to balance against both superpowers but 
met very limited responsiveness.6 Nevertheless, as a result of rapprochement between China 
and the US, most European states established full diplomatic relations with China in the 
1970s, including Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (all in 1971), Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, 
Malta, Netherlands (all in 1972), Spain (1973), Ireland, and Portugal (both 1979). 
Interestingly, Italy even slightly preceded the Kissinger visits to China: after an initial 
commercial agreement with China in 1964 it extended iplomatic recognition in 1970. China 
and the European Community established diplomatic relations in 1975. 
While the development of the “strategic triangle” during the 1970s had finally given 
many western European states the opportunity to establi h official relations with China, this 
by no means resulted in substantial political ties. In fact, the overall strategic leadership of the 
US created the convenient opportunity to follow thepace of Chinese reform and opening up 
and develop economic relations without worrying toomuch about major political or strategic 
issues. This comfortable situation came to an end in 1989. First, the felt need for European 
states to react in some way to the violent repression in China of June 1989 suddenly imposed 
a political dimension on relations with China. Second, the end of the Cold War indicated that 
in the future Europe would have to take more political responsibility for its actions on the 
world stage. Since then, Sino-European relations have evolved considerably. Despite their 
almost complete interruption in the immediate aftermaths of the Tiananmen Incident, over the 
past fifteen years relations have both widened, in terms of the scope of issue-areas concerned, 
and deepened. 
 
3.1.2 1989 to mid-1990s – the End of the Age of Innocence and a Normalising Relationship 
 
In 1994 Michael B. Yahuda stated that “[t]he European Community has tended to focus 
primarily on the economic aspects of its relations with China.”7 He added that “it is 
appropriate to consider the relationship as secondary from China’s point of view”, and that 
China is “lacking much leverage in Europe”.8 China-EU relations during the 1990s were 
deeply marked by the Tiananmen experience. In May 1989, at the time of demonstrations and 
                                                
5 On the understanding of the Sino-Soviet split in the west see Ford 1998-99. 
6 See for example Yahuda 1994, pp.266-268; Shambaugh 1996, p.12. 
7 Yahuda 1994, p. 272. 
8 Yahuda 1994, pp. 266 and 270. 
 125
before the repression by the Chinese government, the European Parliament had already taken 
up the issue and adopted a resolution calling on the C inese government to enter into dialogue 
with the students.9 On the Chinese side this was a time when the dialogue proposed by 
general secretary Zhao Ziyang had already been refused as a solution by the party elders in 
charge and a violent reaction by the government only a matter of time.10 The actual repression 
in early June was followed by various EU statements that condemned the events in China, 
called for a continuation of opening up and reform and imposed a number of sanctions.11 
Nevertheless already in the second half of 1989, there were strong signs that the EU would try 
to re-establish contacts with China. The foreign miisters publicly stated this intention in July, 
some of them met their Chinese colleague on the margins of the UN General Assembly in 
September, and the same month the EC ambassadors attended the reception for the 40th 
anniversary of the PRC, although leaving before the cultural part of the event. More concrete 
steps followed the year after, and by late 1990 and early 1991, regular mutual visits between 
the Chinese leadership and their EU colleagues started gain. 
The first written indication of a change in European ttitudes towards China after 
Tiananmen was the Asia strategy of the German foreign ministry of 1993. Neither Tiananmen 
nor substantial violations of human rights in general were mentioned, instead it emphasised 
the economic dimension of the relations with Asia and the need for “substantial partnerships 
for mutual benefit”, but also called for increased political dialogue with Asian partners.12 
More specifically, “[w]ith the most important Asian states, Japan, China, India, and one state 
of the ASEAN grouping, there should be annual visits among foreign ministers and heads of 
government.”13 It is significant that the actual debate was not starting in Brussels but rather in 
member state capitals. In fact, the German paper was soon followed by a similar French 
strategy called the “Ten Initiatives for Asia,”14 and only after that came a very similar 
strategic paper by the European Commission entitled “Towards a New Asia Strategy”15 in 
July 1994. 
This means that the Commission, although now fully and formally associated with 
CFSP and participating in all Troika events, did not have any leading role in promoting the 
new approach of China. In fact, all through the history of CFSP, formal instruments have 
                                                
9 For the historical references in this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, see Möller 2002, p.16-18. 
10 See Baum 1993 on this. 
11 For more details on this and the re-establishment of the relationship in the early 1990s see the chapter on the 
arms embargo case.  
12 Asienkonzept der Bundesregierung 1993, pp.2; my translation. 
13 Asienkonzept der Bundesregierung 1993, pp.10; my translation. 
14 Casarini 2006, p.10. 
15 Commission 1994. 
 
 126
never been used towards China. Other institutional innovations, in particular the formal CFSP 
instruments and the link to the WEU for security-relat d tasks, were also of limited relevance 
for the engagement of China. 
Since the mid-1990s, the Commission, to this point the only permanent EU body 
working on CFSP, seemed to gain more initiative. This is reflected in a constant flow of 
China papers from the Commission to the Council, which promote a growing engagement of 
China, enlarging the scope of issue-areas covered by cooperation and increasing the number f 
contact points between the EU and China. This may also be a function of the growing  
engagement of the Commission in China through its role as implementing agency for all EC 
development cooperation programmes, and, more importantly even, the Commission’s 
increasing prestige in China-EU relations as the sol negotiator of the bilateral agreement on 
WTO accession. 
Nevertheless, the building up of political relations between China and the EU happened 
once again without significant contribution of the Commission.16 A political dialogue was 
established in 1994 and a human rights dialogue introduced in 1995, interrupted a year later 
but resumed in 1997. This development reflects once more the key role of the big member 
states in CFSP processes. The initiative to set up the human rights dialogue came from China 
and was initially accepted by EU member states. When it became clear, however, that the EU 
would again sponsor a resolution in the annual UN Commission on Human Rights, China 
interrupted the dialogue. In the wake of this, France and several other large member states 
declined to sponsor further resolutions, arguably for fear of disturbing growing economic 
relations with China, but also because in previous years those resolutions usually had not even 
made it on the agenda since China could mobilise enough supporting countries to ensure that 
the draft was voted down. In 1997, a number of EU members, including Nordic countries and 
the UK, sponsored the resolution on a national basis, but after this a new policy of 
constructive engagement in the human rights field was agreed among member states, and then 
included in the Commission paper of 1998 “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with 
China.”17 It favoured bilateral dialogue over UN resolutions and the GAERC meeting in 
March 1998 established a policy that the EU would “neither propose, nor endorse” any UN 
resolution condemning China for its human rights situat on.18 This position has been 
maintained until today. 
                                                
16 See on this also Möller 2001 and Casarini 2006. 
17 Commission 1998. 
18 Casarini 2006, p.19. 
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It is obvious that in the process leading up to this policy, the new common foreign 
policy institutions of the second pillar did not play any important role, nor did the 
Commission, except maybe as an advisor to governments and the Council on EU matters. But 
what was the dynamic among the member states that led to this outcome? Again, the process 
is hard to trace, yet interviews with policy-makers both in Brussels and in Beijing suggest 
that, apart from avoiding the negative political effects of the public UN resolutions, EU 
leaders, especially from the larger member states, sought to place the topic of Chinese human 
rights outside the democratic accountability and tight media supervision of the domestic 
political sphere.19 A dialogue at the EU-level does indeed have the advantage of signalling 
that something is being done while avoiding interfering too deeply in industrial promotion, 
which is still largely done at the member state leve . The reluctant member states, in particular 
the Nordic countries with a strong tradition of prom ting human rights in their external 
relations, were convinced of the solution by the costs in terms of relations with China that 
would have resulted from their individual insistenc on public criticism at the UN. 
This cannot be considered a final conclusion on the establishment of the human rights 
dialogue, however. In fact, the interviewees were current officials and policy advisors, and are 
themselves not fully familiar with the details of EU politics in the mid-1990s. To be fair, one 
also has to add that several member states (includig the UK, Germany, Sweden, and 
Denmark) have subsequently also introduced bilateral human rights dialogues at the national 
level. And although it has not done so, France seem to be a particularly active participant of 
the preparatory sessions for the China-EU human rights dialogue.20 
 
3.1.3 Mid-1990s to 2002 – Into the Honeymoon 
 
In 1996, David Shambaugh judged the 1995 Commission C mmunication on China as 
“strong on commerce, but [with] noticeably less emphasis on political, diplomatic or strategic 
matters”.21 This recalls somehow the judgement by Yahuda two years earlier, cited at the 
beginning of the previous section. Yet Shambaugh also found a new dynamism in Sino-
                                                
19 Preliminary Interview China 1, Shanghai Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006; 
Preliminary Interview EU 3, Beijing Q3 2006; Interview EU 15, Brussels Q1 2007. 
20 Interview EU 15, Brussels Q1 2007. 
21 Shambaugh 1996, p.1. 
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European relations, a relationship that “can be said to be in excellent overall health” with a 
“trendline of improved relations [that] can be expected to continue.”22 
With regard to political relations, the end of the Cold War inspired some hope on the 
Chinese side of building up Europe as one of the pol s f a future multipolar world order. In 
fact, the receding superpower rivalry had created new opportunities of action for other states, 
great powers or, more generally, other entities on the global stage. Among them, both the EU 
and China belonged to the most influential ones. The EU included two permanent members of 
the UN SC and four members of the G-7. In 1994 Henry Kissinger wrote that “[u]nited, 
Europe will continue as a Great Power; divided into ational states, it will slide into 
secondary status.”23 One may object that Europe as a single great power is by no means a 
continuation of the past, but nevertheless, a re-examination of the quote today could indeed 
suggest a “great power Europe”. Regional integration has made enormous progress since the 
early 1990s, most notably with the development of apolitical and foreign-policy dimension. 
The EU can use some of its immense economic power for the pursuit of political goals, 
through sanctions or political conditionality on economic cooperation and/or membership. 
Beyond the concept of “civilian power,”24 it has also made significant steps towards a 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in recent y ars. As far as China is concerned, 
due to its size it has been regarded as a great power with a potentially global reach already for 
long, as witnessed for example by its permanent seat and veto in the Security Council (SC) of 
the United Nations (UN). As a result of the policies of modernisation, pursued since the late 
1970s, its share in the international economy and its m litary weight have been continuously 
growing, and, more recently, China has made consciou  efforts of promoting its “soft 
power.”25 Today it enjoys a global influence unprecedented in its modern history. 
In 1998, annual EU-China summits were started, covering from the beginning economic 
and technical cooperation as well as many political and strategic issues. If in the late 1990s 
official EU parlance was that there are “multi-faceted relations” between the EU and China, it 
had become a “comprehensive strategic partnership” by 2004.26 This notion had been 
promoted by a 2003 Commission policy paper, describing the EU and China as major 
strategic partners, and by the Chinese reply which confirms that “China and the EU have 
                                                
22 Shambaugh 1996, p.3 and 25. 
23 Kissinger 1994, p.807. 
24 On the evolution of the debate on Europe as a civilian power see Manners 2002, in particular pp.236-240. 
25 Gill and Huang 2006 provide a survey of instances and effects of China’s use of soft power. 
26 “Press Statement of the EU” after the 2nd EU-China Summit 1999 and “7th EU-China Summit – Joint 
Statement” 2004. 
 129
developed an ever closer consultation and fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, 
trade, scientific, cultural and educational fields.”27 
Although not the primary focus here, it may be usefl to point out that the mutual 
interest is also reflected at the level of member state . In 1997 France and China established a 
“partenariat global” which was upgraded to a “partenariat global stratégique” in 2004.28 The 
UK and China went from an “enhanced, comprehensive partnership” in 1998 to a 
“comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2004.29 Germany has been a leading force in 
strengthening Sino-European relations and defines the integration of China into the 
international community as one of its top foreign-policy goals.30 German Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier talked of a “strategic relationship” in 2006.31 
The upgrading of the political dialogue in 1998 to an annual summit had not previously 
seen any further effective institutional change (the Treaty of Amsterdam was not to enter into 
force before 1999) and seems to have followed a similar logic of converging interests among 
key EU players. This time, however, the Commission may have played a more active part. It 
had just made public the Union’s new China strategy in its 1998 policy paper and was in very 
close contact with Chinese counterparts on an expanding number of development projects and 
the intensifying WTO negotiations. 
A curious fact of the development of EU foreign policy integration, as compared to EU-
China relations, is that the establishment of summit meetings came before the EU actually had 
a continuous and politically active “summit” in the fi ld of CFSP. While in addition to the 
Presidency the Commission president was naturally attending the first two summits, the HR 
was not to be nominated before late 1999. 
These experiences up until the late 1990s suggest that rather than institutional 
innovation, it was convergence of interests among key players that brought the important 
steps ahead in China-EU relations. This does not exclude that the creation of a new 
institutional framework for CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty, the continuous debates about it 
and its re-design by the Treaty of Amsterdam have substantially contributed to the creation of 
a stronger cooperative dynamic among those key players, and possibly more acceptance for 
an institutional actor like the Commission among them. But it is not possible to establish a 
                                                
27 See Commission 2003b, p.3, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2003, p.2. 
28 “Déclaration Conjointe pour un Partenariat Global” 1997 and “Déclaration Conjointe pour un Partenariat 
Global Stratégique Franco-Chinois” 2004. 
29 “China-UK Joint Statement” 1998 and “China-UK Joint Statement” 2004. 
30 On German policies towards China see Dejean de la Bâtie 2002, pp.6-7 and Wong 2005, pp.3-5 and 10-12; see 
also Auswärtiges Amt 2002, p.7. 
31 “Interview mit Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier” 2006. 
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causal link between institutional innovation in Europe and the concrete steps of China-EU 
relations. 
 
3.1.4 2002 to Present – Learning to Live with Each Ot er 
 
According to both European and Chinese officials and observers, the years 2003-2004 
marked a recent apogee of the relationship between Chi a and the EU.32 In 2002 Hervé 
Dejean de la Bâtie remarked that “la Chine a pris conscience de l’émergence de l’Europe 
politique, de l’Europe commerciale et de l’euro”; and despite the predominance of the US on 
Beijing’s security agenda “[l]a Chine commence à se soucier de l’Europe pour ses mérites 
propres.”33 Lastly, in 2004 Xiang Lanxin saw an “‘entente active’ of four major powers: 
France, Germany, Russia and China” and claimed that “[i]n 2004, […] the EU is at the top of 
the Chinese leadership’s international agenda”.34 
Since the late 1990s there have been no further fundamental changes in the institutional 
framework for cooperation between the EU and China. What is noteworthy though are the 
increasingly detailed final statements of the annual s mmit meetings. First, they have led to a 
number of new issue-specific dialogues, e.g. on intellectual property, and have covered a 
growing field of international relations, as visible in the more recent strategic dialogue35, the 
dialogue on Africa.36 Second, they have included a number of Joint Declarations with a 
growing scope, like for example the Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control 
of 2004,37 and led to the signing of significant agreements, e.g. on China’s participation in the 
Galileo positioning system.38 
Most of these declarations were initially drafted eith r in the Commission DG Relex or 
in the Council Secretariat’s China Desk undergoing then amendments by the other body and 
by member states. This is in line with observations that in the late 1990s and early 2000s the 
actual role of Brussels-based institutional bodies ha increased, in particular the Commission 
and the Policy Unit in the Council Secretariat.39 This suggests that at present CFSP has 
                                                
32 Preliminary Interview China 1, Shanghai Q3 2006; Preliminary Interview China 3, Shanghai Q3 2006; 
Interview EU 5, Berlin Q1 2007. 
33 Dejean de la Bâtie 2002, pp.70-72. 
34 Xiang 2004, pp.109 and 113. 
35 EU-China Joint Statement 2005, par.3. 
36 EU-China Joint Statement 2006, par.15.  
37 See EU-China Joint Statement 2004, par.2. 
38 EU-China Joint Statement 2003, par.9. 
39 Interview Europe #5 and #6. 
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reached a situation in which not only the centre of gravity in EU foreign policy has moved to 
Brussels but in which also Brussels-based institutions can exert some real influence as 
informal agenda-setters. 
More recent events have contributed to a “return from the honeymoon” – thorny issues 
in which Chinese policy-makers did not achieve some major goals of their EU policy that 
they were sure to reach based on the improving China-EU relations. Four of these issues will 
be dealt with in some detail the following three chapters: the question of China’s status as a 
market economy, the lifting of the EU’s arms embargo towards China, textile trade between 
China and the EU, as well as the European position on Taiwan. 
Some of these cases show that the activity of Brussels-based bodies still depends largely 
on a convergence of interests among key players, i.. member states and the Commission. The 
failure to lift the arms embargo is a case in point. Although big member states and the 
Brussels institutions agreed on the goal to lift the embargo, they could not convince another 
group of more sceptical member states of the values of such a decision, in part, but not only, 
because of external pressure from the US.40 imilarly, the case of the failure to acknowledge 
market economy status for China shows that foreign policy of the EU depends on a general 
consensus to act. 
The two China documents the Commission published in 2006 have cooled down 
Chinese enthusiasm even further,41 since they include a number of points that were unpleasant 
to the Chinese side: strong criticisms of Chinese commercial policy, critique about China’s 
human rights record, listing of the Cross-Strait relations under “regional issues”, etc. 
 
3.2 Reflections of Contemporary China-EU Relations in the Literature 
 
After providing a general historical background to China-EU relations, I now turn to the 
question of how the current state of the relationship is reflected in literature. Aside from 
further elaborating on various dimensions of contemporary China-EU relations, this also 
serves as an intellectual background on what has been written on the empirical side of this 
research. 
                                                
40 See on this Casarini 2006, p.16. 
41 See Feng 2006 and Li 2006. 
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Despite their significance on a global scale, Sino-European relations seem to have been 
neglected in both academic and non-academic literature. This is valid for both political 
scientists and historians. Historians have discussed relations of European states with China, 
especially in the context of the major crises with international dimensions that have marked 
Chinese history throughout the 19th and much of the 20th century, e.g. the Opium Wars, the 
Sino-Japanese War 1894-95, the Boxer War 1900-01, the long Chinese civil war, etc…42 The 
important changes in Sino-European relations resulting from the strategic triangle, the 
beginning of reform in China in the late 1970s and eventually from the end of the Cold War 
seem to be too recent even for most scholars of contemporary history.43 Political scientists 
have hardly paid any attention to the evolution of Sino-European ties over the past few 
decades. This is also true for treatments of particular aspects of the relationship, like WTO 
negotiations or the EU’s arms embargo, which have otherwise received large coverage in 
mass media. 
All academics writing on Sino-European relations have adopted an atheoretical and 
policy-oriented approach. Often they are purely descriptive.44 Among recent publications, the 
few exceptions that make serious explanatory efforts mostly present arguments akin to 
classical realism, like the absence of strategic confli t between Europe and China, the reaction 
to the transatlantic rift, the common desire to constrain US unilateralism, complementary 
economic interests, and common preferences on the structure of the international system, 
namely for multilateralism and strong international institutions.45 These points provide 
answers to the question “Why China and Europe?” But what is missing is a coherent analysis 
of how China engages the EU and an explanation of this process. Aside from these academic 
writings, a number of analysts from the policy-consulting community contribute to the 
literature on Sino-European relations, and several think-tanks occasionally present analyses 
on the issue in the form of policy papers or short studies.46 
Limited as it may be, what does the existing literature tell us about Chinese foreign 
policy towards the EU? This discussion can be usefully structured by looking separately at 
                                                
42 Examples of publications include Fay 1998, Xiang 1995 and Xiang 2002. 
43 A very noteworthy exception are several articles by historian Xiang Lanxin, e.g. Xiang 2001 and 2004. 
44 See for example Shambaugh 1996, as well as some contributions to the edited volume by Santos Neves and 
Bridges 2000 Europe, China and the Two SARs and the 2002 special edition of the China Quarterly ntitled 
China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective. 
45 See Shambaugh 2004, Shambaugh 2005, and Xiang 2004. 
46 The think-tanks include most notably the European Policy Centre in Brussels, the French Institut Français de 
Relations Internationales, and the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. 
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different topics. It will start with studies explicitly dealing with China-EU relations,47 and 
then turn to writings on Sino-European relations in general.48 Lastly, for the sake of 
completeness, and although this is not the primary focus of the research, it will introduce 
some of the efforts concentrating more on relations between member states and China.49 
 
3.2.1 China-EU Relations: Who is the EU for China? 
 
The contribution to the 2002 special edition of the China Quarterly on China and 
Europe by Kay Möller, entitled “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: 
China and the European Union”, presents a primarily descriptive account of EU-China 
relations since the 1970s with few explicit analytical propositions. The author is a former 
German diplomat and currently analyst at the governm nt think-tank Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik in Berlin. For the question of “Who is Europe for China?” his account is 
interesting in that member states play a central role in his article. In particular, Möller 
describes how the re-animation of Sino-European relations after the short interruption 
following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 was a consequence of member states’ desire to 
overcome the economic downturn of the early 1990s. For him, the highly political role of the 
EU in Sino-European relations, notably the human rights dialogue, was largely a tool to 
achieve that end. This would imply that principally China’s engagement was aimed at 
member states of the EU. Möller makes several references to Chinese views on the EU. He 
states that China has supported European integration for a long time and all through the 1980s 
as part of a wider logic of balancing against powerful third states, in particular the USSR, and 
expected a united Europe to play a role in emancipating Central Eastern Europe (CEE). For 
the 1990s to the present Möller suggests that “interes  in Europe has been a variable of 
China’s unstable relationship with Washington.”50 Yet, despite the promising title of his 
article, Möller fails to elaborate who exactly stands for the EU in specific instances of Sino-
European relations. In fact, he can be criticised for not differentiating in any meaningful or 
systematic way between “Europe”, the EU and the member states in Sino-European relations. 
                                                
47 Dejean de la Bâtie 2002 and 2003, Möller 2002, Wang 2004, Wong 2005, Crossick, Cameron and Berkovsky 
2005. 
48 Shambaugh 1996, 2004, and 2005, Xiang 2001 and 2004, Zhou 2000 (although the title suggests a specific 
treatment of EU-China relations). 
49 Möller 1996, Ferdinand 2000, Godemont and Serra 2000, Sandschneider 2002, Heilmann 2002, Schulte-
Kulkmann 2005. 
50 Möller 2002, p.31. 
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The 2003 policy paper by the Institut français de relations internationales entitled 
L’Union européenne vue de la Chine by Hervé Dejean de la Bâtie, at the time of writing an 
official at the Asia and Oceania desk of the French foreign ministry, comes to a different 
conclusion. For Dejean de la Bâtie Sino-European relations are not just a negative function of 
the ups and downs in transpacific ties. He thinks that since the mid-1990s Chinese policy-
makers have become aware of the importance of the EU in its own right, and cites four 
reasons for this: increased efforts of Chinese academics in studying the EU, the WTO 
negotiations that convinced Chinese policy-makers of the force and cohesion of the EU, the 
successful launching of the Euro, and a reaction to the growing interest of the EU for China.51 
These are suggestive points which may imply a great d l, in particular as regards the role of 
learning and socialisation in Chinese foreign policy towards Europe. But again, the 
implications this can have or has had in specific stuations remain unclear.  
Wang Yi’s contribution “La Chine et l’UE: vers une coopération stratégique” to the 
edited volume of 2004 Global Views on the European Union by the Paris-based think tank 
Institute for Security Studies focuses on China-EU relations since, approximately, the year 
2000. The author was First Secretary at the Chinese embassy in Paris at the time of writing. 
Wang first emphasises the convergence of interests on a large number of issues between 
China and the EU and points to their strategic cooperation that started with the Joint 
Declaration at the EU-China summit of October 2003 and the policy papers published by both 
sides in preparation of the summit.52 This means that Wang also takes a realist view of a
wider rational bargaining process in international relations. In fact, throughout the paper 
Wang develops the theme of balancing against a third power already mentioned by Möller. 
He argues very explicitly that EU-China cooperation is aimed at containing US unilateralism 
and hegemonic tendencies and that in any case the transa lantic partnership is irreconcilable 
with the respective strategic interests of the US and Europe. His clarity merits a lengthy 
quote: 
“Après le 11 septembre 2001, les Etats-Unis ont successivement lancé la notion ‘d’axe du mal’ 
et promu une politique de préemption, afin de casser le système multilatéral actuel et le cadre 
du droit international, de réorganiser l’ordre mondial sous leur contrôle à travers le hard 
power, sous prétexte de lutter contre le terrorisme. Face à ce nouveau défi, aucun pays seul ne 
parvient à endiguer le pouvoir de l’unilatéralisme américain; ce n’est qu’à travers la 
coopération internationale et le soft power qu’on peut former une force de ‘contrainte légère’ 
pour contrebalancer l’hégémonisme et l’unilatéralisme. Dans ce contexte, la Chine et l’Union 
                                                
51 Dejean de la Bâtie 2003, pp.7-8. 
52 See Commission 2003a and 2003b, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003. 
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[européenne], deux grandes puissances ayant des points de vue différents sur la gouvernance 
globale avec les Etats-Unis, empruntent la même voi. […] [L]es divergences entre les deux 
rives de l’Atlantique ne cessent de s’accroître. […] L]eur partenariat traditionnel se heurte aux 
intérêts stratégiques de l’autre partie. […] En accélérant l’Union politique et de la défense, 
d’une perspective chinoise, [l’Union européenne] a l’ambition de jouer un rôle particulier dans 
les affaires internationales et de se retrouver sur un pied d’égalité avec les Américains.” 53 
In addition to these general views on Sino-European r lations, Wang explicitly refers to 
the complex face of the EU in international affairs. He complains that “[l]es divergences qui 
opposent le Royaume-Uni, la France et l’Allemagne, les petits et les grands pays, la 
‘nouvelle’ et la ‘vieille’ Europe […] limitent la construction d’une politique étrangère 
commune et d’une défense autonome.”54 According to Wang this results in a confusion on the 
Chinese side on whom to deal with, which is sometims perceived by Europeans as an 
attempt to play the different European actors out against each other.55 
In his conference paper Towards a Common European policy on China? from 2005, 
Reuben Wong compares the China-policies of the EU and its member states, through the 
“Europeanisation”-approach. The author presents successive descriptions of British, French, 
German and EU policies towards China in the fields of trade, “political and strategic 
relations” and human rights since the mid-1980s. For each policy field he characterises the 
actors’ behaviour in different years as either containment, neutrality, or positive engagement. 
This is conveniently summarised in tables, and Wong concludes convincingly that “there is 
overall a more coordinated European position on China in 2003 compared to 1985.”56 
Although this piece explicitly compares the role of dif erent entities under the EU umbrella in 
Sino-European relations, it is of very limited value in the present context. A “more 
coordinated European position” may result in less confusion for outsiders but does not 
necessarily mean that it becomes easier to engage the EU – was demonstrated by the 
comments by Wang discussed in the previous paragraph. Like other Europeanisation 
approaches, Wong is focusing on policy content rather an process and does not address at 
all the question of how the outside deals with the EU.57 
The 2005 policy paper EU-China Relations – Towards a Strategic Partnership by 
Stanley Crossick, Fraser Cameron and Axel Berkofsky of the Brussels-based think tank 
                                                
53 Wang 2004, pp.74-75. 
54 Wang 2004, p.76. 
55 Wang 2004, p.76. 
56 Wong 2005b, p.18. 
57 See for example Tonra 2001 who elaborates on how te foreign policies of small EU member states adjusted 
to larger European approaches. 
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European Policy Centre joins Wang (2004) in criticising the fact that “deciding when to 
address the EU and/or individual governments is not easy for third countries.”58 The authors 
acknowledge that especially the large member states promote their individual interests at the 
expense of common EU goals and call on the member states to “agree common policies 
towards China and support, rather than undermine, th  EU-China relationship.”59 This 
supports Wang and undermines Wong, in that it shows that, beyond any apparent 
convergence of common EU and individual member state policies towards China, there are 
diverging positions. Otherwise there are no additional analytical elements to draw from this 
paper, but the authors provide a useful overview of the current contents of EU-China 
relations. They first emphasise political and strategic issues, in particular integrating China in 
the international community and thus providing regional and global stability, although they 
criticise that it is yet unclear what exactly policy-makers intend by the term “strategic 
partnership”. Second, they mention trade diplomacy as an important aspect of the 
relationship, in particular as related to commercial d sputes. A third key element discussed in 
the paper is the human rights dialogue. In addition, the authors also mention the important 
dimension of development cooperation, technological exchange, a large number of specific 
sectoral dialogues, “ranging from environmental protection to science and technology and 
from industrial policy to education and culture.”60 
Another publication directly addressing China-EU relations is the 2006 volume Facing 
China’s Rise: Guidelines for an EU Strategy, edited by Marcin Zaborowski for the Institute 
for Security Studies in Paris. It provides an interesting overview of current issues, but even 
the section on Chinese foreign policy does not much more than restate, probably more 
eloquently, the fundamental problem of this research, namely that “Europe’s post-modern 
institutional construction, where there is no conception of a military balance and no prevailing 
nation-state, where the practical instrument for a common foreign and security policy are still 
very much in debate, and are as yet shared with the mor  traditional instruments of each of the 




                                                
58 Crossick, Cameron, and Berkovsky 2005, p.35. 
59 Crossick, Cameron, and Berkovsky 2005, p.36. 
60 Crossick, Cameron, and Berkovsky 2005, p.28. 
61 Godement 2006, p.56. 
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3.2.2 Sino-European Relations in General 
 
A few publications have treated Sino-European relations from a more general, mostly 
strategic viewpoint, unfortunately though without much effort to analyse the processes of 
engagement towards different European actors. The most noteworthy recent piece is Xiang 
Lanxin’s article “China’s Eurasian Experiment” in Survival (2004). If the above-cited Wang 
2004 focuses on the transatlantic rift, Xiang adds a eeper cultural argument. “The concept of 
the ‘West’ is in crisis at the same time that transatlantic strategic priorities and culture are 
diverging.”62 He sees transatlantic cultural divergence in the American democracy based on 
individual rights as opposed to European communitarian social democracy. US foreign policy 
is solely based on national interest while European foreign policies build and respect 
international norms and institutions. At the same time, Xiang observes a Chinese leadership 
well aware of the fact that political reform cannot be postponed for long, and the search for 
political models brings China closer to Europe rather t an to the US. “American democracy is 
based on ‘inalienable’ individual rights that are sustained by ‘self-evident’ truth. […] [T]he 
Chinese tradition is hostile to any self-evident truth and nothing is inalienable. […] The 
Chinese elite is intensely interested in how European social democracy works.”63 With regard 
to foreign policy, he implies that with a “long-term, grand strategy of peaceful rise”64 China 
has become a status quo power, although for most of the past half-century China has been far 
more unilateralist than the US and “adhered to the ‘friend or foe’ mentality.”65 Now that China 
finally embraces multilateralism the US has become revolutionary, challenging international 
norms and institutions with a doctrine of pre-emptive strike. Xiang, like Wang 2004, sees the 
EU-China summit of 2003 and the related policy papers as a turning point toward a strategic 
partnership: the Iraq War turned both the EU and China further away from the US and 
towards each other. These comments confirm the global strategic relevance of Sino-European 
relations and point to their substantial underlying potential. In addition to that, Xiang also 
argues that until recently China did not understand the EU “because the European model of 
diplomatic compromise and muddling through did not fit the Chinese communist notion of an 
effective strategy in a revolutionary world.”66 But by now, “China has discovered the 
                                                
62 Xiang 2004, p.110. 
63 Xiang 2004, p.116. 
64 Xiang 2004, p.109. 
65 Xiang 2004, p.117. 
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advantages of muddling through in a messy world.”67 In fact, according to Xiang the Chinese 
idea of “democratisation of international relations” i  precisely the mode of international 
relations that is being practiced within the EU. This is an interesting perspective on policy 
making and cooperation processes preferred by the Chinese leadership. Unfortunately though, 
Xiang does not offer any analysis on how they manage these processes, or how China 
“muddles through” towards an EU that is itself “muddling through” towards more common 
foreign policies. 
With regard to the previous authors, Shambaugh’s article “China and Europe: The 
Emerging Axis” in Current History (2004) offers a number of confirmations and interesting 
qualifications. First, he confirms the importance and strategic nature of Sino-European 
relations. Second, rather than pointing to fundamental cultural differences with regard to the 
US, he emphasises, more pragmatically, the relative ease with which Europe and China can 
engage. “The absence of a ‘Taiwan factor’ removes a significant potential irritant in EU-
China ties”68 as opposed to US-China relations. In addition Europe, ther than the US, has no 
strategic interest in East Asia that could conflict with China. Third, he admits that one goal of 
the Sino-European partnership is to constrain US hegemony. So far these points betray a 
somewhat classical realist perspective that fails to deal with the complex governance 
structures in Europe though. But Shambaugh does go further: Fourth, he confirms, and as the 
only one in the literature, the importance of transgovernmental relations between European 
and Chinese policy-making units, although he does not go so far as to differentiate between 
different institutional entities on the European side. “Each meeting catalyses the respective 
bureaucracies to generate proposals and to negotiate tangible programs involving financial 
and human resources – thus marrying the respective bur aucracies and fusing them with 
common purpose.”69 Shambaugh’s piece “The New Strategic Triangle” in The Washington 
Quarterly (2005) does not add many new elements to this. It mostly confirms the global 
strategic dimension of the cooperation between Europe and China by relating it to the 
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3.2.3 Member States in Sino-European Relations 
 
Given the difficulty of finding and surveying relevant literature for 27 member states, 
this discussion will concentrate on comments about the three biggest member states, Britain, 
France, and Germany, and only provide a cursory overview over discussions on the role 
played by smaller member states. The chapter “UK Policy Towards China” by Peter 
Ferdinand in the edited volume Europe, China and the Two SARs (2000) first emphasises the 
importance of Hong Kong in Sino-British relations, both in the 1980s when the transition was 
negotiated and in the 1990s when the British pre-transition policies angered Beijing. Second, 
Ferdinand points out that, although the UK is still party to the Five-Power Defence 
Agreement,70 it does not have any specific strategic interests with regard to China, other than 
those related to general stability of the regional and global systems. Third, his comments on 
the issue-areas on the British bilateral agenda with China suggest an overlap with the common 
EU agenda: the growing importance of British commercial and investment interests towards 
China and UK development cooperation in China. This implies room for cooperation and 
conflict within the EU and for an unclear situation f r the Chinese side concerning who to talk 
to on what. Yet the UK also entertains limited military-to-military exchanges with China 
which obviously do not exist at an EU-level. Another interesting aspect is Ferdinand’s 
discussion of China policy-making in the UK. Until the 1980s, he states, a small group of 
China experts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Far Eastern Department and Hong 
Kong Department. Since then this has changed though, as “[t]he number of government 
agencies with serious interest in China has grown sig ificantly.”71 This confirms that it is not 
sufficient to distinguish EU-level institution from ember state governments but that even 
within the latter the number of institutional actors actively engaged in relations with China is 
increasing. 
François Godement and Régine Serra in their contribution to the same edited volume 
“French Policy Towards China: a Redefinition” point to an early mutual political and strategic 
interest between France and China, related to France’s independent stance within the Western 
alliance. Nevertheless, they argue, France does not have specific political and strategic 
interests beyond keeping up a generally stable interna ional situation in Asia. When reviewing 
the main policy areas of Sino-French cooperation, the authors put trade and investment in the 
most prominent places. According to them, while Mitterand had a dual perception of China, 
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“at the same time diplomatic and economic,”72 economic interests became a primary motive 
behind the French China policy, as visible in the normalisation of relations with Beijing 
already shortly after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. Godement and Serra also see the French 
arms sales to Taiwan in the early 1990s, which caused serious political irritations between 
Beijing and Paris, as economically motivated, “in order to absorb the large trade deficit 
between France and Taiwan.”73 When the negative economic effects following Chinese 
sanctions against France turned out too large, Paris chose subsequently a path of closer 
cooperation with Beijing. Other than trade, technical (i.e. agricultural and industrial 
technology, life sciences, etc…) and cultural cooperation are also mentioned as important 
policy fields. With these points Godement and Serra confirm the substantial overlap of the 
French and the common EU agenda – like Ferdinand for the UK and with the same 
implications. By contrast no overlap exists with regard to military exchanges, and in the field 
of human rights, the authors criticise France for having abandoned this topic fully to EU-level 
institutions in order to focus on economic interests. Godement and Serra do not go into much 
detail on the making of French China policy, but they complain that the concentration on 
economics has wide-ranging results for example that “t e role of the Ambassador is getting 
more and more difficult since his function goes from political representative to high level 
trade representative.”74 This could also point to a diffusion of China policy away from the 
core competences of the foreign ministry, like in the British case. 
On Sino-German relations, Möller, in his 1996 article “Germany and China: A 
Continental Temptation” from the China Quarterly, and Klaus Rupprecht, in his contribution 
four years later to Europe, China and the Two SARs “Germany’s Policy Towards China and 
the Future SARs of Hong Kong and Macau”, agree thatat he political level, German 
aspirations to a permanent seat in the UN SC have been a central issue in the relationship. 
This is interesting insofar as it indicates how single institutional entities under the EU, the 
German foreign ministry in this case, may be pursuing key goals that lie outside the scope of 
shared EU interests which makes them susceptible to side-payments from the Chinese side in 
different bargaining fora, like here the UN. Neverth less, overall German political and 
strategic interests in China remain general, i.e. related to regional and global stability, as in 
the case of Britain and France. Möller discusses intensive efforts in the early 1990s from both 
Germany and China to establish some sort of key political and strategic relationship.75 
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However, Sebastian Heilmann of the University of Trier points out in his policy paper 
“Grundelemente Deutscher Chinapolitik” that these ambitions receded with the start of 
political and human rights dialogue at the EU level, as the case in France.76 Also like in the 
French case, all three authors emphasise the primarily economic nature of the relationship, 
with important German interests in trade with and ivestment in China. Möller points out that 
economic interests convinced the German government to re-establish ties with China shortly 
after the disruption related to the Tiananmen massacre, as we have also seen in the case of 
France.77 He also notes that the German ministry of foreign affairs explicitly included the 
issue of Chinese membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in its 
talks with China, an issue that, already at that time, was recognised as an exclusive EC 
competence. The authors also agree on other important issue-areas of Sino-German 
cooperation, namely its development cooperation, China being one of the main recipients of 
German aid, as well as cultural and scientific issue .78 All this confirms the again the overlap 
between the scope of issues-areas on the joint agend  of the EU towards China and those 
pursued individually by member states. 
The more general article by Eberhard Sandschneider “China’s Diplomatic Relations 
with the States of Europe” in the 2002 China Quarterly special edition suggests a few general 
remarks on smaller member states and the new member stat s of CEE. He points out that both 
groups tend to follow their bigger partners on China-policy, for fear of suffering in the 
economic relationship when taking strong positions a d for lack of influence, and generally 
promote the common EU approach. 
Despite the title, Dejean de la Bâtie’s policy paper La politique chinoise de l’Union 
européenne, published by the Institut français de relations internationals in 2002, adds to this 
debate mostly with regard to member states. The author’s views on the EU and China are 
presented more succinctly in his policy paper of 2003, already discussed above. In contrast to 
the paper by Wong discussed above, Dejean de la Bâtie shows that there is imperfect 
convergence of China policies among member states of the EU. For this, he cites three 
reasons. First, according to him member states haved different historical experiences with 
China. He mentions the questions of Hong Kong and Macao for the UK and Portugal, a minor 
but continuing colonial issue for France in the form of ongoing negotiations on 
compensations for property confiscated in former French concessions after 1949, and, by 
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contrast, the absence of any colonial burden for Germany. Second, Dejean de la Bâtie points 
to domestic politics. He mentions, unfortunately without further detail, that the governments 
of different member states are subject to different degrees of parliamentary control, and he 
distinguishes a Northern European (i.e. Scandinavia, Danish, Dutch, and Irish) public 
opinion very much concerned with human rights issue from a Southern European (i.e. 
Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Greek) one that accepts “en gros le dialogue constructif et la 
primauté des considérations commerciales.”79 In this context he cites Britain, France and 
Germany as special cases where public opinion is sen itive to human rights but governments 
have nevertheless more and more concentrated on dialogue with Beijing. A related third 
element, according to the author, has to do with diverging current interests. Britain and France 
have a strong incentive to engage positively with China as they have to cooperate with it in 
the UN SC, a position shared by Germany as it develops more and more of a “politique 
mondiale.”80 Other member states, by contrast, have few global r Asian political aspirations 
and are consequently less interested in formulating related policies. A last point for the author 




This chapter has proposed a structuring of Sino-European relations since the end of the 
Second World War into four periods, namely the Cold War period, the time from the end of 
the Cold War and the Tiananmen crisis in China to the mid-1990s, from then to the time 
around the year 2002, and finally from 2002 until the present, i.e. the time of the fourth 
leadership generation under Hu Jintao which is the focus of this research. Since the important 
events of 1989, both in China and in the world as a whole, the relations between China and 
the EU have indeed grown from a functionally limited, “secondary” relationship to one that 
encompasses all dimensions of foreign policy. Betwen the early 1990s and present times, 
China and Europe have progressed from almost no dipl matic contact to a tight web of 
institutionalised regular exchanges on a wide range of topics, including technical, economic, 
political, and strategic issues. It has been pointed out that in all this the formal advances in 
European integration, in particular those relevant for external policies, have played a minor 
role. Rather than being based on strict institutional rules, relations with China at the EU level 
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could be deepened when there was a consensus on policy references towards China among 
the most significant bureaucratic players within the EU. The specific evolution and 






















































Chapter IV. Trade Matters – China’s Quest for Official Recognition as a 
Market Economy by the EU 
 
 
This chapter will analyse the modalities of China-EU bureaucratic interaction based on 
the case of Chinese efforts to get the EU to grant it Market Economy Status (MES). It will 
first present the meaning of MES in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
the significance this has for China. A second section will then outline the evolution of China-
EU bureaucratic interaction on this issue. In the third section I will attempt an explanation of 
the patterns of interaction based on the three dimensions of the theoretical framework 
introduced in chapter II. 
 
4.1 The Significance of Market Economy Status for China 
 
Since 2002 China has consistently been pushing the EU to recognise China officially as 
a market economy, which the EU has, equally consistently, declined to do. Aside from the 
EU’s arms embargo against China, a case that will be discussed in the next chapter, this has 
been one of the two top issues on the Chinese agend for relations with the EU. The 
importance of MES for China is related to two points: first, it is a question of “face”, second, 
MES may entail benefits in the context of the WTO anti-dumping system. 
 
4.1.1 The Symbolic Dimension 
 
The importance China attaches to questions of status in its foreign relations, its 
resentment of what is seen as national humiliation in the past and its sensitivity to practices 
that can be perceived as discriminating, will be discussed in depth in chapter VI. But such 
symbolism also plays a role with regard to MES. Some commentators in the media have for 
example pointed out that “Beijing […] attaches political significance to the status and sees it 
as another milestone in its efforts to be considered on an equal footing with the largest 
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western industrialised powers,”1 others have emphasised that, “symbolically, MES would 
herald China’s arrival as a major industrialised world trade player.”2 In 2004 Stephen Green, 
at that time head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House, noted that MES was “a matter of 
national pride”, and that recognition would be, “like the 2008 Olympic Games, a stamp of 
international approval.”3 
Aside from such comments by observers, the symbolic dimension of MES emerges from 
two types of materials: statements by Chinese officials and policy advisors on the one hand 
and EU documents and comments by EU officials on the ot er. First of all, Chinese officials 
have stated, more or less explicitly, that MES matters per se, as a symbol of China’s 
international status. In September 2002, when calling for the first time on the EU to recognise 
China as a market economy, State Premier Zhu Rongji implicitly evoked an accusation of 
discrimination by (wrongly) linking this to the respect of WTO rules on non-discrimination.4 
In July 2005, Liu Jianchao, spokesman of the MFA, explicitly interpreted MES as a status 
symbol when stating that “[t]he EU's recognition of China's full market economy status means 
its acknowledgement to China’s positive efforts made in the establishment of socialist market 
economy system [sic].”5 Zhu’s successor Wen Jiabao declared at the EU-China summit in 
Helsinki in September 2006 that recognition of MES would “reflect mutual respect and 
equality”, again reflecting the suspicion of discrimination.6 That MES is an issue of “face”, a 
question of acknowledging the importance of China’s reform effort, has also been confirmed 
by a Chinese interviewee.7 During another interview on the Chinese side it was stated that 
non-recognition amounted indeed to unfair treatment, in particular when compared with 
Russia which was granted MES in November 2002.8 As a caveat it should be added, however, 
that Chinese officials were not very insistent on pinting to the symbolic dimension of MES, 
neither in public statements nor in the interviews conducted for this research. There are hardly 
any related comments aside from those quoted here – in stark contrast to the arms embargo 
case, as will become clear in the next chapter. 
                                                
1 Justine Lau and Raphael Minder, Financial Times, 5 July 2005, “Recognise China as a market economy, says 
UK”. 
2 Amit Chanda, Worlds Markets Research Centre – World Markets Analysis, 5 Sept. 2005, “EU-China summit 
starts in Beijing, amid trade tensions and long-simmering disagreements”. 
3 Green 2004, p.2. 
4 See statements by state premier Zhu Rongji, as reported in Xinhua General News Service, 24 September 2002, 
“China to further enhance China-EU relations” and Sun hangwu, China Daily, 26 Sept., 2002, “Zhu: Nation 
values China-EU dialogue” 
5 BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 14 July 2005, “China calls for EU 
recognition of full market economy status”. 
6 David Ibison, Financial Times, 11 Sept. 2006, “Brussels refuses to yield over market economy status for 
China”. 
7 Interview China 7, Shanghai Q3 2007. 
8 Interview China 11, Brussels Q1 2008. 
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Nevertheless, for China there certainly was a symbolic dimension of the MES issue 
throughout the period under review here, and this wa noticed by China’s EU counterparts. As 
a result it is visible in the second type of materials, namely EU documents and comments by 
EU officials. Already in 1997 the Commission noted for example that “both Russia and China 
have attached great political significance to EU anti-dumping policy, in particular their stature 
as [non-market economies].”9 In 2003 and 2004 EU officials anonymously commented in the 
press about the importance of political symbolism in China’s quest for MES.10 In February 
2005 Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelsson was quoted making the following comment: “I 
know this is of great political importance for China. And I understand why. I am hearing 
you.”11 
 
4.1.2 MES and Expected Commercial Benefits 
 
(i) The WTO and Non-Market Economies 
The question of the benefits China might receive from the recognition of MES in the 
WTO context is a complex technical issue that calls for further comment. Whether a member 
state of the WTO is considered a market or a non-market economy has important 
consequences in the context of anti-dumping measures. Therefore, it may be necessary, as a 
first step, to take a closer look at what “dumping” is according to WTO rules. According to 
the WTO’s “Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994”, or simply the Anti-
Dumping Agreement (ADA), “dumping” means to be selling a product in an export market 
below its “normal value […] in the ordinary course of trade.”12 Therefore a key element in 
determining whether or not dumping is occurring is the careful comparison between export 
price and “normal price”. The tricky question is though: what is the “normal price”? It is in 
this connection that MES becomes significant. 
Elaborating on art.VI of GATT 1994, the ADA stipulates that usually the “normal price” 
for comparison should be the domestic price of the concerned product in the exporting 
                                                
9 Commission 1997, p.5. 
10 Tobias Buck and Judy Dempsey, Financial Times, 6 May 2003, “Chinese premier to hear string of complaints 
in Brussels today”; Channel NewsAsia, 6 May 2004, “Chinese premier urges rewards from EU on economy, 
arms ban”. 
11 Amit Chanda, World Markets Research Centre – World Markets Analysis, 24 Feb. 2005, “EU trade 
commissioner discusses Chinese progress on market economy, human rights and IP protection”. 
12 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, art.2(1). 
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country.13 When there are no domestic sales, or when their low v lume or any “particular 
market situation” in the exporting country do not allow for a “proper comparison” of prices 
along these lines, other rules are available to determine the normal price, namely using “a 
comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country” or “the 
cost of production in the country of origin.”14 In addition, however, the ADA also re-affirms 
the provisions on anti-dumping in Annex I to GATT 1994, where it is acknowledged that “in 
the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly 
of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist 
in determining price comparability […], and in such ases importing contracting parties may 
find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic 
prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.”15 
Based on this annex to GATT, and despite its strict language on monopoly and state 
control, numerous countries, especially those in tra sition from a planned to a market-based 
economic system, have been designated “non-market economy.”16 The provision 
“traditionally has been used […] to ignore prices and costs in ‘non-market economies’ on the 
ground that they are unreliable because they are not set by market forces [… and instead] use 
prices or costs in a market economy as the basis for normal value.”17 This means that, instead 
of reverting to the provisions for “particular market situations” of the ADA, the label “non-
market economy” and the so-called “surrogate country approach”18 have, in practice, allowed 
importing countries to exercise “significant discretion in the calculation of normal value of 
products exported from non-market economies.”19 Put simply: since there are no precise rules 
on how to select the surrogate country, you simply have to pick one in which production costs 
are sufficiently high, and you will always be able to conclude that there is dumping and to 
impose anti-dumping duties. A good illustration may be the EU’s anti-dumping investigation 
on Chinese polyester staple fibre producers, started in December 2003, in the course of which 
a US producer was used as a surrogate to determine normal prices in China – who was later 
sued under US anti-trust law for conspiracy to keep prices artificially high.20 All this means 
                                                
13 GATT 1947 art.VI (1a) and Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, art.2(1). 
14 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 art.2(2). 
15 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, art.2(7); Annex I to GATT 1994, second 
Supplementary Provision to Art.VI, par.1. 
16 Vermulst 2005, p.45. 
17 Vermulst 2005, p.44. 
18 Vermulst 2005, p.44; see also Green 2004, p.3, for a very succinct presentation. 
19 Technical Information on Anti-Dumping on the WTO website. 
20 European Report 25 March 2005, “EU/China: Beijing considers WTO action on polyester fibre duties”. 
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that, in general, it is more likely for an investigation to find evidence of dumping if the 
exporting country is considered a non-market economy. 
Aside from the problematic surrogate country approach, countries considered non-
market economies for a long time had to bear with a collective treatment of all its producers 
and exporters. In general, under WTO rules, the magnitude of dumping and the anti-dumping 
duty should be determined individually for every firm.21 Yet for non-market economies, it 
was assumed that “all the means of production and ntural resources belong to one entity, the 
State”, therefore considered the “single producer”, which means that “the application of a 
single rate is necessary to avoid circumvention of the duties, that is the channelling of exports 
through the exporter with the lowest duty rate.”22 The situation on the ground was obviously 
far more complicated than this. By the mid-1990s, it was already EU practice to determine 
dumping and apply duties individually in “exceptional cases where a company can show that 
it operates independently from the state.”23 A revision of EC administrative rules in March 
1997 introduced more flexibility and specified “core criteria” that companies need to fulfil “to 
qualify for such treatment.”24 After examination of related rules in other WTO members, in 
particular US legislation allowing firms in non-market economies to demonstrate that their 
goods are produced in a “market oriented industry”, in April 1998 the Council then passed a 
new regulation removing China and Russia from the list of non-market economies and 
instituting a system by which individual firms in these two countries can demonstrate “that 
market economy conditions prevail” based on five spcific criteria.25 If a producer passes the 
test, the same anti-dumping rules will be applied as for producers in market economy 
countries, if not it is the collective surrogate country approach.26 
 
(ii) MES in China’s WTO Membership 
There has been no fundamental change in these rules since then. In fact, China’s WTO 
accession protocol follows the same logic. “If the [Chinese] producers under [anti-dumping] 
investigation can clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry” then 
                                                
21 According to art. 6(10) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 individual dumping 
margins must be determined for every concerned exporter r producer; these margins constitute the upper limit 
for anti-dumping duties according to art.9(3); in case exporters or producers are too numerous art.6(10) and 9(4) 
provide how to determine dumping margins based on samples and how to determine anti-dumping duties for 
individual firms based on this method.  
22 Commission 1997, p.3. 
23 Commission 1997, p.3. 
24 Commission 1997, p.3. 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No.905/98 of 27 April 1998 art.1. 
26 Council Regulation (EC) No.905/98 of 27 April 1998 art.1. 
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the domestic Chinese price is to be used for comparison.27 This means that there is a general 
assumption that market economy conditions do not prevail and the burden to prove the 
contrary is on the Chinese producers. If they cannot demonstrate this, then “a methodology 
that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China” can be 
applied.28 
The rules and practices on anti-dumping towards countries considered non-market 
economies have contributed to making China the prime target of anti-dumping measures in 
the world: between January 1995 and December 2004, 297 anti-dumping measures have been 
adopted against China.29 For comparison, in the same period, the other two major victims 
have been the EU-25, with 224 anti-dumping directed against the group as a whole and 
individual member states, and South Korea, suffering from 118 measures.30 Since 2002 the 
EU itself has imposed anti-dumping duties on 26 types of Chinese export commodities (not 
counting those only set provisionally), more than on any other country, and overall the 
number of new cases per year has followed an increasing trend until 2005.31 
Against this background it is understandable that Chinese authorities expect a certain 
economic benefit for their exporters from being granted MES by major trading partners. 
According to the accession protocol there are two ways of achieving this. First, if China can 
show “under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy”, or 
that a certain industry operates by market economy conditions, then the special provisions of 
the accession protocol will end, for China as a whole or the industry in question, and the 
WTO’s normal anti-dumping provisions will apply.32 This presupposes, however, “that the 
importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of 
accession.”33 Second, the accession protocol stipulates that the option of not using domestic 
prices or costs if the concerned producer fails to demonstrate that the business operates under 
market economy conditions will be terminated 15 years after accession, i.e. by late 2016.34 
Generally this is interpreted as meaning that other WTO members will have to start treating 
China as a market economy.35 Strictly speaking, the provision is not very clear as the 
paragraph that puts the burden of proof on Chinese producers will not be invalidated after 15 
                                                
27 WTO Decision of 10 November 2001 on Accession of the People’s Republic of China, par.15a(i). 
28 WTO Decision of 10 November 2001 on Accession of the People’s Republic of China, par.15a(ii). 
29 Vermulst 2005, p.5. 
30 Vermulst 2005, p.5. 
31 For anti-dumping statistics, see European Commission 2002 to 2007a. 
32 WTO Decision of 10 November 2001 on Accession of the People’s Republic of China, par.15d. 
33 WTO Decision of 10 November 2001 on Accession of the People’s Republic of China, par.15d. 
34 WTO Decision of 10 November 2001 on Accession of the People’s Republic of China, par.15d. 
35 Green 2004, p.3. 
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years. It is unlikely, however, that this will be used as a legal trick to extend the current 
regime beyond 2016. First of all, in agreeing on the 15-year period of non-market economy 
treatment China made a major concession that no other WTO accession country has made 
before. Of this, policy makers in China and elsewhere are aware, and there is a general 
expectation, and resulting political pressure, thatfrom 2016 on China will enjoy full MES in 
the WTO system. Second, although it will be more difficult, even the normal AD provisions 
in the WTO treaties will leave some leeway to impose AD duties against certain Chinese 
producers.36 
 
(iii) The EU Approach to MES 
In its relations with the EU, China has been trying to benefit from early recognition as a 
market economy, which means it has to fulfil the EU’s five market-economy criteria. 
Conforming to the requirements of China’s accession protocol, these criteria were part of EU 
law at the time of China’s accession, since they had been established in the Council 
Regulation of April 1998. They comprise the following points:37 
(1) Decisions of firms on prices, costs and inputs must be based on the market signals 
of supply and demand; 
(2) Firms must have one set of basic accounting records which are independently 
audited in line with international standards; 
(3) Firms’ production costs and financial situation must not be subject to distortions 
carried over from a former non-market economy system; 
(4) Firms must be subject to bankruptcy and property laws that guarantee legal 
certainty and stability of their operation; 
(5) Exchange rate conversions must be carried out at the market rate. 
The Chinese efforts to demonstrate that it is a market economy by EU standards have so 
far not been successful though. In reaction to the repeated Chinese requests to be granted 
MES the Commission has usually pointed out China’s shortcomings with regard to these 
criteria. In June 2004 it mentioned that, despite “significant progress”, further reforms in the 
financial sector and with regard to corporate and banking law, state interference and property 
law were necessary for a favourable decision on Chinese MES in the future.38 In September 
2006, Commission President Barroso pointed out that the EU expected improvements with 
                                                
36 This is visible for example in the anti-dumping case against Chinese polyester apparel producers: even the 25 
companies that were granted MES were charged anti-dumping duties; see Asia Pulse, 18 March 2005, “Chinese 
Fabric Firms to Challenge EU’s dumping ruling”. 
37 Council Regulation (EC) No.905/98 of 27 April 1998. 
38 Associated Press Worldstream, 28 June 2004, “EU refuses to recognize China as ‘market economy’” and 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2006. 
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regard to state influence, accounting rules, bankruptcy laws, and financial services.39 
Nevertheless the Commission has repeatedly affirmed that it will be “ready to act quickly 
once all the conditions are met.”40 
 
4.2 The Evolution of the Issue 
 
4.2.1 Before WTO Accession – MES as One Issue among Many 
 
The removal of China from the list of non-market economies in the regulation of April 
1998 was certainly a friendly gesture towards China. Yet there is no sign of any sustained 
Chinese efforts to achieve recognition as a full market economy at that time. This means that 
MES has been an issue in China-EU relations for a long time already but not always in the 
same way. 
MES was also a big issue in China’s WTO negotiations, although not in the bilateral 
ones with the EU. The provisions on China’s status s non-market vs. market economy were a 
result of its negotiations with the US.41 The China-US Agreement of November 1999 
established that the US could continue for 15 years after accession to treat China as a non-
market economy and to apply its current practice with regard to anti-dumping procedures; it 
specifically spelled out that a) the US would continue to use the same methodology to 
determine dumping, which implies non-market economy treatment and surrogate country 
method as default approach; b) that Chinese industries would continue to have the burden of 
prove in establishing that market economy conditions exist in their sector; and c) that China 
would continue to have the opportunity of demonstrating that market economy conditions 
prevailed in a sector or the economy as a whole.42 After the conclusion of the agreement these 
stipulations were applied to China’s relations with all other WTO members as well, based on 
the most-favoured-nation rule. 
China concluded its negotiations on WTO accession with the EU in May 2000, i.e. after 
those with the US. Therefore, in China-EU relations the issue of MES may have been one 
among many in the context of highly complex, technial negotiations on the terms of China’s 
                                                
39 Financial Times, 11 September 2006, “Brussels refuses to yield over market economy status for China”. 
40 Commission 2006c. 
41 Green 2004, p.3, fn.4. 
42 See China-US Agreement on China’s WTO Accession 1999, section “Anti-Dumping”. 
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membership. Yet it appears that for the EU the terms of the China-US agreement on this point 
were fully satisfying, as it decided to push hard on issues related to telecommunication and 
financial services instead.43 In fact, unexpectedly for the Chinese side, the negotiations with 
the EU turned out very difficult,44 and dragged on until the final rounds were led not by he 
top negotiators but by the Chinese Minister Shi Guangsheng and European Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy themselves.45 
 
4.2.2 After Accession – MES as a Main Item on China-EU Agenda 
 
In any case, in China-EU relations MES only emerged as a major issue by itself after 
China’s accession in December 2001. From public statements and related reporting in news 
media one can sketch the evolution of MES as an issue in China-EU relations. In a first 
period, from September 2002, when MES surfaced the first time in public statements, until 
the end of 2003, China cautiously raised the issue towards those authorities on the EU side 
that are formally responsible for trade matters, in particular the Commission. This changed in 
the second period, roughly from late 2003 till June 2004. This was a time of frenzy during 
which China raised the issue constantly in any possible instance of interaction with the EU 
and its member states. From the EU side, a large majority of member states emphasised 
support for granting China MES while the Commission repeatedly pointed out that it is 
favourable in its basic disposition but that review of the problem is ongoing. After the EU’s 
first explicit refusal to recognise China’s MES in June 2004, a third period started that lasts 
until the present. China-EU interaction on the issue has been getting more and more sober. 
China continues to broach the issue with various European stakeholders but with decreasing 
energy and expectations. The general EU rhetoric, from both the Commission and member 
states, is that of “technical criteria” that need to be fulfilled first, while explicit public support 
for Chinese MES from among EU members gets weaker. 
 
                                                
43 Facts on File World News Digest, 21 February 2000, “China: EU talks on WTO entry break off”. 
44 Interview China 7, Shanghai Q3 2007; Interview China 8, Beijing Q3 2007. 
45 People’s Daily (English), 20 May 2000, “China, EU sign agreement on China’s WTO accession”. 
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(i) A Technical Issue between Technical Bureaucracies 
The starting point of the first period was Zhu Rongji’s invocation of the Chinese desire 
to be granted MES by the EU at the 5th EU-China summit in Denmark in September 2002.46 
This was the first public evidence of MES on the diplomatic agenda between China and the 
EU, although the issue did not make it into the final joint statement.47 A few weeks later, Ms. 
Wu Yi, Chinese Vice-Premier in charge of international trade, called on the EU to grant 
China full MES during a visit to Beijing of trade commissioner Pascal Lamy.48 In November, 
Chinese officials went to Brussels to discuss a number of specific commercial disputes with 
their counterparts in the Commission and on this occasion they also urged the EU to recognise 
China’s MES.49 
In June 2003, the Chinese MOFCOM for the first time submitted a formal request to the 
Commission to be recognised as a market economy by the EU.50 From that point on there was 
indirect evidence of continuing Chinese pressure on the issue towards the Commission in that 
high officials repeatedly assure China that the Commission is working on verifying China’s 
economic status, that a favourable outcome is not ulikely and that a decision should be 
expected soon. For example, in October 2003, at the 6th EU-China Summit in Beijing, 
Commission President Romano Prodi stated that he was “very optimistic about this” and that 
it is “something we will do within a short timeframe.”51 Similarly, in the context of the 19th 
meeting of the Joint Committee of Economy and Trade, also in Beijing in October 2003, 
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy confirmed that Commission is working on the issue and it 
will decide no later than first half of 2004.52 
 
(ii) MES Travels to the Top 
The first public indication that the dynamic of China-EU interaction on MES was 
changing appeared during a visit of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to Beijing in 
December 2003. On this occasion Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao expressed his hope that 
                                                
46 Xinhua General News Service, 24 Sept. 2002, Tuesday, “China to further enhance China-EU relations”; Sun 
Shangwu, China Daily, 26 Sept., 2002, “Zhu: Nation values China-EU dialogue”. 
47 Commission 2002. 
48 Xinhua General News Service, 17 Oct. 2002, “China calls on EU to grant it full market economy status”; Asia 
Pulse, 18 October 2002, “China urges EU to grant it full market economy status”. 
49 Business Daily Update, 8 November 2002, “China”. 
50 Green 2004, p.2, and Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2006, p.1; the receipt of a formal request at th t 
time is also acknowledged in Commission 2003b, p.19 and in Interview EU 29, Brussels Q1 2008. 
51 Prodi comments during Press briefing at 6th EU-China summit; see also AFX.com, 30 October 2003, 
“Roundup: EU, China agree to address trade problems, seek economic partnership”. 
52 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 30. October 2003, “China, EU to 
establish trade dialogue mechanism”. 
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Germany would exert a positive influence in brining the EU to recognise China’s MES.53 This 
is evidence, on the one hand, that on the Chinese side the issue had left the circle of trade 
policy makers and reached the top leadership. On the o er hand, it shows that the target on 
the European side had changed, in that it was no loger only the Commission, i.e. the organ 
with formal competence to negotiate trade matters with third countries, but also member 
states who have no formal influence on this matter expect when voting on Commission 
initiatives in the Council. 
This marks the beginning of the second period during which the Chinese side exerted 
pressure with regard to MES on virtually any EU representative at hand, whatever the 
institutional affiliation. In March 2004, Chinese Minister of Commerce, Mr. Bo Xilai, urged 
the EU to grant MES soon, “as promised by President Prodi,”54 towards Trade Commissioner 
Lamy and Irish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 
Mary Harney, also representing the Irish EU presidency. Harney assured him that the Irish 
Council Presidency would promote the finding of a solution to the issue at an early date.55 In 
March, during a visit of Italian Vice-Minister for Productive Activities, Adolfo Urso, the 
same Bo stated himself that Italy would push for the EU to grant China MES.56 The climax of 
this period of frenzy was Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao’s 11-day visit to Europe in May 
2004 which brought him to Germany Belgium (including both Belgian government and EU 
institutions), Italy, UK and Ireland. During the meetings with top government leaders as well 
as with the commission president, Wen called on his ho ts to recognise China as a market 
economy. From all member states he received assurance that their governments backed China 
in its quest to receive MES from the EU, and Prodi promised a decision from the Commission 
by June 2004.57 The visits lead to a display of optimism on the Chinese side.58 A similar 
                                                
53 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 1 December 2003, “Chinese Premie, 
German Chancellor stress cooperation.” 
54 Asia Pulse, 16 March 2004, “China will play active role in new WTO talks”. 
55 Business Daily Update, 19 March 2004, “China willing to expand trade with Ireland”. 
56 Business Daily Update, 5 April 2004. “Sino-Italian [sic] to strengthen cooperation”. 
57 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, quoting from Xinhua News Agency, May 4, 2004, “Chinese premier, 
German chancellor address Berlin high technology forum”; Channel NewsAsia, May 6, 2004, “Chinese premier 
urges rewards from EU on economy, arms ban”; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News 
Agency, 6 May, 2004, “Chinese premier Wen Jiabao raises proposal for promoting ties with Belgium”; 
European Report, 8 May, 2004, “EU/China: Customs deal but no move in arms row during premier’s visit”; 
BBC Monitroing Asia Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 10 May, 2004, “China, Britain agree to 
strengthen bilateral relations”; Channel NewsAsia, 11 May, 2004, “Wen urges Europe to recognise China as 
market economy”; China Daily, 13 May, 2004, “Premier pushes for stronger Sino-Irish partnership”. 
58 AFX.com, 6 May, 2004, “China Premier Wen confident of end to EU’s arm ban”; China Daily, 14 May, 2004, 
“Wen’s visit advances Sino-EU relations”; BBC Mon Asia Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 14 
May, 2004, “Chinese foreign minister views achievements of premier’s European trip”. 
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dynamic then unfolded during the visit to France of Chinese Vice-Premier Mr. Zeng Peiyan in 
June 2004.59 
An interesting aspect of this second period was also the rumour that, in addition to the 
rhetorical pressure on EU member states as well as the Commission, China uses its economic 
muscle to push for MES, namely through a limitation f its coke deliveries.60 This coal 
product is essential for steel making. While China st rted exporting coke in 1993, this low-
cost competition forced European (and US) coke producers out of the business by the late 
1990s. By 2001, China accounted for 60% of the world’s coke exports. In 2004, China cut its 
coke exports, thus putting European steel makers in trouble, a move suspected to be designed 
to pressurise the EU on MES. By late May, the problem was solved as China agreed to keep 
exports at the level of 2003. Wen Jiabao’s remarks in December 2004 at the EU-China 
Business Summit in The Hague may have been an indirect attempt to disperse any such 
accusation. He stated that “China has developed a policy of relying mainly on domestic 
resources […] China does not pursue its development at the expense of other’s interests.”61 
 
(iii) Disenchantment – MES Moves Down the Agenda 
The Commission’s refusal in late June 2004 to grant China MES on the grounds that it 
did not fulfil the EU’s market economy criteria initiates the third period. From then on China 
continued to demand recognition of MES in various venues of China-EU relations, although 
by no means with the same intensity as during the previous six to eight months. In October 
2004, at the Asia-Europe Meeting in Hanoi, the Chinese Minister of Commerce Bo repeated 
the call on the EU to grant China MES, and, on the same occasion, assured a supportive 
statement by a French trade official.62 Similarly, at the 7th EU-China Summit in The Hague in 
December 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao raised the issue and received supportive statements 
from Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende both in his role as Council President and as Dutch 
head of government.63 The following months saw the development of an almost “ritualistic” 
practice during meetings between EU member states and China: while the Chinese side called 
for MES, the European states expressed support but pointed out at the same time that this was 
                                                
59 BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 12 June, 2004, “France, China 
discuss energy, transport, aviation cooperation”. 
60 On this see AFX.com, 30 May, 2004, “China becoming more important player in global coal market – 
industry sources”. 
61 Business Daily Update, 10 December 2004, “Market recognition benefits all”. 
62 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, quoting from Xinhua News Ageny, Oct.9, 2004, “China urges EU to 
recognise…”]. 
63 China Daily, 9 December, 2004, “EU moves to lift arms embargo”; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, 
quoting from Xinhua News Agency, 9 December, 2004, “Chinese PM holds talks with Dutch counterpart”. 
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an EU matter and that a single member cannot do much about it.64 This was the case, for 
example, in January 2005, both during the visit of P rtuguese President Jorge Sampaio to 
Beijing, and also when the head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist 
Party visited Italy.65 At the same time, Commission officials, like Deputy Head of EC 
Delegation in Beijing, Franz Jessen, or Peter Mandelson, new Trade Commissioner, tended to 
stress more and more that MES was a technical rather than a political issue, based exclusively 
on fulfilment of specific economic criteria.66 These patterns of interaction remain largely 
unchanged until today. 
At the beginning this period Sino-European interaction on MES has also saw a new 
initiative to avoid a deadlock. After the EU’s refusal of June 2004 to grant MES, it was 
agreed with the Chinese side to establish a common working group on the issue.67 In the end, 
the working group only met once in November 2004, and initiative failed to bring any 
progress.68 
 
4.3 Explaining China-EU Interaction on MES 
 
After this overview of who did what with whom on the issue of MES, the task will be to 
explain the evolution of those patterns of bureaucrti  interaction. In order to do so this 
section will look at them through the three dimensio  of the analytical framework introduced 
in chapter II. 
 
4.3.1 Chinese Foreign-Policy Making and MES 
 
                                                
64 Interview EU 20 Beijing, summer 2007. 
65 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, quoting from Xinhua News Agency, 13 January, 2005, “China, 
Portugal issue joint communiqué on EU, human rights”; BBC Monitoring International Reports, quoting from 
Xinhua News Agency, 21 January, 2005, “Italy pledges to push for early lifting of EU weapons export ban on 
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66 See for example Asia Pulse, 15 December, 2004, “China exports to the EU jump 38%, January to October”; or 
World Markets Research Centre – World Markets Analysis, 24 February, 2005, “EU trade commissioner 
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67 See Relex Commissioner Chris Patten’s speech in Singapore in June 2004, as reported in BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacific – Political, quoting Xinhua News Agency, 30 June 2004, “European Commissioner Patten stresses 
importance of Sino-EU trade ties”. 




In the first period, on the Chinese side decision-making with regard to MES was largely 
contained within the commercial policy structure. This involved the MOFCOM, the Finance 
and Economics LSG and, at the very top, Vice-Premier and PB member Wu Yi. From the 
point of view of Chinese foreign-policy making, the d cision to engage Commission trade 
officials on MES and to submit a formal request for MES to them can probably best be seen 
as a result of organisational routine. As one Chinese interviewee, familiar with both MFA and 
MOFCOM activities in Brussels, explained, for most day-to-day or technical matters there is 
no explicit consideration of who in the EU to engage and how as the contacts simply follow 
routine.69 
As an institution the MOFCOM has built up significant experience on dealing with the 
EU on trade matters. At least since the 1985 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
the normal EU counterparts for MOFCOM (or previously MOFTEC) were the trade 
commissioner and Commission officials from DG Trade, with annual meetings in the 
framework of the Joint Committee and a growing number of working groups and dialogues on 
various specific trade topics. In addition to this, these same EU officials and entities were 
leading the bilateral negotiations with Chinese commercial diplomats on China’s accession to 
the WTO.70 Aside from this one could also argue that a routine procedure when selecting a 
foreign counterpart is to study the formal distribut on of competences within the other 
administrative structure. In the case of the EU, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is 
exclusive competence of the EC with a prominent role f r the Commission to play, as 
discussed in chapter IV. 
That in this first phase even State Premier Zhu Rongji and Vice-Premier Wu Yi became 
involved does not contradict this explanation based on organisational routine with regard to a 
technical trade matter. Wu Yi’s remit as Vice-Premir was international trade and her 
counterpart, by routine and by formal competence, was therefore Pascal Lamy. Zhu Rongji’s 
involvement more than anything is an indicator that for China trade was of prime importance 
in its relations with the EU. And Zhu also carefully followed formal competences, in that he 
only brought up MES during the EU-China summit meeting and not during his ensuing visit 
of France, although commercial contacts were also very high on his agenda for Paris.71 
                                                
69 Interview China 9, Beijing Q3 2007. 
70 Due to the complexity of the negotiations, various ther entities were involved on the Chinese side. However, 
MOFCOM was the lead actor, although it was not always strong enough to impose its position. For details on the 
Chinese politics behind WTO accession based on the example of negotiations with the US, see Pearson 2001. 
71 SDA – Service de base français, 27 September 2002, “France: visite du premier minister chinois, Zhu Rongji 
demande la levée de l’embargo européen sur les armes”; Emmanuel Defouloy, Agence France Presse, 27 
September, “Zhu Rongji demand la levee de l’embargo eur péen sur les armes”. 
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The second period identified above is more intriguin . Why would Chinese policy 
makers decide to move off the beaten MOFCOM-Commission track in late 2003 and start to 
engage not only trade policy makers in Brussels but also several EU member states? It 
appears that in the transition between phase I and phase II, within the Chinese foreign-policy 
structure, the issue of MES moves up, changing as a re ult the dynamics of decision making. 
Interviewees have pointed out that the years 2002-2003 constituted a period of deep 
reconsideration among Chinese foreign-policy makers on the structure of the international 
system and China’s opportunities in it.72 The result was that relations with the EU moved to 
the top of the Chinese foreign policy agenda.73 This implied that MES was no longer one 
technical issue among others in the context of the important commercial relations with the 
EU. Instead, MES became one of the very few top issue  for a relationship which was 
considered of strategic importance for China. 
With regard to the bureaucracies involved this also meant a significant change. While 
trade related matters are largely contained within e commercial policy-making structure 
already mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, the key issues of foreign relations 
deemed of strategic significance are discussed in other contexts as well. On the one hand there 
is of course the MFA, in particular its Europe Department, in charge of the general 
management and development of relations with Europe. On the other, there are analysts and 
advisors at the level of the top leadership. It appears that, already from the time of Jiang 
Zemin, there has been a team of diplomatic advisors to the top leadership, largely consisting 
of former ambassadors, i.e. linked to the MFA, who are regularly consulted on major foreign 
policy issues.74 
It is important to note that neither the MOFCOM nor the MFA or the team of top 
advisors have any direct influence on the final decision, be it on trade or any other kind of 
issues. Yet their approach to the development of options and to implementation is quite 
different. With this involvement of career diplomats, an alternative to the previously practiced 
contained engagement based on habitual patterns of commercial discussions and formal 
competences emerged quite naturally, namely a larger diplomatic initiative through virtually 
all available channels. Interviewees linked to the MFA emphasise that throughout the period 
under review, MES did continue to be treated mostly by the MOFCOM – however the MFA 
                                                
72 Interview EU 28, London Q1 2008; Interview China 11, Brussels Q1 2008. 
73 See on this Xiang 2004. 
74 Interview China 8, Beijing Q3 2007. 
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intervenes precisely with regard to related political issues and at the political level, in 
particular in order to lobby high officials on the EU side.75 
This change in the interpretation, and as a result the treatment, of the MES issue led to 
the larger diplomatic offensive in phase II, when virtually any EU counterpart was called on 
to support China’s recognition as a market economy. The choice of this strategy of a general 
attack was certainly facilitated by the parallel emergence of yet another top issue, the arms 
embargo, to be studied in the following chapter. It is possible that, to some extent, MES was 
drawn into the political logic of lobbying for the lifting of the arms embargo. 
From a focused look at decision making in China it is difficult to discern any particular 
changes in 2004 that could explain the beginning of period III, i.e. steadily decreasing energy 
in Chinese lobbying efforts. Most certainly, the insistence by the EU since its initial refusal of 
MES in June 2004 that this is a technical issue has contributed to a decrease in the fervour of 
diplomats, foreign policy advisors and top leaders, and has served to push the issue back into 
the realm of the MOFCOM. 
 
4.3.2 EU Reactions to Chinese Approach on MES 
 
How did the EU foreign policy structure constrain Chinese approaches and thus shape 
the evolution of bureaucratic interaction? The first period does not pose any major problems: 
the competent EU authorities had been approached and there was no intra-EU contestation of 
their role or their actions. The question gets more int resting with regard to the second period: 
how did the EU react to the diplomatic “general attack”, and especially to the fact that 
member states were massively approached on an issue outside their normal competences? 
On the EU side the lack of formal competence by member states was made up for by 
strong interest in the issue. As a result, in period II virtually no member state refused or re-
directed Chinese lobbying on MES. The interest was not so much related to the substance of 
the MES question, an issue at that time still rather unproblematic from the EU’s point of 
view.76 It was rather that actors within the EU were keen to please the Chinese on a largely 
uncontested issue, especially as the other matter China was pressing on, the arms embargo, 
                                                
75 Interview China 9, Beijing Q3 2007; Interview China 15, Beijing Q4 2008. 
76 An EU official familiar with the matter claimed that up to 2003 hardly anyone in the EU thought that China 
should not get MES, and that China simply missed a window of opportunity; Interview EU 29, Brussels Q1 
2008. 
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was far more contentious and obviously not ripe for any fast progress. In addition, the very 
positive and supportive reactions by EU member state  to Chinese requests on MES also 
suggest that they may have consciously profited from the freedom of making easy promises 
on issues they know they cannot be asked to deliver on. In a way it is the official Commission 
reaction on China’s formal request of MES that brings things back to the order of formal 
competences: the competent actor, i.e. the Commission, assesses a concrete request based on 
specific technical criteria. 
This points to yet another difficulty in EU’s foreign policy process: the problem of the 
negotiating mandate. In activities and decisions on trade policy towards third states, the 
Commission is obviously bound by the existing rules of the EU. In the case of MES, these 
rules consisted of the technical criteria for granting MES as defined in the regulation of April 
1998. In addition, these criteria were locked in through the stipulations of China’s accession 
protocol that market economy criteria had to be defined in the law of the respective WTO 
member at the time of China’s accession. For the Commission this meant that it only could 
play a role of pure technical verification – unless of course it had a negotiation mandate from 
the Council which it did not.77 The irony on the EU side is that during a period in which there 
would have been widespread agreement among member stat s on granting MES, i.e. in phases 
I and II, the difficulty of doing it based on the existing criteria was not yet obvious. At the 
time this was understood, the mood in several member states had changed against MES for 
China, mostly in the Mediterranean countries which tend have stronger protectionist reflexes 
than central and northern European states.78 This means that even if, in substance, a political 
deal could maybe have been reached, i.e. a selling of MES against some issue of importance 
for the EU, the Commission was confined to seeking concessions from the Chinese that could 
be interpreted in some way as bringing China closer to the technical criteria of MES.79 
This situation of deadlock also has an impact on the reaction of EU member states to 
Chinese approaches on MES in phase III. Whether really in favour of granting MES or not, 
most member states revert to an almost ritualistic diplomatic formula that was repeated on any 
occasion when Chinese officials requested MES: namely that the member state in question 
supported China on this but that the decision was large y a technical matter of which the 
Commission was in charge.80 
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4.3.3 Independent Dynamics of Bureaucratic Interaction 
 
With regard to the explanatory factors presented under this dimension of the framework, 
it is obvious that in the first period of China-EU engagement on MES, previous experience of 
interaction plays a crucial role, as has already been pointed out above when discussing 
China’s motivations to choose specific EU counterparts. 
The change in the pattern of bureaucratic interaction from the first to the second period 
can be partly explained with the quality of personal ties. As the logic of decision making in 
China shifted from “important trade issue” to “top strategic relationship”, the logic of 
interaction with the EU changed from looking for the functional counterpart to focusing on 
long-time “friends of China” like Prodi, Berlusconi, Chirac, and Schröder.81 Yet while these 
ties assured a certain continuity in China-EU bureacr tic interaction through phases II and 
III, changes and disruptions came from differences in preferences and perceptions. 
In terms of preferences, one can argue that there was no mismatch through periods I and 
II: Chinese foreign-policy makers wanted recognitio as a market economy and in the EU no-
one seemed explicitly opposed. Yet perceptions started to diverge in the second period. On 
the Chinese side the MES issue had just entered a larger foreign policy logic, i.e. gained a 
political dimension as a key issue in a strategic relationship. This implied that political actors 
throughout the EU were perceived as the adequate counterparts. In EU member states the 
issue at that time was not of key political importance, but rather a symbolic one, a chance to 
demonstrate good will. As regards perceptions of themselves, all member states knew very 
well that they could do fairly little on MES. At the same time, this is the moment when in the 
Commission the trade officials really in charge became aware that from an EC perspective 
this issue could only be a technical one, and neither political nor symbolical, at least in the 
absence of a Council mandate to negotiate on the issue. As a result bureaucratic interaction 
with none of the EU counterpart could lead to any substantial result. 
In the third period there was again a change, both wi regard to preferences and 
perceptions. Chinese policy makers continued to pursue recognition of MES, yet the 
continued denial by the EU conferred a symbolic dimension to the issue. If a trusted “strategic 
partner” holds back on such an issue in spite of intensive lobbying it amounts to lack of 
                                                
81 Interview China 15, Beijing Q4 2008. 
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respect.82 At the same time, many of the traditionally more potectionist member states started 
favouring continued non-recognition, in light of a growing trade deficit with China and 
liberalisation of textile trade. As a result, for them the issue also lost attractiveness as an 
opportunity to show a friendly attitude, and for them it became again a simple question of 
trade defence. While in China a symbolic dimension was building up, in many EU member 
states this dimension was lost. By contrast, the Commission started to move from a purely 
technical approach of the issue to a more political view, and expected something substantial 
in return for MES, ideally somehow linked to the market economy criteria.83 The willingness 
to “sell” MES was expressed quite explicitly towards the Chinese.84 
This led to a grotesque situation. The Commission was illing to exchange MES for 
something, yet it was bound by the rigid EC rules framework and also received strong 
pressure from the more protectionist member states not to engage in any “horse trading.”85 
The Chinese wants MES but has gained the conviction that it somehow has the right to get 
this without any concession in exchange.86 The only possible outcome then becomes 
continued non-recognition – which is probably the explanation why the joint working group 
on MES only met once in November 2004 with no substantial result.87 
Roughly in the last two years, there may have been y t another shift in Chinese 
perceptions of this issue. Probably from the MOFCOM, it seems that a new view emerged 
according to which MES was far less precious in commercial terms than initially assumed. 
For China the real economic value of MES depends on the frequency with which non-
recognition of MES actually leads to anti-dumping duties. Yet since 2006 the EU has shown 
growing restraint,88 much to the dismay of some European producers.89 In addition, the fact 
                                                
82 Compare Wen Jiabao’s comments in Sept. 2006; see David Ibison, Financial Times, 11 Sept. 2006, “Brussel  
refuses to yield over market economy status for China”. 
83 Interview EU 29, Brussels Q1 2008. 
84 See for example the remarks of Serge Abou, head of the EC Delegation in Beijing, that there “there is no free 
lunch”; Xinhua Financial Network News, 13 June 2005, “Europe ‘ready to talk’ on granting China market 
economy status – official”; Tschang Chi-chu, Straits Times, 14 June 2005, “Market economy status next for 
China? Europe says it will repay China for its decision to restrict its textile exports”. Similar remarks by 
Barroso; see Xinhua Financial Network News, 14 July2005, Thursday, “EU’s Barroso says time not right for 
China market economy status [sic]”. 
85 Interview EU 32, Brussels Q1 2008. 
86 Interview EU 20, Beijing Q3 2007, Interview EU 29, Brussels Q1 2008. 
87 Interview EU 20, Beijing Q3 2007, Interview EU 29, Brussels Q1 2008; for confirmation of the working group 
and the meeting date, see Asia Today, October 2004, “Invisible barriers to future trade – labour standrds GMO 
social issues”; China Daily, 9 Dec. 2004, “EU moves to lift arms embargo”. 
88 Interview EU 29, Brussels, Q1 2008; Interview China 12, Brussels, Q1 2008. 




that generalised recognition in 2016 is just a few y ars away, Chinese policy makers hesitate 




The discussion in the previous pages has traced the evolution of China-EU bureaucratic 
interactions on the issue of China’s status as a market economy. With regard to the conceptual 
frame proposed in chapter II, it confirms several points. First, transgovernmental relations do 
matter. The pattern of engagement of the EU changed substantially when the issue of MES 
moved beyond exclusive control by MOFCOM. Second, “fragmented authoritarianism” 
within the Chinese administration does affect negatively the capacity of Chinese policy-
makers to effectively deal with the outside. Third, interests do matter in the reaction of 
European actors to Chinese approaches. An additional p int that emerged was the apparently 
interrelated effect of interest and competence on EU actors’ behaviour, in that the absence of 
competence gives large room for symbolical statements that are expected to promote interests 
in other spheres. 
There are a number of obvious signs of influence from the larger international 
environment – although all indirect, concerning prefer nces and perceptions of bureaucratic 
actors, as set out in the analytical framework. First of all, the entire issue of MES is rooted in 
the WTO and China’s accession to it. Similarly, the early “window of opportunity” that China 
missed by pressing MES too late, was largely related to the general perception, not only in 
Europe, that China was doing well on the implementation of its WTO commitments. 
Expectations on the EU side were aimed at getting this new big WTO member to actively 
participate in the Doha Round negotiations.91 
In a next step, the reconsideration of China’s international strategy in 2002-2003, which 
contributed to conferring a political dimension to MES in the Chinese foreign policy process, 
was clearly linked to the changes in global politics that became obvious after “9/11”. The 
Bush administration, who in any case had significantly limited contacts with China, was seen 
as unreliable and unilateral in its foreign policy. The EU, by contrast, had long implemented a 
far more positive attitude towards China, including both substantial development cooperation 
                                                
90 Interview China 9, Beijing Q3 2007, Interview China 11, Brussels Q1 2008. 
91 Interview EU 29, Brussels Q1 2008. 
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projects and a constantly upgraded political exchange,92 and visible in a series of Commission 
policy documents.93 In addition to this, the transatlantic rift over the war on Iraq, during 
which the Chinese position was close to that of the European sceptics, seemed to herald the 
multipolar world order China had long been hoping for.94 The decision not to “bandwagon” 






















                                                
92 See on this Casarini 2006. 
93 See Commission 1995, 1998, 2001, 2003. 
94 Interview China 7 Beijing, summer 2007, Interview China 8 Beijing, summer 2007. 


































This chapter will trace the evolution of China’s efforts to convince the EU to lift the 
arms embargo it maintains towards China. A first section will elaborate why this issue is of 
importance to China, pointing out two major aspects, namely status and military procurement. 
A second section will provide a detailed account of what happened between bureaucratic 
actors on both sides. The following section will then propose explanations of these 
developments based on the general theoretical framework introduced in chapter II. 
 
5.1 Why Does the EU’s Arms Embargo Matter for China? 
 
Aside from MES, another major issue in China-EU relations during the first term of 
office of the current Chinese leadership has been th  future of the arms embargo the EU had 
imposed in the aftermath of internal repression in China in June 1989. Between 2003 and 
2005 China has made considerable efforts to get the EU to lift it. Throughout this period no 
complete consensus emerged within the EU on how to react to this Chinese request, but there 
were more and more signs that those member states favourable of a lifting would eventually 
manage to convince their more sceptical partners. Nevertheless, in the end the arms embargo 
was not lifted, for a variety of reasons related to the internal politics of the EU, developments 
in China and the wider international environment. 
 
5.1.1 The Arms Embargo and the Issue of “Face” 
 
The Chinese interests behind the drive to get the EU to lift the embargo are less obvious 
than one would expect. When explicitly referring to why the embargo should be lifted 
Chinese policy-makers have mostly mentioned two points: first, the continuation of the 
embargo does not match the current state of the relationship between China and the EU, in 
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particular the “comprehensive strategic partnership;”1 second, the embargo constitutes 
“political discrimination”, e.g. because China is put into the same category as a number of 
outright rogue states like Zimbabwe or Myanmar.2 This emphasis on the symbolic dimension 
of the issue, i.e. the rejection of a treatment that is perceived as unequal or unfair, is more than 
simple rhetoric. Questions of China’s international st tus and the related symbols have indeed 
been of great importance for Chinese foreign policy makers, in reaction to what has been 
perceived as a “humiliation” of China at the hands of foreign imperial powers during the 19th 
and 20th centuries. According to historian John W. Garver, 
“[t]he central aspect of recent Chinese history, as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), is the Chinese people’s struggle against the ‘humiliation’ of China by foreign 
imperialism during the 110 years between 1839 and 1949. To the CCP, the era between the 
[beginning of the] first opium war and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China is 
essentially a chronicle of wars imposed by aggressiv  and arrogant imperialist powers, and of 
increasingly harsh terms forced on China in consequence of its defeat in those wars.”3 
Garver calls this “century of National Humiliation” a myth, not because the criticised foreign 
encroachment did not happen, but rather because “the fact of belief is more important than 
what actually occurred.”4 In his view, this myth “stands at the centre of the political culture of 
the People’s Republic of China.”5 Yet this is not only a characteristic of Chinese communists. 
Garver adds that “[t]he common denominator of the leaders of modern China – from Sun Yat-
sen, to Chiang Kai-shek, to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping – has been a deep bitterness at 
China’s ‘humiliation’, and a determination to blot out that humiliation and restore China to its 
rightful place as a great and respected power.”6 And also according to political scientist Zhao 
Suisheng “[a]lmost all powerful Chinese political leaders from the early twentieth century 
                                                
1 See Interview China 8 Beijing 3rd Q 2007; see also quotes from Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in BBC 
Monitoring International Reports, 29 April 2004, “Chinese premier comments on ties with Germany, EU arms 
embargo”, and in AFX – Asia, 15 December 2004, “Focus – China will upgrade weapons technology if EU lifts
arms embargo”. 
2 See, for example, vice-foreign minister Zhang Yesui a  quoted in South China Morning Post, 4 December 
2004, “ Arms embargo a ‘sign of inequality’; Beijing says EU ban will affect ties but denies holding up Airbus 
order in retaliation” or Chinese MFA spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue in United Press International, 7 December 
2004, “Analysis: EU-China ties strained over arms”; unnamed Chinese MFA officials are quoted as complaining 
about China’s being part of a list of “true pariahs” in Financial Times, 10 February 2005, “The EU’s ban on 
selling military equipment to Beijing lacks credibil ty but Washington believes any change would be 
irresponsible”. 
3 Garver 1993, p.4. 
4 Garver 1993, p.7. 
5 Garver 1993, p.8. 
6 Garver 1993, p.20. 
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through today have shared a deep bitterness at this humiliation and have determined to restore 
China’s pride and prestige, as well as its rightful place in the world.”7 
For sure, concern about symbols of status on the world stage are not limited to China 
alone. However, Garver explains that while “[c]oncerns with security, development, and 
status are not unique to China”, there is “something more” in the Chinese case: “a deep and 
abiding conviction that China ought, by historical right, to be one of the great powers of the 
world.”8 With regard to the particular trait of the Chinese concern with status symbols another 
historian, Steven I. Levine, states that 
“Chinese leaders tend to internalize a sense of historical resentment at the raw deal which 
history has given them. This resentment often translate  into a claim of entitlement upon others. 
When other states behave toward China in accordance with their supposed obligations, 
everything is fine. But when these claims are not recognized, or are recognized only partially, 
additional layers of Chinese resentment may build up. This hypersensitivity is manifested with 
respect to symbolic and status issues no less than to substantive issues of resource allocation and 
power.”9  
Against this backdrop, it does make sense to understand Chinese efforts at getting the arms 
embargo lifted as rooted in the conviction that such a measure is inappropriate both with 
regard to China per se and in the context of the EU’s overall relations with it. The arms 
embargo is indeed perceived as a stigma which may iply that in some way China is not a 
fully respectable member of the international community. And in fact, on the EU side, many 
officials, both at member state and at EU level, are convinced that this symbolic dimension is 
the only or the main aspect of Chinese interests on this issue.10 
 
5.1.2 Military Dimensions 
 
However, there are also other interests behind Chinese activism, in particular related to 
military supplies. China’s EU Policy Paper of October 2003, for example, does not mention 
anything with regard to the arms embargo that is connected to questions of status or symbols 
or might be interpreted within the Chinese logic of “face”. It is, by contrast, rather explicit on 
                                                
7 Zhao 2005, p.133. 
8 Garver 1993, pp.27-28. 
9 Levine 1994, p.44. 
10 Interview EU 5 Berlin 1st Q 2007, Interview EU 25 Beijing 3rd Q 2008, Interview EU 27 London 1st Q 2008, 
Interview EU 28 London 1st Q 2008, Interview EU 33 Brussels 1st Q 2008, Interview EU 34 Burssels 1st Q 2008, 
Interview EU 36 The Hague 1st Q 2008. 
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defence interests in that it states that “[t]he EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an 
early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defence industry and 
technologies.”11 This matches comments of various experts on Chinese affairs and Asian 
security. Wu Guogang of the University of Victoria, for example, has affirmed that China was 
interested in European military items, that it was trying to diversify its military suppliers and 
upgrading its defence technology in anticipation of increasing cross-strait tensions.12 
According to Robert Karniol, former Asia editor of Jane’s Defence Weekly, a lifting of the 
embargo would not have any major impact on Chinese military modernisation but it would 
allow for European products to fill niches in Chinese equipment.13 He also stated that “China 
has not been interested in European weapons platforms, and to a lesser extent weapons 
systems”, but rather “subsystems” as well as “dual-use technology and other military 
hardware.”14 Arthur Ding of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University pointed to the effect a 
lifting would have on current military suppliers, in particular in that it would provide China 
with more leverage towards Russia.15 One official on the European side also affirmed that 
China covets all European technology, including in the defence sector.16 
Aside from the symbolic and the military dimension, another European official also 
pointed to the use of the arms embargo, along with other issues, as bargaining chips. In this 
interpretation, China balanced continuous criticism from the EU on a wide variety of issues, 
like market access, intellectual property, human rights, etc…, by picking its own “irritants” on 
the European side and repeatedly complaining about them.17 
How can one make sense of this combination of interes s? One interpretation points to a 
change in emphasis over time. A Chinese policy-advisor from a think-tank close to the central 
government claimed that the initial goal behind getting the EU to lift the embargo was that 
China wanted to buy military equipment. Only after he process had become blocked did 
Chinese decision makers start to emphasise political discrimination in a “face-saving” 
attempt.18 The fact that political discrimination appears in Chinese public statements only 
more than one year after the text of China’s EU Policy Paper, which links the lifting of the 
                                                
11 China’s EU Policy Paper 2003, p.9. 
12 AFX European Focus, 30 April 2004, “China premier Wen’s visit to Europe to focus on trade, arms embargo”. 
13 Washington Post, 31 January 2004, “US pressing EU to uphold arms embargo against China; rights abuses, 
security cited; France, Germany back Beijing”. 
14 AFX – Asia, 15 December 2004, “Focus – China will upgrade weapons technology if EU lifts arms embargo”. 
15 AFX – Asia, 15 December 2004, “Focus – China will upgrade weapons technology if EU lifts arms embargo”. 
16 Interview EU 27 London 1st Q 2008. 
17 Interview EU 25 Beijing 3rd Q 2007. 
18 Interview China 5 Beijing 3rd Q 2007. 
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embargo quite openly to strengthened defence cooperation, and after intensive lobbying 
towards the EU with no concrete progress, would seem to match this view.19 
 
5.2 The Evolution of the AE as an Issue in China-EU Relations 
 
5.2.1 The Jiang Zemin Years – “Don’t Mention the Embargo” 
 
(i) The Origins – One of Several Restrictive Measure  
The arms embargo is the only sanction from 1989 still in place. That year, the violent 
suppression of wide-spread demonstrations against the government in China, especially in 
Beijing where demonstrations on Tiananmen Square had caught international attention,20 led 
the EC and its member states to condemn the Chinese gov rnment for the non-respect of 
human rights and to impose sanctions against China, or “restrictive measures” in EC parlance. 
In an immediate reaction to the events of 4 June in Beijing the Twelve issued a first 
declaration in the context of European Political Cooperation (EPC) on 6 June, in which they 
“condemn the violent repression used against peaceful d monstrators,” call on the Chinese 
authorities “to stop the use of force against the unarmed civilian population” and “to engage 
without delay in the search for a peaceful solution” through “political dialogue.”21 They 
warned that continuing repressive policies “will greatly prejudice China’s international 
standing and compromise the reform and open-door policies” and state that the EC and its 
members “have already taken a number of measures, includ ng suspension of high-level 
contacts.”22 A second EPC declaration of 27 June largely re-affirms these points, with only a 
few minor variations, but adds a catalogue of restrictive measures:23 
“[I]n the present circumstances the European Council thinks it necessary to adopt the following 
measures: 
                                                
19 The first public statements from the Chinese side interpreting the arms embargo as political discrimination 
appeared in December 2004, i.e. about 14 months after the publication of China’s EU Policy Paper in mid-
October 2003. 
20 See Baum 1993. 
21 “Statement Concerning China”, European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin 89/171, 06/06/1989. 
22 “Statement Concerning China”, European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin 89/171, 06/06/1989. 
23 “Statement Concerning China” European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulleting 89/180, 27/06/1989; 




- raising of the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora; asking for 
the admittance of independent observers to attend the trials and to visit the prisons, 
- interruption by the Member States of the Community of military cooperation and an embargo 
on trade in arms with China, 
- suspension of bilateral ministerial and high level contacts, 
- postponement by the Community and its Member States of new cooperation projects, 
- reduction of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation to only those 
activities that might maintain a meaning in the present circumstances, 
- prolongation by the Member States of visas to the Cinese students who wish it. 
Taking into account the climate of uncertainty created in the economic field by the present 
policy of the Chinese authorities, the European Council advocates the postponement of the 
examination of new request for credit insurance andthe postponement of the examination of 
new credits of the World Bank.”24 
 
(ii) But the Only One Left 
Most of these measures were gone within a few years. A chronology of EU-China 
relations provided on the website of the Commission states that in October 1990 “[t]he 
Council and the EP decide[d] to gradually re-establish bilateral relations with China” and that 
in 1992 “EC-China relations [were] largely normalised but the arms embargo remain[ed] in 
place.”25 A similar view, i.e. that sanctions have been “gradu lly relaxed” while “a ban of 
arms sales is still in place”, can be found in the Commission’s first communication on China, 
A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, of July 1995.26 
Looking at the specific measures, it appears that te postponement of projects and 
reduction of programmes did not have any major impact. Although development aid was 
“drastically curtailed”27 in the immediate aftermath of the events, most programmes were 
quick to be back on track. 
The same is true for the suspension of contacts between the political leadership of the 
two sides. Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández-Ordoñez visited Beijing in 
November 1990, with a mandate from all EC foreign ministers to discuss gradual 
                                                
24 European Council 1989. 
25 See Commission 2007. Found at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/docs/07_chronology_jan-07.pdf, 
last consulted 15/03/2008. 
26 Commission 1995, p.7. 
27 Taube 2002, p.85. 
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normalisation of EC-China relations.28 This was quickly followed by further exchanges of 
visits. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Portugal, Spain and Greece in February 
and March 1991, and in April Deputy prime minister Zhu Rongji held meetings with the 
Commission in Brussels.29 The same month, EC Energy Commissioner Antonio Cardoso e 
Cunha went on official visit to China, followed in October of the same year by External 
Relations Commissioner Frans Andriessen.30 Bilateral “ministerial and high level” exchanges 
involving EC member also gained momentum in 1991 with the visits to China of Italian 
Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis in May and of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti in 
September. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng followed an invitation to Italy in January 1992.31 
The pace of the exchange of visits only increased aft r that. 
Military cooperation, in the form of mutual visits and dialogues, also revived rather 
quickly. After the US had taken the lead in re-establishing military consultations with China 
in 1993, Portugal became the first EU member to send a military delegation to China in 
October 1994, headed by air force Chief-of-Staff Mendes Dias.32 France followed suit in 
March 1995 by sending its Chief-of-Staff Jacques Lanxade to Beijing for talks with his 
Chinese counterpart Zhang Wannian.33 In November of the same year, German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl was the first foreign leader to visit Chinese ground forces since 1989, reportedly 
with the intention to integrate Chinese military lead rs in political contacts since they were 
expected to play a role in China’s political evolution.34 In September 1996, Liu Huaqing, 
vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, was received in France and Italy.35 
For Britain, Chief-of-Staff Peter Inge visited Beijing in November 1996 and welcomed his 
Chinese counterpart Fu Quanyou in London in March 1997.36 By this time Italy and Spain 
had also established direct contacts with the Chinese military.37 
The decision to raise human rights in China in the respective international arenas 
remained an issue for a little longer. Indeed all EC, and later EU, members jointly sponsored 
                                                
28 Möller 2002, p.17. 
29 Apparently Qian Qichen renounced to visit Germany d Luxemburg because it was refused to rank the visit 
as official; see Möller 2002, p.18. 
30 EC Press Release IP/91/292 of 09/04/1991 and Andriessen’s speech at the ABN AMRO-EEC Seminar in 
Beijing on 25/10/1991, reference SPEECH/91/108. 
31 Studwell 2003, p.310. 
32 Agence France Press, 8 October 1994, “Portuguese military team to visit China next week”. 
33 Agence France Press, 17 March 1995, “France resumes military contacts with China”. 
34 South China Morning Post, 9 November 1995, “Kohl t make rare PLA visit”. 
35 Agence France Press, 8 October 1996, “China poised to seal AWACS deal with British firm”. 
36 Associated Press Worldstream, 26 November 1996 “British military leader visits China, restoring high-level 
ties”, and The Independent, 25 March 1997, “China’s army chief shown latest British weaponry”. 




resolutions on human rights in China in the context of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
since 1990, i.e., as its meetings were usually held in February or March, since the first 
opportunity after the Tiananmen events. This policy was abandoned in 1997 when the EU’s 
emphasis shifted to the bilateral human rights dialogue with China.38 
 
(iii) An Unusual Restrictive Measure 
Overall it is fair to say that by 1997, of the measure  adopted in 1989, only the arms 
embargo was left. Yet this arms embargo against China is not only special in that it is the only 
restrictive measure left over from 1989 and in that it survived the rapid improvement in 
China-EU relations during the late 1990s and the early 2000s. It is also different from most 
other EU arms embargos currently because it is the only arms embargo from EPC times that 
has not been transformed, in the years after the entry into force of the TEU, into a CFSP 
measure through a Common Position based on art.15 TEU.39 Since there was no agreement 
among member states on whether to continue the measure, and if so how, it continued in the 
old form by default.40 As a result, the legal nature of the EU sanctions against China is 
unclear at best, especially as concerns the question to what extent they are legally binding for 
member states of the EU. The Single European Act, which for the first time integrated 
European Political Cooperation into the same treaty basis as EC provisions, does neither 
define specific EPC instruments nor establish any obligation for member states to implement 
EPC positions. It only provides that “[i]n adopting its positions and in its national measures 
each High Contracting Part shall take full account of he positions of the other partners and 
shall give due consideration to the desirability of adopting and implementing common 
European positions.”41 By contrast, the TEU, in setting up the framework for CFSP, 
establishes a more explicit legal obligation for memb r states to implement common positions 
by stating that “Member States shall ensure that their national policies states that their 
national policies conform to the common positions.”42 
Even in the absence of clear legal obligations for EU member states under the EU arms 
embargo against China, one could say that there is a political obligation to conform to the 
measure. Arguably, a clear breach of the ban by an EU member would cause considerable 
                                                
38 See Möller 2002, pp.22-23, Baker 2002, pp.55-60. In 1997, 5 out of 15 members withdrew support from the 
draft resolution, while by 1998 the unanimous policy of the EU had become to address human rights issues in the 
bilateral dialogue rather than in the context of the UN. 
39 Kreutz 2004, p.46, Kreutz 2005, p.11, Anthony 2005, p.11. 
40 Interview EU 34 Brussels, Q1 2007. 
41 Single European Act, Title III, art.30 (2c). 
42 TEU, Title V, art.15; this was already the wording of the original TEU in Title V, art.J.2(2). 
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negative repercussions for the transgressor. But given the general language of the declaration 
imposing the embargo it is unclear what exactly would constitute a breach. The simple listing 
of “interruption […] of military cooperation” and “an embargo on trade in arms” without 
further specification leaves a lot of leeway for interpretation by the implementing agencies, 
i.e. the governments of EU member states. 
Indeed, application of the arms embargo has been unven across EU member states, and 
the limits of what is considered permissible have extended over time. Comments about 
possible or projected deals in militarily relevant materials between certain EU member states 
and China appeared as early as 1995. Indirect evidence of this is given by the French denial 
that chief-of-staff Lanxade’s visit to Beijing in March 1995 would result in military deals.43 A 
press report on German chancellor Kohl’s visit to China in November 1995 stated that China 
was interested in European fighter jet electronics and in German diesel engine submarines.44 
While the German cabinet office also denied that Germany wanted to sell military items to 
Beijing, Kohl’s delegation did include representatives of the armament industry, and the US 
became suspicious of a number of German-Chinese infrastructure projects with potential 
military-strategic implications, like railways and ports.45 In 1996, British GEC-Marconi 
Avionics reportedly was close to concluding a deal to provide China with advanced airborne 
radar systems, and another UK firm, Racal Electronics, was said to have formally agreed to 
sell surveillance equipment.46 At about the same time, a conservative US observer, Richard D. 
Fisher of the Heritage Foundation, deplored the more generous interpretation of the embargo 
by certain European states. “By early 1996, Britain had revised its interpretation of the 
embargo to permit the sale of military technology except that which explodes or delivers 
explosives.”47 According to him, concluded or imminent militarily relevant deals between EU 
member states and China included: British GEC-Marconi and German DASA participating in 
a project “to develop a radar satellite for military and civilian use”; British electronics firm 
Racal selling airborne radar systems to China; French, Italian and Dutch components in a new 
Chinese destroyer; and the joint production of transport helicopters between French 
Aérospatiale and Chinese producer Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation.48 In fact, for 
the French defence and high tech industries, the Chinese market had remained largely closed 
                                                
43 Agence France Press, 17 March 1995, “France resumes military contacts with China”. 
44 South China Morning Post, 9 November 1995, “Kohl t make rare PLA visit”. 
45 South China Morning Post, 9 November 1995, “Kohl t make rare PLA visit”. 
46 Agence France Press, 8 October 1996, “China poised to seal AWACS deal with British firm”. 
47 Richard D. Fisher. 1997. How America’s Friends are Building China’s Military Power. Heritage Foundation 
Reports, 5 November. 
48 Richard D. Fisher. 1997. How America’s Friends are Building China’s Military Power. Heritage Foundation 
Reports, 5 November, Appendix. 
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for over five years after several companies had sold military equipment to Taiwan.49 
Nevertheless, by the end of the decade they were back in the game with dual-use 
technologies. In 2000, French Thomson-CSF, one of the firms involved in the sale of 
Lafayette frigates to Taiwan, won a contract for extending radar coverage to all Chinese 
skies.50 About one year later, the same firm, now re-baptised Thales, concluded a contract to 
set up an integrated aerial control system for three largest cities in China, Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou.51 In 2002, Dassault, which had earlier supplied Taiwan with Mirage 2000-5 
combat planes, concluded a deal by which it started constructing parts of a civilian plane in 
China.52 
In pace with the revival of military contacts and deals in items with military use, 
rumours about an end of the arms embargo appeared periodically. Ahead of German 
Chancellor Kohl’s trip to China in November 1995 the South China Morning Post noted that 
“the ban is weakening.”53 The head of the EC Delegation in Beijing, Endymion Wilkinson, 
was quoted to have said that the embargo was still in p ace, although it “could come under 
review if some European countries feel they want to sell weapons to China.”54 Less than two 
years later, in March 1997, the Portuguese Defence Minister Antonio Vitorino stated that the 
arms embargo could soon be lifted: with the ongoing normalisation of relations between the 
EU and China it was natural to re-examine this policy.55 On the occasion of Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin’s visit to France in October 1999, it was speculated that China was targeting 
France to promote the lifting of the arms embargo within the EU.56 Then, after the third EU-
China summit of October 2000, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana was 
quoted as saying that some member states, including France, UK and Italy, wanted to revise 
the arms embargo, although others were still committed to keeping it.57 
Despite its unclear legal status, the vagueness of it  text and the talk about its possible 
end, the EU’s arms embargo remained in place. In addition, until 2002, there was no trace of 
                                                
49 Libération, 1 October 2001, “Thales à la reconquête de la China”; François Hauter, Le Figaro, 20 March 2002, 
“Pour Dassault, la Chine n’est plus un mirage”; Caroline Puel, Le Point, 22 March 2002, “Chine, Dassault 
réhabilité”. 
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any sustained efforts, neither from Chinese nor from the European side, to achieve a lifting. 
Although there has been some press coverage, it is spar e when compared to big issues on the 
China-EU agenda, like trade relations or WTO negotiati ns. Public statements on the issue 
were extremely rare.58 Overall, while the arms embargo did come up occasionally in 
diplomatic circles,59 it seems to have been rather low on the diplomatic agenda. 
 
5.2.2 2002 to 2005 – Pushing for a Lifting 
 
This changed in late 2002 when China started a major c mpaign aimed at pushing the 
EU to lift the arms embargo. These efforts were stopped in mid-2005, and since then the issue 
has virtually disappeared from China-EU relations. From media reports, public statements, 
and interviews it is possible to draw a rather detailed picture of the evolution of the arms 
embargo issue in China-EU relations during these thr e years. Three different periods can be 
distinguished. In a first period, from late 2002 to late 2003 the Chinese initiative was almost 
exclusively targeted at France. The French government was very responsive. Yet this made 
the problem of divergent views within the EU only more visible. In a second phase, from late 
2003 to mid-2004, China approached the EU more broadly, including both various member 
states and EU institutions. On the European side, this phase saw an intensive public debate on 
the issue with some positions already shifting in favour of lifting the embargo. This was 
followed by a third period, roughly from mid-2004 to mid-2005, when China discontinued its 
advances towards EU institutions and focussed more on member states. 
 
(i) Targeting France 
As a starting point for the first period, one can refe  to the visit of Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji to France in September 2002. This was the first time that a member of 
the Chinese top leadership publicly expresses the desire to have the arms embargo lifted, and 
this on various occasions during the visit.60 Zhu explicitly linked his call for a lifting to the 
prospect of substantially increasing volumes of commercial exchange between France and 
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China, both in public, when responding to the question of French industrialist on how French 
business could improve its performance in China,61 nd, according to his own statement, in a 
closed meeting with French president Jacques Chirac.62 Zhu also pointed out that, while past 
cooperation on armament and defence between China and France had already been good, 
there was great future potential.63 This Chinese initiative came at a time when French 
commentators were clearly dissatisfied with the limited economic benefits France could attain 
from relations with China, especially as compared with other EU members.64 Following up on 
this, the French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin affirmed France’s willingness to 
convince the EU to lift the embargo when visiting Beijing in April 2003.65 In June, French 
defence minister Michèle Alliot-Marie reacted to resp ctive Chinese demands, by assuring 
her counterparts that France was working in this direction but also pointing to the differing 
opinions in other EU capitals.66 It is noteworthy that, in this phase, while major French 
newspapers and magazines comment extensively on the Chinese advances towards France, 
there was hardly any echo of them in the British and German presses. 
 
(ii) A Broader Approach 
Mid-October 2003 represents the beginning of the second period of China-EU 
interaction on the arms embargo issue. At this time, foreign policy makers in Beijing decided 
to include the request for a lifting in China’s EU Policy Paper. The inclusion per se as well as 
the wording (“The EU should lift…”) indicate that the claim was no longer directed at France 
alone but at the EU as a whole.67 The document appeared as a response to the latest China
policy paper by the Commission of September 2003, which, however, had not contained any 
mention of the arms embargo.68 This new approached was confirmed during the 6th EU-China 
summit in late October. Although the final joint statement did not mention the arms 
                                                
61 Les Echos, 30 September 2002, “Ventes d’armes; le meilleur moyen de developer les échanges fracno-chinois 
selon Pékin”. 
62 Emmanuel Defouloy, Agence France Presse, 27 September, “Zhu Rongji demand la levee de l’embargo 
européen sur les armes”. 
63 SDA – Service de base français, 27 September 2002, “France: visite du premier minister chinois, Zhu Rongji 
demande la levée de l’embargo européen sur les armes”; Laurent Chemineau, La Tribune, 30 September 2002, 
“Zhu Rongji pose ses conditions à une amelioration des échanges franco-chinois” 
64 Philippe Massonnet, Agence France Presse, 24 September 2002, “Zhu Rongji en France dans l’attente d’une 
relance des échanges économiques”; François Hauter, Le Figaro, 26 September 2002, “Le premer minister Zhu
Rongji en visite en France jusqu’à Samedi”. 
65 Arnaud Rodier, Armelle Bohineust, Delphine Denuit, 23 April 2003, Le Figaro, “Jean-Pierre Raffarin en visite 
officielle à Pékin”; Jean-Dominique Merchet, La Libération, 27 June 2003, “Péking veut son satellite-espion”. 
66 DPA – AFX, 30 June 2003, Monday, “Frankreich will China wieder Waffen liefern”. 
67 China’s EU Policy Paper 2003, p.9 (see above). 
68 Commission 2003b. 
 179
embargo,69 Commission President Romano Prodi confirmed in a public statement that the 
question had been raised in the discussions during the summit.70 Prodi was quoted as saying 
that “political difficulties” had been addressed and that “[w]e have also agreed we want to 
work on [sic] this direction so that in the not too distant future we may finally reach a shared 
position.”71 This may sound like a careful statement, but, in fact, working towards a common 
viewpoint with Beijing simply meant envisaging a lifting. 
Considering that these comments were in contradiction with almost 15 years of EU 
policy, that they were made by the Commission president, and that the Commission has very 
limited formal competence in the field of CFSP to which the arms embargo belongs, it is 
surprising that they did not trigger a wide debate in Europe. Yet two further events were 
needed for that. First, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, during his visit to Beijing in 
early December 2003, publicly assured his Chinese ho ts that he would promote the idea of a 
lifting within the EU,72 as, in his view, it was time to eliminate the weapons ban.73 This 
kicked off almost immediately an intensive debate in the German press on the pros and cons 
of such a policy.74 On this move, Schröder had previously consulted Chirac75 who then placed 
the issue on the agenda of the Brussels European Cou cil, in mid-December.76 This led up to 
the second event, namely the decision of the European Council to request the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC), i.e. the foreign ministers of EU member states, “to 
re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China”.77 It meant that the 
weapons ban became a pan-European media issue, asid from being at the top of the China-
EU as well as the intra-EU diplomatic agenda. 
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There is evidence that, with the beginning of the second period in late 2003, China 
extended its diplomatic initiative to EU member states other than France, an approach that 
was maintained also through the following period, i.e. until the arms embargo virtually 
disappeared from the China-EU agenda in mid-2005.78 China consciously targeted member 
states in all possible venues, including in European capitals and in Beijing, and at all levels.79 
This method was perceived on the European side as a something like an all-out attack,80 
although the actual intensity of Chinese lobbying was still variable to some extent and 
intensified ahead of events that were considered important, like for example Council 
meetings.81 In fact, despite the rather open dialogue on the matter between China and France 
for more than a year, the sudden emergence of the arms embargo as a top issue of China-EU 
relations was unexpected for many European diplomats.82 Schröder’s open expression of 
support for lifting the arms embargo, in December 2003, i.e. early in the second period, can 
be seen as a first success of this new approach. At t e same time, China was hoping to use the 
influence of prominent supporters, initially France in particular but then also Germany, to 
promote the idea within the EU, and it continued to lobby with them for public backing and 
efforts of persuasion towards their EU partners.83 This is visible for example in the visit of 
Chinese president Hu Jintao to France in late January 2004, during which Chirac publicly 
repeated his strong support for the Chinese request.84 
In May, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s eleven-day visit of Europe provided 
another opportunity to advocate an end of the weapons ban at the level of the top leadership. 
He first visited Germany, the newly converted staunch supporter, before travelling on to 
Belgium, Italy, UK, and Ireland.85 In Germany, Wen broached the topic with Schröder86 and 
obtained a renewed expression of support for the Chinese request, a pledge to vote in this 
sense in the European Council, and a confirmation that work towards a quick solution that 
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would be acceptable for China was under way.87 In Belgium, the second leg of his trip, Wen 
received further assurance. Prime Minister Verhofstadt clearly stated that Belgium was in 
favour of lifting the ban, adding, however, that in this context it would be important for China 
to ratify the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to intensive the political dialogue 
with the EU, especially in its human rights dimensio , a link immediately rejected by the 
Chinese premier.88 Wen’s third stop, Italy, sticks out in that the arms embargo was not topic 
of any public statements. This may be related to an intensive yet inconclusive debate on the 
issue. The previous Italian government had wanted to end the embargo,89 and as the holder of 
the Council presidency Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi had been present when Prodi made 
his favourable statement in Beijing in October 2003. Yet during the Brussels European 
Council in mid-December, Berlusconi only stated that a decision should be expected at the 
earliest in May 2004, without expressing his governme t’s position on the matter.90 Shortly 
thereafter, Roberto Antonione, a high official in the foreign ministry, said that Italy was 
opposed to a lifting.91 Just about one year later, though, Italian President Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi openly articulated Italy’s strong support for the Chinese position.92 These evolutions 
would suggest that the issue was on the agenda for closed-door talks during Wen’s visit to 
Italy. In his last two destinations, the UK and Ireland, Wen did not achieve any immediate 
public support for a lifting either. However, in London he publicly repeated the Chinese 
request,93 and, according to a leak from the Chinese side, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
sent positive signals, possibly as a consequence of onsultations with the French leadership a 
few days before.94 In Ireland, no public comments were given due to time constraints, but an 
official statement listed the arms embargo as a topic f discussion.95 But the Chinese guest did 
not obtain an endorsement of Beijing’s position. 
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Throughout this second period, aside from lobbying with EU member states, the 
Chinese initiative for removing the ban on military sales included a targeting of EU 
institutions, especially the Commission. This was fir t visible when the matter was raised in 
discussions with Prodi during the EU-China summit of October 2003. A few months later, in 
March 2004, Mr. Zhang Yesui, Chinese Vice Foreign Mi ister in charge of Western Europe, 
visited Brussels and broached on the arms embargo question both with external relations 
commissioner Chris Patten and with Solana.96 Then in April, the embargo came up as Prodi 
was visiting Beijing, apparently in the context of a larger charm offensive during which Prodi 
was given “the red carpet treatment in Beijing – a welcome not always afforded to the 
president of the EU's executive arm.”97 Finally in May, Wen Jiabao’s tour d’Europe also 
included a stay in Brussels and a meeting with Prodi. Confronted once again with the question 
of lifting the arms embargo, Prodi limited his comments to stating that the matter was being 
discussed by the member states.98 
 
(iii) An Intra-EU Process of Convergence 
Aside from direct Chinese pressure on various European actors, there was also an intra-
EU dynamic on the question of lifting the weapons ban. In general, in late 2003 most actors 
within the EU seemed rather well disposed towards China, given a promising evolution of the 
relations with China over the previous years.99 This impression is confirmed by the decision 
of the European Council to have the arms embargo re-examined. Yet beyond this general 
attitude, positions of individual governments on the question of lifting were far apart at that 
time. For France and Germany the embargo was outdated and to be lifted unconditionally, 
whereas Italy voted for a review in the European Council but, as noted above, expressed 
strong reservations. And while Swedish Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds commented on the 
European Council vote that “a compromise has been made that we will examine the matter 
and have a discussion on the issue but in no way at this stage decide on it”, Danish Foreign 
Minister Per Stig Moeller reportedly said it was necessary to review the matter as rules on 
arms embargos had changed since 1989.100 At the same time, however, the long-standing 
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French support for China’s request and the new German stance in favour of a lifting 
combined to create a strong momentum among EU member stat s to accept the issue on the 
EU agenda, to position themselves and to develop a common approach with a positive 
perspective for China. Among the proponents of a lifting, this resulted in increasingly firm 
expressions of their views. The French government is an example of this, as it further stepped 
up its public advocacy for a policy shift. In the context of Hu Jintao’s visit to France, Hervé 
Ladsous, spokesman of the French foreign ministry, noted that in the EU no-one was “really 
opposed” to re-examining the arms embargo, and that “[w]hen you look at the countries 
subject to similar EU sanctions, you will surely feel that China should not be on the list.”101 
French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said that more discussion was needed but that 
a decision should be made at the next European Council meeting in March.102 As to the 
sceptics, they continued to voice concerns but appeared to be growing more open about an 
eventual lifting and less demanding with regard to preconditions. For instance, the 
Netherlands seemed to be shifting its policy stance rather abruptly. They had been for some 
time, along with the Scandinavians, among those favouring a continuation of the arms 
embargo, and in late January 2004 a Dutch diplomat was reported as saying that while the 
Netherlands were ready to discuss the issue, they thought it was not yet the right time for a 
lifting.103 But just about one week later the Dutch government an ounced that it favoured a 
lifting of the ban.104 In terms of common policies at the EU level, this new dynamic helped 
bring about a GAERC decision in late January 2004, to charge both the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and Coreper with a review of the arms embargo.105 From then on, the bulk 
of substantive work was performed in the PSC, with support of the EU’s Working Party on 
Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) and, marginally, of COASIE, the committee on policy 
towards Asia.106 
The dynamic of converging positions also included rpresentatives of EU institutions. 
At the beginning of the second period, the commissioners in particular were very vocal on the 
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issue, although not very much in unison. Then, over the following months, positions 
converged somewhat. At the same time, they also seemed to become more aware of the limits 
of the Commission formal competences and accordingly grew more cautious in their public 
statements. At the EU-China summit in October 2003, Prodi had expressed support for 
working towards a lifting of the arms embargo. However, little more than a month later, in 
early December, Relex Commissioner Chris Patten was quick to rebut explicitly Schröder’s 
very similar advance. His spokeswoman Emma Udwin was quoted as saying, first, that China 
would have to improve its human rights record before ne could even think of a lifting and, 
second, that decisions in the EU were not taken by a single member state.107 Shortly after 
these comments, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy reacted by recalling Prodi’s positive 
statement during the summit, and by emphasising the EU’s readiness to examine the 
embargo.108 Over the following weeks, Patten’s viewpoint seemed to be softening. In January 
2004, the same spokeswoman said that the mood in member state capitals was shifting more 
in favour of a lifting, and she added that there was “clear pressure from China.”109 Patten 
himself was quoted on the arms embargo issue as acknowledging the enormous changes in 
China since 1989, all the while continuing to insist that despite some progress the human 
rights situation in China was not yet satisfying.110 At the same time his boss Prodi opined that 
it was high time to reconsider the situation and get rid of the arms ban.111 Positions continued 
to converge, and on different occasions in March and April, both Patten and Prodi told their 
respective Chinese counterparts that assurances on human rights would be helpful in getting 
the embargo lifted.112 Then by the time of Wen Jiabao’s Europe trip in May 2004, as already 
noted above, Prodi refrained from any strong comment and referred to the ongoing discussion 
among member states.113 
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Outside the Commission, Solana commented on Schröder’s statement of early 
December 2003 with cautioning remarks that “the entir  EU” had to decide on the issue and 
that there were still concerns about human rights.114 However, for most of the period, he kept 
a low profile, a stance he largely maintained until the question of lifting the arms embargo 
disappeared from China-EU diplomatic agenda. The emrging strong divisions among EU 
member challenged his own understanding of his roleas a mediator and put him in an 
uncomfortable position.115 This must have been noted by the Chinese side, as there are signs 
that during his visit to Brussels Wen Jiabao did not approach Solana on the arms embargo 
issue.116 
 
(iv) China Focuses on Member States 
The beginning of the third period of Chinese efforts to get the EU to lift its arms 
embargo is hard to specify. Over late spring and summer 2004 China seemed to reduce 
significantly, or even phase out, its efforts towards EU institutions and focus on member 
states. This approach was then maintained until mid-2005 when the issue was dropped. After 
the Commission had progressively lowered its profile on this matter in the first months of 
2004, and with Solana keeping his restraint, there were no more signs of important initiatives 
on the arms embargo towards these targets. Then in mid-2004, a new Chinese initiative 
towards member states started to gain momentum, namely the sending of special presidential 
envoys. 
This change in China’s approach to the EU can be seen in part as a reaction to the 
limited success of previous efforts. In spring 2004, it had become obvious that, despite 
intensive Chinese lobbying and some intra-EU convergence of positions, disagreement on 
how to handle the issue persisted among EU member stat s and blocked progress. Instead of 
having a final decision on the question in March, as announced by de Villepin in January, the 
GAERC in April simply noted that “a solution for the matter had to be found which was in 
line with the current situation in China, the increasingly close bilateral relations and the EU’s 
intention to develop a strategic partnership with China”, added that “the issue required further 
discussion” with regard to human rights in China and the application of the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports, and requested Coreper and the PSC “to take the discussion 
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forward.”117 In the same vein, the Brussels European Council of June 2004 stated that “[t]he 
European Council invites the Council to continue its consideration of the arms embargo in the 
context of the EU’s overall relations with China.”118 
China sent at least two special presidential envoys t  EU member states, both of them 
former ambassadors to EU member states and deeply involved in foreign policy making as 
advisors to the top leadership.119 Neither from interviews, nor from available official 
documents or media reports is it possible to establi h the dates and destinations of their 
missions with precision. Reconstructing from approximate indications on timing in various 
interviews and considering the general evolution of the issue, it is likely that they took place 
between late summer 2004 and spring 2005.120 Mei Zhaorong, ambassador to Germany from 
1988 to 1997, was sent to Germany, Portugal, and several Nordic countries, while Wu 
Jianmin, Chinese ambassador to France from 1998 to 2003, visited France, Spain, and Italy, 
and possibly other countries.121 It is not entirely clear whether their travels also included a 
visit to Brussels. Two interviewees firmly deny it.122 Two others confirmed it, although they 
were not completely certain and contradicted each other as to who of the two ambassadors 
they thought went there.123 Still, the focus on EU member states instead of EU institution is 
obvious, and even more so, the Chinese hope to be able to count on the support of “key 
member states”124 and their influence on the debate within the EU. Mei and Wu had been 
consciously selected because of their former positions and their network of highly placed 
contacts.125 It is telling indeed that, among the many former amb ssadors to EU member 
states currently involved in foreign policy making in Beijing, those chosen had been in 
Germany and France respectively. 
The concrete impact of these missions is hard to assess. Chinese foreign policy makers 
consider the special presidential envoys as a key element of their lobbying strategy towards 
the EU, with the advantage of direct access to the top leadership in EU member states.126 By 
contrast, on the European side the visits are attribu ed much less significance. One 
                                                
117 2577th Council meeting, external relations, 26-27 April 2004, Press release 8567/04 (Presse 116), p.10. 
118 Brussels European Council, 17-18 June 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 10679/2/04, par.77. 
119 Interview China 7, Beijing, Q3 2007 
120 Interview China 7, Beijing, Q3 2007; Interview China 8, Beijing, Q3 2007; Interview China 10, Brussel, Q1 
2008; Interview EU 33, Brussels, Q1 2008. 
121 Interview China 7, Beijing, Q3 2007; Interview EU 28, London, Q1 2008. 
122 Interview China 10, Brussels, Q1 2008 and Interview EU 33, Brussels, Q1 2008. 
123 Interview China 8, Beijing, Q3 2008 and Interview EU 28, London, Q1 2008. 
124 Interview China 8, Beijing, Q3 2008. 
125 Interview China 7, Beijing, Q3 2007. 
126 Interview China 7, Beijing, Q3 2007, Interview China 8, Beijing, Q3 2007. 
 187
interviewee called them a “waste of time.”127 Another acknowledged that the visits did take 
place but denied any link to the arms embargo issue.128 
Aside from the special envoys, China continued to press for a lifting of the arms 
embargo through many other channels of interaction with the EU.129 At the EU level, instead 
of Brussels-based bureaucracies, efforts now concentrat d on the Council, especially on 
getting the issue on the agenda of Council meetings. Otherwise the question was raised with 
EU member states during bilateral meetings, by Chinese embassies in Europe and towards 
European embassies in China. Lastly, meetings with representatives of the EU and its member 
states on the margin of multilateral events, like for example the UN General Assembly or the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) were used to keep 
pushing towards a lifting. Visits to the EU by members of the Chinese leadership, reportedly 
about ten in 2004,130 indicate a certain effort to cultivate also some of th se member states 
that are more critical of an end of the weapons ban. In November 2004 Hu Jintao made a 
short visit to Portugal, the leadership of which had not yet publicly committed itself to any 
specific position, and he obtained the assurance from Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro 
Santana Lopes that Portugal would not oppose a lifting when the question was debated the 
next time by the EU.131 A few days later, Chinese Vice-Prime Minister Huang Ju visited 
Luxemburg and Ireland, two other countries that hadso far not publicly stated their support 
for the Chinese request.132 In December, when Wen Jiabao attended the 7th EU-China summit 
in the Netherlands, the first involving the new Barroso Commission, the issue was brought up 
yet again.133 In addition, it was regularly discussed during visits from the EU to China, 
including for example Chirac in early October 2004, Schröder and Ciampi in December, and 
Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern in January 2005.134 
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Within the EU, the third period sees a further convergence of positions, more in favour 
of an eventual lifting. By November this had gone far enough to allow for the GAERC to 
conclude that “the EU was ready to give a positive signal to China”, a rather upbeat statement 
compared to comments earlier that year, although it continued that “a number of concerns 
must be addressed, including in the field of human rights, and work must continue on 
strengthening the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports.”135 Ahead of the 7th EU-China 
summit in early December 2004 comments on the EU side got more concrete on the question 
of timing. Bernard Bot, Foreign Minister of the Dutch Council presidency, expressed the hope 
for a lifting during 2005, while Solana said that he oped the arms embargo might be lifted at 
the European Council meeting in March 2005.136 The summit’s Joint Statement stopped short 
of giving any date, but it read that “[t]he EU side confirmed its political will to continue to 
work towards lifting the embargo” while “[t]he Chinese side welcomed the positive 
signal.”137 The most concrete, and for the Chinese side most pr mising, statement by the EU 
then came in the Presidency Conclusions after the Brussels European Council in mid-
December 2004 which implied that a lifting could be expected during the first presidency of 
2005. The conclusions stated that “[t]he European Council reaffirmed the political will to 
continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo” and “invited the next Presidency to 
finalise the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision.”138 
 
(v) A Dissenting Voice of America 
What is noteworthy about the momentum of convergence within the EU towards 
eventual lifting of the weapons ban is that it was maintained despite increasingly sharp 
criticism and even outright threats from the US. In fact, the US had first protested against EU 
considerations about ending the embargo in January 2004 and kept voicing its concerns 
throughout the year.139 In February and March 2005 the US Congress got involved as the 
House of Representatives approved by a large majority a non-binding resolution condemning 
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the EU efforts, and several Senate hearings were held on the issue.140 The American 
objections were forcefully conveyed to EU leaders during three high-level visits, first 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in February, then lat r that month President George W. 
Bush himself, followed in April by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick.141 The US’s 
objections were based on a variety of points, most importantly that lifting would send the 
wrong sign to China given its weak human rights reco d and its resistance to democratic 
reforms; that it would accelerate China’s military modernisation and create a threat for 
Taiwan and other neighbours; that this might directly endanger US troops in Asia; and that 
China has had a bad track record on weapons proliferation.142 These criticisms were 
underlined by open threats to restrict technology transfers between the US and Europe.143 
Some of these points had already come up in the intra-EU debate on whether or not the 
arms embargo should be lifted. Especially European p rliaments and some of the more 
sceptical member states had been emphasising the human rights situation in China, and the 
EU had repeatedly declared that it expected China to t ke an initiative in this field, e.g. by 
committing itself to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which it 
had signed in October 1998.144 This was never formulated as an explicit conditionality, but it 
was emphasised that some progress on human rights would facilitate the lifting by the EU.145 
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Aside from waiting for human rights initiatives from the Chinese side, in the intra-EU debate 
the main argument in favour of a lifting was that, even without the embargo, exports to China, 
like to all other destinations, would still be subject to controls based on the EU’s Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports from 1998.146 This code was supposed to be revised and 
strengthened, as well as completed with a “‘tool box’ r set of measures providing for 
increased sharing of information and transparency, to be applied by Member States for a 
specific period with respect to arms exports to a previously embargoed destination.”147 
In reaction to both scepticism within the EU and opp sition from the US, the Brussels 
European Council of December 2004 added to its favourable conclusions on the prospect of 
getting the arms embargo lifted that 
“the result of any decision should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member States to 
China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms. In this regard the European Council recalled 
the importance of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on arms exports, in particular criteria 
regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly 
and allied countries. The European Council also stres ed the importance in this context of the 
early adoption of the revised Code of Conduct and the new instrument on measures pertaining to 
arms exports to post-embargo countries (‘Toolbox’).” 148 
During the first months of 2005, the EU kept up this policy course towards an eventual lifting 
against mounting US pressure. In January EU presidency Luxemburg indicated that the ban 
could be lifted by summer.149 The same month, Ahern said he expected the issue to b  solved 
in the course of the year, a shift from the previously rather reluctant Irish position.150 In 
February, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw avoided th  criticisms by calling the dispute a 
mere “presentational problem.”151 Then, just ahead of Bush’s visit a source from the
Lithuanian foreign ministry indicated that Lithuani would follow an EU consensus on lifting 
the embargo.152 At about the same time, the Swedish Prime Minister Go an Persson was 
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quoted as saying that the arms embargo had never been efficient and that what was needed 
was a strong Code of Conduct, adding, however, that Sweden had hesitated for a long time 
before following the UK’s shift in favour of a liftng.153 In late February a specialised 
magazine commented that “[t]here’s widespread expectation the European Union will commit 
to lifting the partial embargo during Luxembourg’s EU presidency, partly because the 
following British presidency appeared “eager to avoid a decision on ending the sanctions 
during its watch.”154 
This steadfastness on the part of the EU started to dwindle with the passage of the Anti-
Secession Law by the National People’s Congress in Be jing on 14 March 2005.155 Within a 
few days it became obvious, mostly from unofficial sources in EU institutions and member 
state governments, that this would have a clear negative impact on the prospects for an early 
lifting of the arms embargo, as within the EU it provided a new argument for the sceptics.156 
It also reinforced US criticisms, as experienced painfully by Annalisa Giannella, Solana’s 
personal representative for non-proliferation, who arrived in Washington to defend the EU 
policy – “she was massacred” in the words of one int rviewee.157 At first the public discourse 
in the EU did not change significantly, with French foreign minister Michel Barnier and 
Schröder defending the EU policy and reaffirming their desire to end the weapons ban,158 and 
Luxemburg’s foreign minister Jean Asselborn indicating that, with some progress on human 
rights, a lifting before the end of the presidency was not impossible.159 Signs from the UK 
were more mixed, as vice-prime minister John Prescott tated that he expected the embargo to 
be lifted soon, while Tony Blair put the emphasis on the need to implement a strong Code of 
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Conduct and to ensure that there would not be an increase in arms sales to China.160 China 
continued to raise the issue on various occasions of interaction with the EU, e.g. during Hu 
Jintao’s visit to the UK, Germany and Spain in Novemb r 2005,161 and has been doing so 
until the present.162 However, no progress has been made compared to theJoint Statement of 
the 7th EU-China summit and the Presidency Conclusions from the Brussels European 
Council of December 2004. In fact, the Joint Statement from the 8th EU-China summit simply 
refers to those two documents: 
“Leaders discussed the EU arms embargo. The Chinese side was of the view that lifting the arms 
embargo would be conducive to the sound development of the China-EU comprehensive 
strategic partnership and urged the EU to lift the arms embargo at an early date. The EU side 
reaffirmed its willingness to continue to work towards lifting the embargo on the basis of the 
Joint Statement of the 2004 EU-China Summit and the subsequent European Council 
Conclusions on this subject.”163 
The following summits simply repeated the same phrases, with only very minor 
changes, almost “like a mantra.”164 China does not harbour any great hopes on the issuand 
would only start serious efforts again if there was a very tangible chance of a quick lifting.165 
As to the EU, it seems that it is trying hard not to create any expectations on the Chinese side. 
 
5.3 Explaining China-EU Interaction on the Arms Embargo Issue 
 
Based on this detailed analysis of the evolution of China’s engagement of the EU with 
regard to the arms embargo, the goal of this section will be interpretative. I will look 
subsequently at the three dimensions of my analytic framework and assess to what extent 
the causal mechanisms it proposes can account for the patterns of China-EU transnational 
bureaucratic interaction on the arms embargo. 
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5.3.1 Chinese Foreign-Policy Making and the Arms Embargo 
 
The increasing importance Chinese policy makers attached to the arms embargo during 
the last years of President Jiang Zemin can be explained, at least in part, with an internal 
process on the Chinese side. The bombing by NATO forces of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade triggered a debate on strategy during the year 1999 within the Chinese foreign 
affairs community, in the large sense, i.e. also including academics and intellectuals. The 
result was that the international environment was not as peaceful as concluded during 
previous such debates and that a new emphasis on military modernisation was needed.166 This 
implies that the question of military procurement, and as a result of the EU’s arms embargo, 
imposed itself as a key issue of Chinese foreign policy.  
The targeting of a member state initially, i.e. France from late 2002 to late 2003, is also 
partly explainable with reference to the Chinese policy process. From this perspective, the 
question of the arms embargo was an issue for the foreign ministry and the top leadership. 
Both of them had, at this time, only limited diplomatic experience with EU institutions, and 
the initiative to bring the issue out on the agenda did come from the very top of China’s 
leadership.167 At working level there was certainly some familiarty, yet the horizontal 
divisions between different hierarchical levels, here the officials directly involved with EU 
reality and the leadership were too deep. Also this wa  before the push in the building up of 
EU-specific expertise when the Chinese mission to the EU in Brussels was separated from the 
embassy to Belgium in 2005, with more than double the personnel. On the other hand, the 
relations with the governments of member states and their foreign ministries were well 
established. 
Why did the Chinese strategy change in late 2003? A key factor lies within the Chinese 
foreign policy establishment. The arrival of George W. Bush at the US presidency, the 
tougher China policy of the new administration, and, most importantly, the beginning of the 
war in Iraq in March 2003, had contributed to yet another debate and a rethinking in the 
Chinese foreign policy establishment concerning China’s international strategy in general and 
its relations with the EU in particular.168 To Chinese foreign-policy makers it appeared (a) 
that a more unilateralist US needed balancing and (b) that in face of the transatlantic rift over 
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Iraq and the clear anti-war policies by the two “engines” of European integration, France and 
Germany, the EU seemed the ideal partner for such a strategy. In addition, since the mid-
1990s Chinese ties with the EU had been improving constantly. This rethinking also included 
the realisation that the arms embargo was an EU issue, as witnessed by its inclusion in 
China’s EU Policy Paper of October 2003, and that it needed to be solved in cooperation with 
the entire EU. 
The most remarkable feature of the second period is the explicit targeting of leaders of 
EU institutions, like Prodi, Patten and Solana. This can again be related to the divisions in the 
Chinese foreign policy process and limited understanding of EU-related issues among the top 
leadership who led on this issue. Moreover, their snior foreign-policy advisors in charge of 
this issue largely had a MFA background, i.e. with s ronger experience on the side of the 
member states than EU institutions. The MOFCOM, by contrast, had built up considerable 
expertise on the EU institutions as it had been in charge of the relationship with the EC in the 
more than 20 years since the first trade agreement had been signed in 1978. Yet, here the 
vertical divisions between different bureaucracies were too deep to include expertise from 
MOFCOM. 
The third period has been identified as being marked by a slow turn in the Chinese 
strategy away from EU institutions and towards membr states. This can be explained to a 
large extent by the slow inner workings of Chinese foreign-policy making, mostly due to 
horizontal divisions. In fact, the limited impact of the strategy aimed at EU institutions and 
even the growing silence from the Commission clearly was noticed by working level staff in 
the Chinese MFA. As a result the new strategy, mostly based on the sending of “special 
envoys” was elaborated by the Chinese MFA and brought to the attention of the top 
leadership by the bias of a group of top advisers with strong ties to the MFA.169 Despite this 
relatively direct link, which avoids the many layers of hierarchy between MFA working level 
and top leadership, it took some time to catch the att ntion of leaders and get their approval 
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5.3.2 EU Reactions to China’s Push for a Lifting 
 
From the perspective of the EU’s response, it seems that the Chinese approach in the 
first period, i.e. exclusive targeting of France, matched both formal institutional rules and 
informal structures in interest. This means that the arms embargo was (and is) not a 
Community issue, i.e. with a strong role for member state governments and very limited 
influence of the Commission. In terms of interests, a survey of press coverage of the issue 
during this whole first period suggests that no other EU government had any interest in 
picking up this issue. In fact, in the non-French press the question of the arms embargo was 
hardly mentioned at all prior to Schröder’s pronouncements and the European Council vote of 
December 2003.  
The EU’s response to this Chinese approach changed during the second period. 
Obviously in talking to Commissioners on the arms embargo there was a mismatch with the 
formal distribution of competences within the EU. Yet this is a case where personalities do 
matter as explanatory variables. In fact, the Prodi Commission was more vocal than both its 
predecessor and it successor. This concerned first o  all Prodi himself, but also Patten. This 
active approach to CFSP matters allowed the Commission to be initially rather responsive to 
the Chinese advances. The evident correlation between an intensifying debate among member 
states on the issue and the growing restraint on the part of the Commissioners indicates that, 
in light of a mismatch with formal competences and  strong interest in the issue on the side 
of member states, the Commission was forced to take a lower profile. 
The EU response to the shift in China’s strategy back member states, i.e. when special 
envoys were sent in the third period, was largely affirmative. The new Chinese approach 
matched formal competences. With regard to interests, it neglected the smaller member states, 
counting a lot on the support of France and Germany for intra-EU lobbying. Here the Chinese 
MFA had clearly underestimated the alienation of the smaller member states, especially those 
who had been sceptical from the outset because of human rights issues. Although no explicit 
“carrots or sticks” had been used by the Chinese,170 there was a clear sensation that a small 
member state could not oppose itself if it did not want to get into trouble.171 With regard to 
the Commission, the new Chinese focus on member states was in line with the lower profile 
taken by the incoming Barroso Commission on foreign policy. 
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The feeling of alienation among some of the smaller m mber states was exacerbated by 
Chinese passage of the Anti-Secession Law, a clear sign for the sceptics in the EU that China 
was not going to make any compromise on the fields that they linked to the arms embargo, 
namely human rights and cross-strait relations. Onecan say that the passage of this bill in 
Beijing ended the uneasy assent of the sceptics and brought out the difficulties in interaction 
related to very different perceptions of the issue. 
 
5.3.3 Independent Dynamics of Bureaucratic Interaction 
 
The interactive dimension can explain many details that have escaped explanatory 
efforts within the first two process of the analytical framework. First of all, why did the arms 
embargo issue surface in precisely in 2002 and why towards the French leadership rather than 
any other EU entities? Certainly the issue had been raised informally already before that. 
Overall the signs of constantly improving personal relations between Jiang Zemin and 
Jacques Chirac since 1999 suggest that the French president was rather well disposed towards 
this Chinese request. In fact, in October 1999, during a visit to France Jiang was invited to 
Chirac’s private residence, a signal that did not go unnoticed in the press.172 About a year 
later, Chirac was accorded the honour of an invitation o Jiang’s hometown Yangzhou in the 
context of his visit to China, in the function of EU president, for the fourth EU-China 
summit.173 
This means personal relations appear to play a crucial role. The reason why, from the 
new prioritisation of military modernisation and the warming of relations with Chirac, it took 
another three years before the issue was openly raised during an official encounter in 2002 is 
related to the French government: the relations betwe n Chinese leaders and the French Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin and his Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, both in the office since June 
1997, were rather cool.174 This would suggest that the arrival of Jean-Pierre Raffarin and 
Dominique de Villepin in May 2002 was considered by the Chinese as a chance finally to 
launch the issue openly. 
Perceptions also played a role in the choice to targe  France initially. In China, France 
was perceived as a leading force in reacting strongly to the Tianmen repression in 1989 and 
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therefore in bringing about the arms embargo. Therefore it seemed to be a natural strategy to 
start the open push towards a lifting with France.175 
Similarly, the inclusion of the Commission as a target in the second period is related to 
perceptions. In fact, for long Chinese leaders and alysts have tended to overestimate 
European unity.176 This is to say that to some extent the focus on leaders of EU institutions 
could be described as “wishful thinking” – strengthened of course by the activist approach the 
Prodi Commission adopted towards CFSP matters.177 One could say Chinese perceptions of 
the Commission matched the self-perceptions of the Prodi Commission. The contestation by 
the member states then forced the Commission to reconsider its self-perception. 
In terms of issue perceptions, the second period also presents the first confusions with 
regard to the nature of the issue: Is it purely symbolic? Is it strategic? Is it related to human 
rights? At this point there were not yet clear-cut positions but it foreshadowed the later debate 
that erupted especially with the intervention of the US. 
In the third period, the focus of Chinese foreign-policy makers on the foreign ministries 
of France and Germany meant that the three actors who shared the same perception of the 
issue interacted directly. For all three the lifting of the arms embargo was a largely symbolic 
step, it was to be granted with no conditions and no price attached and it was not 
fundamentally linked to the human rights or the Taiwan questions. By avoiding intensive 
interaction with actors who had very different issue perceptions, China chose to leave other 
member states to efforts of persuasion by France and Germany, i.e. to intra-EU politics. 
The “special envoy” strategy of the third period also built explicitly on the strong 
personal ties established by ambassadors, and usually m intained even after the end of the 
term of office. This strategy was successful to some extent. After all the arms embargo was 
almost lifted. However, the alienation of smaller EU members with a strong human rights 
tradition was exacerbated by yet another perception pr blem, namely the growing sense of 
entitlement on the Chinese side. This means while in the second period the issue had 
maintained a political dimension, in that there was talk about the need for a positive gesture 
on human rights on the part of China, during the third period, from the Chinese side it had 
turned almost purely symbolic, and for China lifting the embargo became a gesture overdue 
by the EU. 
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This chapter has introduced the significance of thearms embargo to China, 
reconstructed a detailed account of what happened ad attempted to explain the evolution 
based on the general theoretical framework introduce  in chapter II. The analysis confirms 
that the dimensions and the explanatory factors matter nd can account to a large extent for 
the changing patterns of China-EU interaction. Changes in Chinese strategies can be related to 
the improved understanding of the EU by the Chinese MFA. Lags between the obvious 
problems with one strategy and the implementation of a new one can be attributed to either 
vertical or horizontal divisions within the Chinese administration. Formal and informal 
patterns in EU foreign policy process did constrain the Chinese approaches several times, 
especially when it concerned an involvement of the Commission on an issue that was 
perceived as member state “turf”. Lastly, with regard to the direct interactive dimension of the 
framework both previously established transgovernmental relations and the question of 
matches and mismatches of perceptions can contribute to the understanding of China-EU 
bureaucratic interaction. 
Also, the indirect impact of the international environment is again visible. An important 
background factor accounting for the end of the China-EU discussion on the lifting of the 
arms embargo is the rising US protest, also channelli g to its EU partners the critical voices 
of its allies in East Asia, Taiwan and Japan. Yet while the US did manage to influence the 
preferences of some of the directly involved bureaucr tic agents, it could not match the 
impact of intra-EU lobbying for a lifting by France and Germany. This only changed with the 









Conclusion: Explaining China-EU Bureaucratic Interaction 
 
 
This study started out from the question of how outsiders engage the EU with a 
threefold goal. First, it wanted to explore the reverse side of the findings on the EU’s growing 
impact in international affairs,1 namely how difficult it is to approach the intricate EU 
structures from the outside. Second, it suggested th  need to inquire into the concrete 
challenges this implies for the decision-making process in a third agent. Picking China meant 
insights into how the Chinese policy-makers structures manage relations with a complex 
agent like the EU. Third, the study wanted to contribu e more generally to the analysis of 
bureaucratic interaction between international agents, a topic under-researched so far by 
theorists of international relations. 
This concluding chapter will try to pick up these threads set out at the beginning of the 
study, and recapitulate the insights of the application of the analytical framework to empirical 
cases has been able to create. The following sections will therefore, first, discuss the findings 
on the EU in international affairs, second, summarise the results on Chinese decision-making 
processes vis-à-vis the challenge of engaging the EU, and, third, at a more theoretical level, 
draw conclusions on bureaucratic interaction in general and on the usefulness of the proposed 
analytical framework. 
 
6.1 Engaging the EU: Challenges for Outsiders 
 
The case studies in the precious chapters have largly followed the structure of the 
framework introduced in chapter II. From the various dimensions of the framework and the 
related discussions of empirical evidence, the goalis now to select the specific points that tell 
something about the “approachability” of the EU with its current structure.  
Overall it appears that the EU is tough to engage. The challenge is to find the right 
counterparts at the right time, not so much from the point of view of formal competences but 
rather in view of an effective strategy that also considers interests and de facto involvement of 
not formally competent actors. The de jure structure of EU policy making is already very 
complicated, yet it is not impossible for outsiders to gain a good grasp of who deals with what 
                                                
1 Bretherton and Vogler 1999 and 2006, Ginsberg 2001. 
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and of the procedures that link the various actors. What is very difficult, though, almost 
impossible for outsiders, is to understand the preferences and perceptions of EU actors as 
conditioned by intra-EU politics. 
 
(i) Evidence from MES: Wrong Timing and Victim to Intra-EU Competition 
In the case of China’s quest for market economy statu  (MES), Chinese policy makers 
initially followed the logic of formal competence, not knowing that this could not lead 
anywhere since the political logic of EU politics forces the Commission to stick to technical 
matters rules body on trade policy unless it has a negotiating mandate. When in light of 
lacking progress, China chose a more political approach, including most notably EU member 
states, i.e. entities who are involved in trade policy only through qualified majority voting in 
the Council. Yet the Chinese initiatives were not immediately and explicitly redirected to the 
competent authority, as member states had an obvious interest in declaring their support for 
MES – although this meant virtually nothing. Given competition among member states for 
China business, the slow progress on MES by the formally competent authority, and a fear of 
negative repercussions from China, each member state h d strong incentives to use any 
chance of pleasing China, rather than admitting that its individual position is rather 
meaningless. Once the initial refusal of the Commission to grant MES had clarified the 
situation a shift in preferences among more protectionist member states, even further reduced 
the freedom of action for the formally competent body to broker a deal with China. It can be 
argued that more intensive pressure earlier on, when MES was still a low priority for most 
member states, and an immediate push for a political deal rather than technical 
reconsideration, might have brought China closer to its goal. 
 
(ii) Evidence from the Arms Embargo: Erratic Targeting of EU Bureaucratic Agents 
In the arms embargo case, China started from the members – in conformity with formal 
competence which has not been transferred to EU level in the field of security policy. The 
focus, all through the lobbying process, on the big member states also reflects a sound grasp 
of the key actors most interested in the issue, although it could be argued that more efforts to 
defuse worries in the more sceptical member states could have helped the issue advance more 
quickly. Nevertheless, through its efforts towards the large member states, in particular the 
ardent advocates of a lifting France and Germany, ad by relying on their intra-EU lobbying, 
China managed to get very close to a lifting. Yet it also appears to have made some erratic 
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moves, resulting from apparent confusion with European governance structure. When 
approaching the Commission, a marginal actor in this policy field, Chinese policy makers did 
not receive a polite comment redirecting them to the Council Secretariat and member states. 
Rather there was a vocal and promising reaction, no doubt because the Commission at that 
time was promoting higher EU level ambitions in the security policy field than formally 
determined in the treaties.2 
In both cases, erratic engagement efforts towards EU bureaucratic actors resulted from 
misunderstandings interests and motivations of actors r oted within the logic of intra-EU 
policy making, although, in principle, the formal distribution of competences seems to have 
been fairly well understood. This points to a serious default in the EU’s institutional structure. 
It may be convenient for individual bureaucratic actors to profit from such misunderstandings 
in order to promote their own interests. For the EU as a whole the fact that outsiders may 
easily get confused about whom to talk to on which topic, even in the course of an ongoing 
engagement, is detrimental to its further emergence as an active player among the major 
agents of the international stage. 
 
6.2 China’s Foreign Policy Apparatus and Complex Policy Targets 
 
What do the analytical framework and the cases tell us about the Chinese foreign policy 
process? First, it appears that vertical or functioal divisions within the foreign policy 
structure may impede the continuous development of pr cesses of bureaucratic interaction 
initiated by China. In the case of MES, it was visible that the moving up on the diplomatic 
agenda also implied the involvement of MFA-related officials in addition to those from the 
MOFCOM who had been in charge before. The result was a clear break with the previous 
strategy of approaching the EU. The point is not tha either of the two ministries would have a 
better or worse strategy. It is rather that the sudden shift demonstrates a lack of structured 
cooperation that could bring out synergies. An approach like the alternative strategy for MES 
outlined in the previous section, could only be the result of such a closer cooperation. In fact, 
Chinese interviewees independently confirmed that te s ructure of the Chinese foreign-policy 
                                                
2 See Kurpas, Grøn, Kaczyński 2008. 
 
 202
process does not allow for elaborate strategies on complex issues that go beyond the purview 
of a single ministry, like for example the diplomatic approach of the EU.3 
Second, there are important horizontal divisions in China that make coordination 
between the elaboration of options, the actual decision, and implementation difficult. In the 
case of the arms embargo, there was a decision from the leadership to lift it to the top of the 
agenda,4 short-circuiting the usual MFA channels through which policy options are 
developed. The result was a diplomatic approach that was perceived negatively as a “blanket 
attack” on the EU side,5 and that included the erratic engagement of the Commission on an 
issue on which it has virtually nothing to say. Only with a delay of more than a year a new 
strategy could be elaborated by the Europe staff of the MFA and move up to the top 
leadership for approval. It was based on the idea of special presidential envoys to EU capitals, 
and reflected the degree of familiarity with EU processes at the working level of MFA.6 
Chinese officials at working level do indeed display an amazing degree of familiarity with the 
intricacies of EU decision-making, a situation at least partially related on the very direct and 
open relations between Chinese diplomats and their European counterparts.7 
Horizontal divisions, i.e. between the different levels of authority in the Chinese 
foreign-policy process, may also be visible in the decision to make MES a top issue. In fact, it 
is questionable whether the changes in the approach f the EU, and the erratic engagement of 
member states, were carefully prepared by working level officials familiar with EU structures. 
It may very well be a similar case as for the arms e bargo, where a decision from the top 
came too suddenly to allow for due preparation. It should be added that, in principle, the 
MOFCOM has a more direct link to the central leadership than the MFA, since its former 
minister, Ms. Wu Yi, is Vice-Premier and member of the Politburo. For the MFA the link 




                                                
3, Interview China 4, Beijing Q2 2007, Interview China 8, Beijing Q3 2007, Interview China 9, Beijing Q3 2007. 
4 Interview China 8, Beijing Q3 2007. 
5 Interview EU 28, London Q1 2008. 
6 Interview China 9, Beijing Q3 2007. 
7 This situation is the result of constant improvement of the relations over the past decade; see Interview EU 1, 
Berlin, Q1 2007, Interview EU 2, Berlin, Q1 2007, Interview EU 7, Brussels, Q1 2007, Interview EU 9, Brussels 
Q1 2007. 
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6.3 Analysing Bureaucratic Interaction: Assessment of a New Framework 
 
With regard to a general assessment and explanation of transnational bureaucratic 
interaction, this study cannot provide any definite answer. In fact, far more empirical research 
would be needed to reach the level of detail aimed at and allowed for by the analytical 
framework. Yet a few important findings can already be pointed out. First of all, transnational 
bureaucratic interaction between international agents is a key phenomenon of international 
relations that can be closely linked to the substantial outcomes of diplomacy and foreign 
policy. Second, the proposed analytical framework appe rs to be a valid guide for a thorough 
explanatory effort on transnational bureaucratic interaction. 
Here a few more detailed observations may be in place. The first two dimensions of the 
framework, namely the development of a policy and related approach in one agent and the 
reaction to it in the other, are crucial dimensions f the explanation. In the case of China-EU 
relations, changes in the modalities of engagement b tween decision-making units from both 
sides can be related to a large extent to processes in ide the two foreign policy structures. The 
third dimension, independent dynamics of direct burea cratic interaction, also plays an 
important role. It is obvious that previous experienc  of interaction initially guides the 
modalities of the approach. In addition to this, the question of match versus mismatch in 
preferences and perceptions appears to have a decisive impact on the evolution of a pattern of 
interaction and on the chances of reaching specific policy goals. In the cases of MES and 
arms embargo in China-EU relations complex interplays of matching and mismatching 
preferences and perceptions have contributed to the eventual failure of both initiatives. 
Personal ties, another element of this dimension of the ramework, also contributed to shaping 
the interaction to a certain degree. For example, th  initiative to send former ambassadors as 
special envoys relied substantially on networks of personal relations. Also “like-mindedness” 
among officials dealing with similar issues on both sides, e.g. trade, does appear to help create 
personal links that do have an influence on larger patterns of bureaucratic interaction.8 An 
important obstacle to this kind of phenomenon is certainly the rotation of staff at least every 
four to six years, practised in most administrations.9 Still two Chinese interviewees 
emphasised the openness of MOFCOM and the excellent contacts with foreign trade policy 
makers while acknowledging fundamental differences with MFA staff.10 There is also 
                                                
8 Interview EU 9, Brussels Q1 2007. 
9 Interview EU 7, Brussels, Q1 2007, Interview EU 19, Beijing, Q3 2007. 
10 Interview China 1, Beijing Q2 2007, Interview China 4, Beijing, Q3 2007. 
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evidence that the relations do not necessarily stopafter rotation. One interviewee pointed out 
that personal ties between officials from China andthe EU that started while cooperating on a 
specific technical issue were maintained even after th  concerned persons had rotated into 
new positions.11 Another interviewee stated that relations between d cision-making units are 
passed on to successors after one person in charge switches to a new position.12 On the EU 
side it appears that generally the role of personal rel tions is less important in dealings with 
the Commission than in dealings with member state ministries, since the Commission has a 
more functional, technical work culture.13 If we move above the administrative level to the 
top leadership, personal relations between leaders seem to matter a great deal. 
At the same time, undeniably the independent dynamics of bureaucratic interaction do 
not play the same role in relations between China and the EU as, say, between the US and 
Japan or among states within the EU. In fact, in the interviews no instance of 
“transgovernmental coalitions” in Keohane and Nye’s sense could be found. This may be 
related to two reasons. One the one hand, China-EU relations are not yet as dense as relations 
between the US and Canada or Japan in the 1970s, as in the examples used by Keohane and 
Nye.14 On the other hand, intra-EU cooperation and transprency is such that a “ganging up” 
with outsiders against EU colleagues is close to impossible.15 
The indirect impact of the international environment has also been confirmed. Changes 
in the China-EU interaction, both in the MES case and on the arms embargo, could be 
indirectly related to changes in the international system that became apparent after “9/11”. 
The immediate cause of the changes were shifting perce tions and preferences by Chinese 
policy makers on opportunities of relations with the EU. This means that the patterns and 
evolution of bureaucratic interaction depend exclusively on the choices of policy-makers on 
two sides and the quality of the relationship betwen them. Yet not to refer to the indirect 
influence of the international environment would mean to leave out a key factor that 




                                                
11 Interview China 4, Beijing, Q2 2007. 
12 Interview EU 26, Beijing, Q3 2007. 
13 Interview EU 25, Beijing, Q3 2007. 
14 Keohane and Nye 1975, pp.47-48. 
15 Interview EU 7, Brussels, Q1 2007. 
Annex: Description of empirical data 
 
 
19 interviews on the Chinese side (i.e. persons working directly for or consulting the 
Chinese government), with 18 different persons (during one interview two officials were 
present, two officials were interviewed twice); they include: 
- 4 MFA officials (level section director, first secrtary) 
- 1 MOFCOM official (level section director) 
- 1 former official from the General Administration of Customs (level section 
director) 
- 12 policy consultants from: 
o Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
o China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (attached to 
Ministry of State Security) 
o China Institute for International Studies (attached to MFA) 
o Institute of World Development (attached to State Council) 
o Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
o Shanghai Institute for International Studies 
o Shanghai WTO Consultation Centre 
o Beijing University 
o Fudan University 
o Private sector (law firms) 
 
39 interviews the EU side (i.e. persons working directly for or consulting EU bodies or 
member state governments), with 41 different persons (during six interviews two officials 
were present, four officials were interviewed twice); they include: 
- 11 officials from European Commission (level department director, desk officer) 
- 6 officials from Council Secretariat (level department director, section director) 
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- 3 officials from European Parliament (desk officer) 
- 2 British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (level section director) 
- 3 officials from Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (level department director) 
- 1 official from Dutch Ministry of Economics (desk officer) 
- 1 official from Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (level department director) 
- 3 officials from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (level department director, 
section director) 
- 3 officials from German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (level department director) 
- 2 officials from German Ministry of Economics (level department director) 
- 5 policy consultants from: 
o European Institute for Asian Studies 
o German government think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
o Clingendael Institute, The Hague 
o Party group in German parliament 
o SciencesPo Paris. 
- 1 Brussels-based lobbyist (working for industry association). 
 
Preliminary interviews, i.e. with general questions, focussing in particular on 
perceptions, were conducted in Q3 2006. All otherwise interviews were conducted between 
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